The following is an English summary of an interview with @TarasChmut by @mil_in_ua on 4 MAR for the first anniversary of the ๐ท๐บ invasion of ๐บ๐ฆ. @magictouch190 kindly translated and prepared this summary which I have edited into this ๐งต.
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1. Prior to 24 FEB, a project was approved for @backandalive to perform minor upgrades/repairs to the Tochka-Us of the 19th Missile Brigade (19 RBr). These were expected to enhance the systemโs precision and speed of deployment.
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This project was later partially completed. During the invasion, a new idea was also implemented. Specifically, the creation and provision of a new type of command post to the 19 RBr.
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2. Chmut emphasizes, as he has previously, the outsized role the 19 RBr had defending ๐บ๐ฆ in the initial phase of the invasion. 3. He adds that the 19 RBr later received new equipment, possibly referring to M142 HIMARS or M270 MLRS.
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4. Prior to 24 FEB, @BackAndAlive was working with the 39th Tactical Aviation Brigade (39 BrTa) to enhance their Su-27โs situational awareness. They were designing a low-cost datalink, possibly tablet-based. The project never advanced, however.
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5. Vilkha(-M) was only procured in small quantities prior to the invasion as they were prohibited in the Joint Forces Operation (JFO) by the Minsk Agreements. At the time, funding was prioritized for immediately useful items [Previously reported].
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6. Sapsan/Hrim-2 R&D received no state funding since at least 2014. Two TELs had been produced. One was financed by ๐ธ๐ฆ and the other possibly by KB Pivdenne itself. One TEL plus documentation was delivered to ๐ธ๐ฆ. [Previously reported]
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Some components of the missiles had been tested on the ground, but no complete missiles had been assembled or flight tested. The program was to receive state funding beginning in 2022. [Previously reported]
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As of DEC 2021, Chmut estimates it would take at least 3 years to complete development plus additional time to begin serial production. [He estimates 2 years to begin production in other interviews]
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7. Although ๐ท๐บ was largely unsuccessful in destroying ๐บ๐ฆโs mobile SAM systems, they had some success destroying ๐บ๐ฆโs radar network. Consequently, there is a continued shortage of radars.
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8. Due to a lack of funding prior to the invasion, procurement decisions such as ordering Stugna-P ATGMs with only day sights and only HEAT warheads were made. [Previously reported]
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9. Chmut states, based upon his enlisted service in the ๐บ๐ฆ Naval Infantry (2015-17), that receiving training from NATO instructors is the most useful training event for personnel who are motivated and want to learn.
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NATO offered a variety of courses on specific skills, leadership, etc. He says that although NATO instructors lack experience in large-scale combat operations, they have deep knowledge of fundamental combat skills that are essential to success.
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He offers positive examples of these skillsโ importance:
A) Pair of ๐บ๐ฆ soldiers defending a trench from a large ๐ท๐บ assault
B) ๐บ๐ฆ infantry company with no heavy weaponry beyond RPGs repulsing 10+ ๐ท๐บ AFVs and multiple companies using good coordination
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He also provides a negative example:
A) ๐บ๐ฆ battalion abandoning and withdrawing from their positions when faced with what turned out to be a platoon-sized ๐ท๐บ assault.
He further adds that ๐บ๐ฆโs experiences in this war underscore the importance of NCOs and junior officers.
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10. Chmut speaks highly of ๐บ๐ฆ military analysts @MBielieskov and @anthony__cba. 11. Spring/Summer 2023 are expected to be critical to the outcome of the war. 12. Many new ๐บ๐ฆ units are being formed but there is a critical shortage of manpower.
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13. Much aid is being provided by partners, but ๐บ๐ฆ is still critically short on ammunition and weaponry. 14. ๐บ๐ฆ losses in manpower are significant. 15. ๐ท๐บ wonโt run out of manpower first nor will they fully run out of weaponry and ammunition.
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16. Without Western aid, ๐บ๐ฆ victory is impossible, although a ๐บ๐ฆ defeat would not be guaranteed either. 17. New corps-sized units have been established in addition to new brigades and other elements.
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18. Chmut argues that the best equipment doesnโt guarantee victory as everything gets destroyed eventually. ๐บ๐ฆ needs equipment that is good enough and can be procured in large quantities.
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19. He provides an anecdote of a ๐บ๐ฆ fire mission against a ๐ท๐บ target where 8 M982 Excalibur 155 mm precision-guided shells were fired and all of them either missed or failed to detonate. [Cause unspecified]
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20. Some legacy heavy brigades (72nd, 93rd, โฆ) had additional maneuver battalions beyond the 4 they have on paper. Currently, many of them have as many as 8k-9k personnel, almost division-sized. This impairs C2 as the brigade HQ isnโt setup for this scale.
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They often lack enough heavy weaponry to equip even their original ~4k personnel. Personnel quality also tends to be poor due to significant losses amongst the original core of experienced soldiers since the beginning of the invasion.
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21. Starlink has been mounted on a UAV on at least one occasion. 22. One of ๐ท๐บ's advantages is its relatively functional defense industry.
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23. The need for certain items, such as communications equipment, canโt be met by ๐บ๐ฆโs gov or allies. Assistance from civic organizations is required. 24. @BackAndAlive strives to invest in creating new capabilities for the ZSU.
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25. There are roughly a dozen projects developing various long-range weapons (including USVs). 26. Compared to missiles like ATACMS, long-range UAVs suffer from small warheads and being relatively easy to intercept.
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27. GMLRS have been intercepted by ๐ท๐บ air defense systems such as Buk and Tor. 28. ๐ท๐บ is actively procuring shells and other ammunition from third-party states. 29. ๐บ๐ฆ is expending roughly equivalent quantities of 155 and 152mm shells.
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30. The Kramatorsk factory that produced the Bohdana wheeled self-propelled howitzer has been partially evacuated to a safer location.
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31. The Neptun anti-ship cruise missile is responsible for the sinking of an oil platform. Numerous launches missed their target. A Krivak-class frigate or an Admiral Grigorovich-class frigate was damaged by Neptun.
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There were three launches in the first 24-48 hours of the invasion with at least one being intercepted. The change from a KrAZ to a Tatra chassis on the serial production variant was a major improvement that resolved many issues.
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Neptunโs seeker and guidance package are noted as its most significant weaknesses. Chmut comments that Neptun is easy to intercept and compares it to ๐บ๐ฆ intercepting subsonic ๐ท๐บ cruise missiles with MANPADS.
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He adds that Neptun is not a technologically modern system although work has continued to modestly enhance its performance. The ๐บ๐ฆ Navy selected Harpoon over Neptun for its future vessels. He makes no reference to Moskva and Neptun.
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32. The Stugna-P ATGM is a good system despite not being overly technologically modern. Chmut expresses regret that more werenโt procured.
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33. He speculates that FPV UAVs may supplant ATGMs in the future due to their low cost. 34. MT-12 anti-tank guns and the Shturm self-propelled ATGM platform are already on their way out.
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35. Dozens of new UAV companies have been created in the ZSU. 36. The success of the ๐บ๐ฆ UAV sector is partially attributable to many private companies that are responsive to customers' needs and continually evolve their products.
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37. Many ๐บ๐ฆ IMV, MRAPs, and APCs have proved adequate, esp. in terms of cost-benefit ratio. They compare favorably to some of the obscure IMV/MRAP/APCs that ๐บ๐ฆ has received or procured from abroad such as ๐น๐ท vehicles.
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38. There are currently painful shortages of several systems including AAGs, MANPADS, and mortars. 39. ๐บ๐ฆโs defense industry needs to be deregulated.
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40. ๐บ๐ฆ defense firms producing weaponry and ammunition abroad is not just due to security concerns but frequently due to regulations and economic considerations that render it unfavorable to keep production in ๐บ๐ฆ.
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41. Domestic production of a MBT in ๐บ๐ฆ took about 1 year before the invasion. ๐บ๐ฆ currently lacks the ability to manufacture new MBTs for all practical purposes.
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42. Key areas to assist the ZSU: 1) C3 2) UAS of all classes 3) mobility 4) night and thermal optics
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Looks like it's time for a short Sapsan/Hrim-2 update. Disclaimer: the linked thread is the summary of a ๐ท๐บ TG post. I don't know whether Sapsan is actually operational or not. I would treat this claim with caution as with all ๐ท๐บ claims. So let's begin this ๐งต.
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This is an incredible achievement for ๐บ๐ฆ and an monumental failure for ๐ท๐บ. Now that the worst seems to have passed, it's time for a another ๐งต on ๐ท๐บ standoff munition inventory and production capacity going forward.
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Per this graphic from @oleksiireznikov, as of Jan. 3 ๐ท๐บ had 59 Kalibr SLCMs and 118 Kh-101/555 ALCMs for a total of 177 units plus 52 9M728/9M729 GLCMs and 116 Kh-22/32 AShMs.
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For production, Budanov (Director of GUR) indicated that ๐ท๐บ was producing 20 Kalibrs and 30 Kh-101s (50 total) per month as of Jan. 8. Based on the graphic, we find a production rate of 3-4 9M723 ["Iskander-M"] SRBMs and 2 9M728/729s per month.
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As there seems to be confusion about ๐ต๐ฑ HIMARS, here is a short ๐งตto clarify. ๐ต๐ฑ is ordering 18 M142 HIMARS plus 468 HIMARS Launcher Loader Module (LLM) kits from ๐บ๐ธ. The LLM "IS" HIMARS, it is literally the launcher assembly. They will be installed on a ๐ต๐ฑ domestic chassis.
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This means ๐ต๐ฑ is buying 486 HIMARS, 468 of which will be indigenized. The chassis will likely be the Jelcz P882 that is being used for the indigenization of the K239 Chunmoo from ๐ฐ๐ท. ๐ต๐ฑ will also presumably install their TOPAZ FCS to enable it to launch their ๐ฐ๐ท missiles.
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For ๐บ๐ธ missiles, ๐ต๐ฑ is purchasing 521 GMLRS-U/IMPS (3,126 M31A2), 461 GMLRS-AW/IMPS (2,766 M30A2), and 532 ER GMLRS-AW (3,192 XM403) guided missiles plus 45 M57 ATACMS tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs).
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Some thoughts and comments on this ๐งต. The conclusions presented are frankly excessively pessimistic IMO in their estimation of ๐บ๐ธ relative capabilities. Let's go through point by point.
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Korea:
-๐บ๐ธ/๐ฐ๐ท have the capability to eliminate ๐ฐ๐ต in a conventional conflict, barring direct ๐จ๐ณ intervention.
-๐ฐ๐ต is nuclear weapon state and the logic of MAD applies.
- ๐ฐ๐ท/๐ฐ๐ต status quo is both sustainable and highly unlikely to change.
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Iran:
-The threat from ๐ฎ๐ท is largely asymmetric.
-๐ฎ๐ฑ is a reliable and capable partner.
-๐บ๐ธ/๐ฎ๐ฑ can leverage overwhelming joint fires in a conventional conflict.
-๐บ๐ธ IAMDS capabilities are continually evolving to mitigate ๐ฎ๐ท fires, their most directly threatening capability.
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๐บ๐ธ Abrams main battle tanks being delivered to ๐บ๐ฆ under USAI rather than PDA is an interesting development. A short ๐งตon the possible explanations. 1/5
Option A: ๐บ๐ฆ will receive new build Abrams.
These would likely be M1A2 SEPv3s, the latest Abrams variant, as it is currently the only Abrams variant the Lima Tank Plant has a new build production line for AFAIK. 2/5
Option B: ๐บ๐ฆ receives M1A1 FEPs.
The U.S. Army currently has ~320 M1A1 FEPs inherited from the USMC. USAI could be explained by the need to first remove/replace the FEP's HAP (Heavy Armor Plate) modules, which house the Abrams' depleted uranium armor, prior to delivery. 3/5
Sigh, looks like I need to explain cruise missile guidance and route planning again. The word "turns" is somewhat misleading in this context and the phrase "demanding on the guidance system" lacks technical meaning. A ๐งตwith some context and explanations. 1/18
Most modern cruise missiles (CMs) do not simply follow a straight flight path from their launch platform to their target. Rather, they follow pre-defined mission-specific flight paths. Historically, a specific route was necessary to ensure precise guidance of the munition. 3/18