🧵/ You can choose whether to look at the moon or at the pointing finger instead
With #CreditSuisse#SVBank at al. getting pumped back to life by the State, we should start asking whether the state-bank alliance makes much sense anymore
BANKING IS BROKEN, HALLELUJAH 👇
1/ The fact that #SVBank failure was a shock for markets tells a lot about the quality of markets (and regulators)
Below, an extract from SVB's regulatory disclosures. What was the regulator doing instead of observing the most classic of bank’s maturity mismatches?
2/ I don't want to go all the way to conspiracy theory, but who was extracting the most value from #SVBank, or in other words who had more (short-term) incentives for SVB to keep operating as it was?
Below, another extract. Hint: not only tech benefited from low IR...
3/ Even taking so much interest rate risk, #SVBank wasn't making much money
* 2.73% average gross yield
* 2% average net yield
* 9-10% return on equity, i.e. below cost
* 0.85-0.90x price to tangible book
In other words, management ran a fast-growing value-burning bank
4/ Among the depositors of #SVBank that had the risk of losing a big chunk of their savings was @circle, the minter of $USDC
The risk underpinning $USDC, as well as its absolutely lack of yield for holders, is also not new. The extract below is from DR's 52 release
5/ To me, it is not the story of #SVBank mismanagement that matters, nor the finger-pointing
What matters is the blatant and absolutely unnecessary fragility of banking as we know it that emerged from this and other episodes
Today, we could and should do better
6/ The "OLD" monetary triangle was based on a very tight relationship between Treasury, Central Bank, and Commercial Banks
Commercial Banks distribute money through underwriting, have monopoly of currency storage, and are incentivised (big) buyers of treasuries
7/ The system is showing huge limits:
* DISTRIBUTION: are banks really needed here?
* UNDERWRITING: should banks have monopoly?
* RETURNS: can banks really be self-sustaining?
* RISK: are banks enough low risk for depositors?
My answer is NO to those questions. We can do better
8/ A "NEW" monetary triangle could emerge:
* SPECIALISED UNDERWRITERS distribute money - a combination of banks, funds, and protocols
* DEPOSITORS can access government risk directly rather than being meat for banks
* #CBDC of some sort act as a liquidity stabiliser only
9/ The current monetary framework has reached a point of no return. We need a new paradigm
“The competition between paradigms is not the sort of battle that can be resolved by proofs.” - The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn
0/ I’m on a personal fight to remove the word Real-World Assets (or RWA) from the DeFi jargon
It is truly a logical insult and a counterintuitive definition that can do way more harm than good
*PLEASE* help - here is why 👇🏻
1/ EVERYTHING IS AN ASSET
Whether you can ascribe value to that, and with confidence, it’s a different story. But everything is an asset, from housing to $BTC to watches to reputation to time
2/ WE HAVE BEEN MATERIALISING ASSETS FOR CENTURIES
We started simple and became convoluted. Currently, even (sub-types of) risk, even volatility, is an asset. You own a CDS contract on your balance sheet you have an asset with a fair value
DeFi liquidity went down from 200b ATH to current 60-ish, bettered by interest rates, frauds, bad execution
I couldn’t be happier to invest and build today. These are my:
# 3 most relevant protocols
# 3 protocols I’d stay away from
# 3 things we are missing IMO
With the merge coming, there’s no protocol that has higher potential to transform DeFi:
- Develop new primitive with $stETH
- Spin out native stable
- Expand across other PoS chains
- Express pressure on $ETH governance
0/7 > I had the intuition that flat & naive 1-token-1-vote crypto governance systems are *AWFUL* in uncertain environments, so I tried to prove it. This week Dirt Roads is for *NERDS* and modelled gonzo-mathematical games of governance 🧵👇
1/7 > 1st game: Optimistic Governance Game - OGG:
* Voters are good people
* Voters are not proponents
* Proposals can be benevolent or malevolent, and cannot be distinguished
* Malevolent proposals have huge private benefit at the expense of a probability of blow-up
2/7 > Even by being trivial, OGGs give us few hints:
* There’s incentive for bad proponents to promise a lot
* There’s a dominant incentive to look good
* Illiquidity (delayed outcome) has a premium
* Maximising for value isn’t equal to maximising for survival
0/🧵Last week saw the most participated / contentious vote in the history of DAO governance happening at @MakerDAO
I have now had the time to absorb a lot of what happened in the past days, and being at the centre of it with my proposal for a Lending Oversight unit, my take 👇
1/4 🧵And so my days as CU facilitator @MakerDAO are over - before starting 😂
The ratification vote of Lending Oversight ❤️ attracted 294k voting $MKR - huge record. Most of institutional crypto backed the idea of financial oversight, but that wasn't enough, @RuneKek didn't
2/4 🧵 Worth noting:
Insane active VC participation
Founder re-centralising vote in Shadow Delegate
Previously ostracised co-founder resurrected -> his comeback message is a bliss
Tons of proxy voting
Concerted parties (borrowers too)
Last-minute re-delegation
$MKR borrows
🧵3/4 -> Many questions about REAL centralisation vs. entangled interest in crypto arise, and we should try to answer if we don't want another blowup
DeFi remains extremely immature and dangerous land, but we should all keep working hard