The following is an English summary of an interview with @TarasChmut by @mil_in_ua on 4 MAR for the first anniversary of the πŸ‡·πŸ‡Ί invasion of πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡¦. @magictouch190 kindly translated and prepared this summary which I have edited into this 🧡.
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1. Prior to 24 FEB, a project was approved for @backandalive to perform minor upgrades/repairs to the Tochka-Us of the 19th Missile Brigade (19 RBr). These were expected to enhance the system’s precision and speed of deployment.
1|38
This project was later partially completed. During the invasion, a new idea was also implemented. Specifically, the creation and provision of a new type of command post to the 19 RBr.
2|38
2. Chmut emphasizes, as he has previously, the outsized role the 19 RBr had defending πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡¦ in the initial phase of the invasion.
3. He adds that the 19 RBr later received new equipment, possibly referring to M142 HIMARS or M270 MLRS.
3|38
4. Prior to 24 FEB, @BackAndAlive was working with the 39th Tactical Aviation Brigade (39 BrTa) to enhance their Su-27’s situational awareness. They were designing a low-cost datalink, possibly tablet-based. The project never advanced, however.
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5. Vilkha(-M) was only procured in small quantities prior to the invasion as they were prohibited in the Joint Forces Operation (JFO) by the Minsk Agreements. At the time, funding was prioritized for immediately useful items [Previously reported].
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6. Sapsan/Hrim-2 R&D received no state funding since at least 2014. Two TELs had been produced. One was financed by πŸ‡ΈπŸ‡¦ and the other possibly by KB Pivdenne itself. One TEL plus documentation was delivered to πŸ‡ΈπŸ‡¦. [Previously reported]
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Some components of the missiles had been tested on the ground, but no complete missiles had been assembled or flight tested. The program was to receive state funding beginning in 2022. [Previously reported]
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As of DEC 2021, Chmut estimates it would take at least 3 years to complete development plus additional time to begin serial production. [He estimates 2 years to begin production in other interviews]
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7. Although πŸ‡·πŸ‡Ί was largely unsuccessful in destroying πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡¦β€™s mobile SAM systems, they had some success destroying πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡¦β€™s radar network. Consequently, there is a continued shortage of radars.
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8. Due to a lack of funding prior to the invasion, procurement decisions such as ordering Stugna-P ATGMs with only day sights and only HEAT warheads were made. [Previously reported]
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9. Chmut states, based upon his enlisted service in the πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡¦ Naval Infantry (2015-17), that receiving training from NATO instructors is the most useful training event for personnel who are motivated and want to learn.
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NATO offered a variety of courses on specific skills, leadership, etc. He says that although NATO instructors lack experience in large-scale combat operations, they have deep knowledge of fundamental combat skills that are essential to success.
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He offers positive examples of these skills’ importance:
A) Pair of πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡¦ soldiers defending a trench from a large πŸ‡·πŸ‡Ί assault
B) πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡¦ infantry company with no heavy weaponry beyond RPGs repulsing 10+ πŸ‡·πŸ‡Ί AFVs and multiple companies using good coordination
13|38
He also provides a negative example:
A) πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡¦ battalion abandoning and withdrawing from their positions when faced with what turned out to be a platoon-sized πŸ‡·πŸ‡Ί assault.
He further adds that πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡¦β€™s experiences in this war underscore the importance of NCOs and junior officers.
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10. Chmut speaks highly of πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡¦ military analysts @MBielieskov and @anthony__cba.
11. Spring/Summer 2023 are expected to be critical to the outcome of the war.
12. Many new πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡¦ units are being formed but there is a critical shortage of manpower.
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13. Much aid is being provided by partners, but πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡¦ is still critically short on ammunition and weaponry.
14. πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡¦ losses in manpower are significant.
15. πŸ‡·πŸ‡Ί won’t run out of manpower first nor will they fully run out of weaponry and ammunition.
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16. Without Western aid, πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡¦ victory is impossible, although a πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡¦ defeat would not be guaranteed either.
17. New corps-sized units have been established in addition to new brigades and other elements.
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18. Chmut argues that the best equipment doesn’t guarantee victory as everything gets destroyed eventually. πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡¦ needs equipment that is good enough and can be procured in large quantities.
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19. He provides an anecdote of a πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡¦ fire mission against a πŸ‡·πŸ‡Ί target where 8 M982 Excalibur 155 mm precision-guided shells were fired and all of them either missed or failed to detonate. [Cause unspecified]
19|38
20. Some legacy heavy brigades (72nd, 93rd, …) had additional maneuver battalions beyond the 4 they have on paper. Currently, many of them have as many as 8k-9k personnel, almost division-sized. This impairs C2 as the brigade HQ isn’t setup for this scale.
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They often lack enough heavy weaponry to equip even their original ~4k personnel. Personnel quality also tends to be poor due to significant losses amongst the original core of experienced soldiers since the beginning of the invasion.
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21. Starlink has been mounted on a UAV on at least one occasion.
22. One of πŸ‡·πŸ‡Ί's advantages is its relatively functional defense industry.
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23. The need for certain items, such as communications equipment, can’t be met by πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡¦β€™s gov or allies. Assistance from civic organizations is required.
24. @BackAndAlive strives to invest in creating new capabilities for the ZSU.
23|38
25. There are roughly a dozen projects developing various long-range weapons (including USVs).
26. Compared to missiles like ATACMS, long-range UAVs suffer from small warheads and being relatively easy to intercept.
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27. GMLRS have been intercepted by πŸ‡·πŸ‡Ί air defense systems such as Buk and Tor.
28. πŸ‡·πŸ‡Ί is actively procuring shells and other ammunition from third-party states.
29. πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡¦ is expending roughly equivalent quantities of 155 and 152mm shells.
25|38
30. The Kramatorsk factory that produced the Bohdana wheeled self-propelled howitzer has been partially evacuated to a safer location.
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31. The Neptun anti-ship cruise missile is responsible for the sinking of an oil platform. Numerous launches missed their target. A Krivak-class frigate or an Admiral Grigorovich-class frigate was damaged by Neptun.
27|38
There were three launches in the first 24-48 hours of the invasion with at least one being intercepted. The change from a KrAZ to a Tatra chassis on the serial production variant was a major improvement that resolved many issues.
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Neptun’s seeker and guidance package are noted as its most significant weaknesses. Chmut comments that Neptun is easy to intercept and compares it to πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡¦ intercepting subsonic πŸ‡·πŸ‡Ί cruise missiles with MANPADS.
29|38
He adds that Neptun is not a technologically modern system although work has continued to modestly enhance its performance. The πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡¦ Navy selected Harpoon over Neptun for its future vessels. He makes no reference to Moskva and Neptun.
30|38
32. The Stugna-P ATGM is a good system despite not being overly technologically modern. Chmut expresses regret that more weren’t procured.
31|38
33. He speculates that FPV UAVs may supplant ATGMs in the future due to their low cost.
34. MT-12 anti-tank guns and the Shturm self-propelled ATGM platform are already on their way out.
32|38
35. Dozens of new UAV companies have been created in the ZSU.
36. The success of the πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡¦ UAV sector is partially attributable to many private companies that are responsive to customers' needs and continually evolve their products.
33|38
37. Many πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡¦ IMV, MRAPs, and APCs have proved adequate, esp. in terms of cost-benefit ratio. They compare favorably to some of the obscure IMV/MRAP/APCs that πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡¦ has received or procured from abroad such as πŸ‡ΉπŸ‡· vehicles.
34|38
38. There are currently painful shortages of several systems including AAGs, MANPADS, and mortars.
39. πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡¦β€™s defense industry needs to be deregulated.
35|38
40. πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡¦ defense firms producing weaponry and ammunition abroad is not just due to security concerns but frequently due to regulations and economic considerations that render it unfavorable to keep production in πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡¦.
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41. Domestic production of a MBT in πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡¦ took about 1 year before the invasion. πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡¦ currently lacks the ability to manufacture new MBTs for all practical purposes.
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42. Key areas to assist the ZSU:
1) C3
2) UAS of all classes
3) mobility
4) night and thermal optics
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Oct 7, 2024
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Having read the PCL a few more times, some added clarification.

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(Geolocation @klinger66)
1|6

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Neither an Antenna Mast Group nor Communications Relay Group and Electric Power Unit are visible.

The CRG acting as the RLG's Launcher Control Station plus AMG and EPU are emplaced at a different site. RL1 enables the CRG/LCS to communicate with LS up to 10 km away via VHF.
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Image
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Remote launchers optimize PATRIOT's defended area against tactical ballistic missiles but create dead zones for airbreathing threats.

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So what is S-500? S-500 is a long-range air and missile defense system operated by the VKS (Russian Aerospace Forces).

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1|23
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(Repost due to typo)
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Per interviews with Ukrainian pilots, they are typically releasing JDAM-ER at ~8 km. As SDB's employment profile is likely extremely similar, this is going to bring its range to <100 km.
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