2008 PTSD VS THE GHOSTS OF THE 1970S. @darioperkins writes: While #SVB and its peers were uniquely exposed to COVID bubbles, this latest calamity has highlighted a broader problem in global banking – duration risk. At the start of the year, #centralbanks...
wanted to keep monetary policy “tighter for longer”, with the aim of bringing inflation down in a controlled and gradual manner. Right now, they seem to be losing control of that process. As tensions build, banks – particularly the smaller ones – will restrict credit in a way...
that could have a devasting impact on #SMEs, with powerful knock-on effects to aggregate demand. This will help the authorities to defeat inflation, but in a way that is uncontrolled and intractable, risking unnecessary hardship. Central banks are in a difficult position...
caught between the (largely imagined) ghosts of the 1970s and their own PTSD from what happened in 2008. Our guess is that PTSD will ultimately win out. The only question is how long it takes and at what economic cost
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1. 2010s driver: China’s contribution to global growth in the 2010s was to internalize the deficit that previously was run by the rest of the world, notably the US household sector. As willing foreign borrowers dwindled, the #RMB appreciated and Chinese policymakers chose to
prop up growth by borrowing through the corporate sector, with the private sector following suit, most notably in the real estate sector. By around 2016, the corporate sector was saturated and households took over, blowing the final air into the bubble that is the Chinese