The following is an English summary of an interview with @TarasChmut by @mil_in_ua on 4 MAR for the first anniversary of the ๐ท๐บ invasion of ๐บ๐ฆ. @magictouch190 kindly translated and prepared this summary which I have edited into this ๐งต.
0|38
1. Prior to 24 FEB, a project was approved for @backandalive to perform minor upgrades/repairs to the Tochka-Us of the 19th Missile Brigade (19 RBr). These were expected to enhance the systemโs precision and speed of deployment.
1|38
This project was later partially completed. During the invasion, a new idea was also implemented. Specifically, the creation and provision of a new type of command post to the 19 RBr.
2|38
2. Chmut emphasizes, as he has previously, the outsized role the 19 RBr had defending ๐บ๐ฆ in the initial phase of the invasion. 3. He adds that the 19 RBr later received new equipment, possibly referring to M142 HIMARS or M270 MLRS.
3|38
4. Prior to 24 FEB, @BackAndAlive was working with the 39th Tactical Aviation Brigade (39 BrTa) to enhance their Su-27โs situational awareness. They were designing a low-cost datalink, possibly tablet-based. The project never advanced, however.
4|38
5. Vilkha(-M) was only procured in small quantities prior to the invasion as they were prohibited in the Joint Forces Operation (JFO) by the Minsk Agreements. At the time, funding was prioritized for immediately useful items [Previously reported].
5|38
6. Sapsan/Hrim-2 R&D received no state funding since at least 2014. Two TELs had been produced. One was financed by ๐ธ๐ฆ and the other possibly by KB Pivdenne itself. One TEL plus documentation was delivered to ๐ธ๐ฆ. [Previously reported]
6|38
Some components of the missiles had been tested on the ground, but no complete missiles had been assembled or flight tested. The program was to receive state funding beginning in 2022. [Previously reported]
7|38
As of DEC 2021, Chmut estimates it would take at least 3 years to complete development plus additional time to begin serial production. [He estimates 2 years to begin production in other interviews]
8|38
7. Although ๐ท๐บ was largely unsuccessful in destroying ๐บ๐ฆโs mobile SAM systems, they had some success destroying ๐บ๐ฆโs radar network. Consequently, there is a continued shortage of radars.
9|38
8. Due to a lack of funding prior to the invasion, procurement decisions such as ordering Stugna-P ATGMs with only day sights and only HEAT warheads were made. [Previously reported]
10|38
9. Chmut states, based upon his enlisted service in the ๐บ๐ฆ Naval Infantry (2015-17), that receiving training from NATO instructors is the most useful training event for personnel who are motivated and want to learn.
11|38
NATO offered a variety of courses on specific skills, leadership, etc. He says that although NATO instructors lack experience in large-scale combat operations, they have deep knowledge of fundamental combat skills that are essential to success.
12|38
He offers positive examples of these skillsโ importance:
A) Pair of ๐บ๐ฆ soldiers defending a trench from a large ๐ท๐บ assault
B) ๐บ๐ฆ infantry company with no heavy weaponry beyond RPGs repulsing 10+ ๐ท๐บ AFVs and multiple companies using good coordination
13|38
He also provides a negative example:
A) ๐บ๐ฆ battalion abandoning and withdrawing from their positions when faced with what turned out to be a platoon-sized ๐ท๐บ assault.
He further adds that ๐บ๐ฆโs experiences in this war underscore the importance of NCOs and junior officers.
14|38
10. Chmut speaks highly of ๐บ๐ฆ military analysts @MBielieskov and @anthony__cba. 11. Spring/Summer 2023 are expected to be critical to the outcome of the war. 12. Many new ๐บ๐ฆ units are being formed but there is a critical shortage of manpower.
15|38
13. Much aid is being provided by partners, but ๐บ๐ฆ is still critically short on ammunition and weaponry. 14. ๐บ๐ฆ losses in manpower are significant. 15. ๐ท๐บ wonโt run out of manpower first nor will they fully run out of weaponry and ammunition.
16|38
16. Without Western aid, ๐บ๐ฆ victory is impossible, although a ๐บ๐ฆ defeat would not be guaranteed either. 17. New corps-sized units have been established in addition to new brigades and other elements.
17|38
18. Chmut argues that the best equipment doesnโt guarantee victory as everything gets destroyed eventually. ๐บ๐ฆ needs equipment that is good enough and can be procured in large quantities.
18|38
19. He provides an anecdote of a ๐บ๐ฆ fire mission against a ๐ท๐บ target where 8 M982 Excalibur 155 mm precision-guided shells were fired and all of them either missed or failed to detonate. [Cause unspecified]
19|38
20. Some legacy heavy brigades (72nd, 93rd, โฆ) had additional maneuver battalions beyond the 4 they have on paper. Currently, many of them have as many as 8k-9k personnel, almost division-sized. This impairs C2 as the brigade HQ isnโt setup for this scale.
20|38
They often lack enough heavy weaponry to equip even their original ~4k personnel. Personnel quality also tends to be poor due to significant losses amongst the original core of experienced soldiers since the beginning of the invasion.
21|38
21. Starlink has been mounted on a UAV on at least one occasion. 22. One of ๐ท๐บ's advantages is its relatively functional defense industry.
22|38
23. The need for certain items, such as communications equipment, canโt be met by ๐บ๐ฆโs gov or allies. Assistance from civic organizations is required. 24. @BackAndAlive strives to invest in creating new capabilities for the ZSU.
23|38
25. There are roughly a dozen projects developing various long-range weapons (including USVs). 26. Compared to missiles like ATACMS, long-range UAVs suffer from small warheads and being relatively easy to intercept.
24|38
27. GMLRS have been intercepted by ๐ท๐บ air defense systems such as Buk and Tor. 28. ๐ท๐บ is actively procuring shells and other ammunition from third-party states. 29. ๐บ๐ฆ is expending roughly equivalent quantities of 155 and 152mm shells.
25|38
30. The Kramatorsk factory that produced the Bohdana wheeled self-propelled howitzer has been partially evacuated to a safer location.
26|38
31. The Neptun anti-ship cruise missile is responsible for the sinking of an oil platform. Numerous launches missed their target. A Krivak-class frigate or an Admiral Grigorovich-class frigate was damaged by Neptun.
27|38
There were three launches in the first 24-48 hours of the invasion with at least one being intercepted. The change from a KrAZ to a Tatra chassis on the serial production variant was a major improvement that resolved many issues.
28|38
Neptunโs seeker and guidance package are noted as its most significant weaknesses. Chmut comments that Neptun is easy to intercept and compares it to ๐บ๐ฆ intercepting subsonic ๐ท๐บ cruise missiles with MANPADS.
29|38
He adds that Neptun is not a technologically modern system although work has continued to modestly enhance its performance. The ๐บ๐ฆ Navy selected Harpoon over Neptun for its future vessels. He makes no reference to Moskva and Neptun.
30|38
32. The Stugna-P ATGM is a good system despite not being overly technologically modern. Chmut expresses regret that more werenโt procured.
31|38
33. He speculates that FPV UAVs may supplant ATGMs in the future due to their low cost. 34. MT-12 anti-tank guns and the Shturm self-propelled ATGM platform are already on their way out.
32|38
35. Dozens of new UAV companies have been created in the ZSU. 36. The success of the ๐บ๐ฆ UAV sector is partially attributable to many private companies that are responsive to customers' needs and continually evolve their products.
33|38
37. Many ๐บ๐ฆ IMV, MRAPs, and APCs have proved adequate, esp. in terms of cost-benefit ratio. They compare favorably to some of the obscure IMV/MRAP/APCs that ๐บ๐ฆ has received or procured from abroad such as ๐น๐ท vehicles.
34|38
38. There are currently painful shortages of several systems including AAGs, MANPADS, and mortars. 39. ๐บ๐ฆโs defense industry needs to be deregulated.
35|38
40. ๐บ๐ฆ defense firms producing weaponry and ammunition abroad is not just due to security concerns but frequently due to regulations and economic considerations that render it unfavorable to keep production in ๐บ๐ฆ.
36|38
41. Domestic production of a MBT in ๐บ๐ฆ took about 1 year before the invasion. ๐บ๐ฆ currently lacks the ability to manufacture new MBTs for all practical purposes.
37|38
42. Key areas to assist the ZSU: 1) C3 2) UAS of all classes 3) mobility 4) night and thermal optics
38|38
I won't detail the complete program history of S-300P/F/V as @ChungTzuW has already written excellent threads about them which I strongly recommend reading for context.
In short, all three systems emerged from a joint VKS/VMF/SV procurement program.
2|23
VKS/VMF requirements were focused on ABTs (air-breathing threats) while SV requirements were focused on TBMs (tactical ballistic missiles). This led to a divergence into S-300P/F and S-300V using radically different missiles and radars.
3|23
GLSDB has a range of >150 km while SDB has a range of ~110 km from a ~12 km release altitude and ~270 m/s release airspeed.
Position error due to accumulated inertial measurement unit drift is quadratically proportional to time of flight and range by extension.
2|5
Per interviews with Ukrainian pilots, they are typically releasing JDAM-ER at ~8 km. As SDB's employment profile is likely extremely similar, this is going to bring its range to <100 km.
3|5
So what is 3M22 Tsirkon (SS-N-33)? I have some thoughts based on written Russian sources, published test footage, and conversations with Ukrainian colleagues.
Is Tsirkon a โhypersonic (anti-ship) cruise missile? The answer is โyesnโtโ๐๐ป
1|20
While renders from the past decade depict it as a rocket-assisted scramjet vehicle, similar to X-51 Waverider, this is not accurate to the system that has been fielded.
I suspect that they potentially depict an earlier Tsirkon concept that was abandoned or not pursued.
2|20
Since the first live fire test in 2020, all published images and video have indicated a design substantially different design.
Rather than a scramjet vehicle, Tsirkon bore a striking resemblance to 3M55 Oniks (third image), Russiaโs existing supersonic ASCM system.
3|20
This is going to be a spicy ๐งต, especially for Ukrainians.
But people need to realize that there was no feasible way for Ukraine to have retained its Soviet nuclear weapons in the 1990s. And attempting to would not have ensured Ukraineโs sovereignty.
1|7
Russia had the codes for the weaponsโ Permissive Action Links. Ukraine had no way to arm them without rebuilding the weapons and replacing their PALs.
Moreover, Ukraine could not maintain the warheads, which required regular servicing, without Russian assistance.
2|7
Even if Ukraine was willing to spend the money and time to build a nuclear weapons industry to overcome these challenges, both the U.S. and Russia were fundamentally unwilling to accept the existence of a nuclear-armed Ukraine.
3|7
Good overview of the challenges facing the Marine. Some additional context for SM-2 production. The SM-2 Block IIIAZ All-Up Rounds ordered from Raytheon are new build as far as I am aware. They are modifications of existing USN SM-2 Block IIIA stock.
The USN ordered 94 SM-2IIIAZ MODs and does not appear to be pursuing additional orders and there are no pending FMS orders. SM-2 Block IIIC MODS will likely continue through 2035 for the USN's Acquisition Objective for 1,000 SM-2IIIC AURs as well as FMS actions.
Upon the completion of the Netherlands', Denmark's, Chile's, and Taiwan's SM-2IIIA orders, the only new production AURs will be SM-2IIIBs for South Korea, Japan, and Australia as well as SM-2IIICs for Canada and an expected future Australian order.
Getting some pushback on my comments concerning @MriyaReport last night.
To clarify for those that arenโt familiar, myself and about 50% of the MR team (and 100% of MRโs subject matter experts) left in January 2023 because we were uncomfortable with the direction it was taking.
We became deeply uncomfortable with the volume of misinformation about the frontline and other topics that was being aired by MRโs leadership, @BalticSnowTiger (Axel) and @YAmzallagh (Joe), as well as frequent guests such as @ChuckPfarrer.
We took these concerns explicitly to Joe and Axel repeatedly. However, we were given a cold shoulder and our concerns were ignored. We also raised security and governance concerns regarding the incorporation of MR as a NGO with 501(c)3 status, but were likewise ignored.