We take inspiration from Robert Higgs' 1992 "Myth of Wartime Prosperity" in the Journal of Economic History but shift from the USA to Canada.
Higgs had found that all claims of rising living standards were ill-founded. Most of this was the result of bad statistics, bad understanding of economics and wartime distortions to the meaningfulness of prices to convert quantities into "GDP" as a measure of wellbeing
Why Canada? Because it was in the war in 1939 rather than 1941 (i.e. more time to study) and it was also avoided the physical destruction. We also apply this to WW1. So, do we find the same results as Higgs?
Yes, we do. First, when we correct GDP numbers to concentrate on civilian well-being , we find that there was far smaller increases over the course of the war than the uncorrected figures do. This is true for WW1 as well.
When we correct for the disruptive effects of price controls on the deflator, we find that the war was merely a continuation of the Great Depression.
We also find that investments (private) were not above trends during either war. Similar finding for stock market data (from the TSX)
🧵Now that the book is completed, I want to tell you in this thread why America, between 1870 and 1910, actually was enjoying fast growth in living standards for the bottom 90% -- as fast the improvements for the top 1% & faster than the improvements for the top 10% #econtwitter
The story usually told is that inequality was rising. I dispute that in full. For reasons that historians know and agree but never aggregated as corrections to measurement. There are five big corrections.
1: Inflation was not the same for all. More precisely, deflation (the norm of the era) was not the same for all. The poor saw their cost of living fall more than the rich. This is something I pointed out in 2019 with Peter Lindert. The graph to the right shows the ratio of price indexes for rich and poor. If it falls, the rate of price changes is biased in favor of boosting the poor's real income more than the rich.
This is because the prices of services (consumed by the rich) were driven up by rising productivity of unskilled labor (i.e., wages went up) and the price of staple goods was falling fast.
🧵The United States' weird position on this chart has not as much to do with health care as one would first think.
1. The US has a high rate of car fatality and car ownership. The mortality is concentrated among young people and they heavily reduce life expectancy at birth.
1 (continued): If you shift to life expectancy at 65, which is bound to be less affected by this, the US is not as much of an outlier (see big black dot).
2. The United States, as Emily Oster pointed out, report infant deaths in a far more different manner than elsewhere. This makes America look like it has a higher IMR than elsewhere and IMR has a big effect on Life Expectancy at Birth.
Chen, A., Oster, E., & Williams, H. (2016). Why Is Infant Mortality Higher in the United States Than in Europe?. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 8(2), 89-124.
Thread: Let us be clear -- the work of Gabriel Zucman should be taken with a major/huge grain of salt. Largely because he and his colleagues have been sloppy as hell. I will not mince words here and list the litany of sloppiness #econtwitter
First, you have to understand the following thing: the work of Zucman with Piketty and Saez (henceforth PSZ) builds heavily on a 2003 paper in QJE. I revisited the data, assumptions and methods of that paper in two published papers -- one at Economic Inquiry and the other at EJ
Without that paper, the others dont follow. Its the essential building block and changing stuff to it changes the other papers (on optimal taxation, on progressivity, on wealth inequality)
This paper in NBER (summarized at WAPO) is not saying what many think it says. It says that the state can get more revenues by auditing the rich. It doesnt say the rich cheat more! #econtwitter
Why? I used to be interested in illegal work, sidelines, underground economy etc. I can tell you that cheating at the low-end of the ladder is easier because the sums are smaller and easier to hide.
After all, working a day for $200 cash for a moving company in Montreal (I never did that) when you are low-income is easier to hide than a large sum of unreported income or deliberately inflating expenses etc.
Thread: This is a poor reading of Hayek.
The Use of Knowledge in Society (AER, 1945) does not say what Acemoglu *thinks* it says. Prices are not aggregative devices. They are knowledge-economizing devices that are cheaper than *any* other devices. #econtwitter
The problem starts with fact that there is a great deal of knowledge that is simply tacit and impossible to code. Moreover, the *value* of that tacit knowledge is impossible to code as well. For example, riding a bike is hard to express into a book/code. So is coding its worth
But, the time-price, the price of an instructor, the price of a parent's time etc. are going to express the value of using this knowledge. Prices economize on all the knowledge we need to collect about bikes. They tell us how much knowledge is necessary.