Let's see how that will play out. As a reminder: Recital 11 of the legislative text that the FDP wanted to veto. You can see: No political gain for this stunt! But a weakening of the ordinary legislative procedure. What a disaster. What do we know about the implementation? 🧵
1/ There will be the confirmatory adoption by the Council of the unchanged 2035 end of the combustion engine (amending Regulation (EU) 2019/631 as regards strengthening the CO2 emission performance standards for new passenger cars).
2/ The Commission seems to have proposed to adopt an implementing act under Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 715/2007 on type approval of motor vehicles with respect to emissions from light passenger and commercial vehicles (Euro 5 and Euro 6) (eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/…).
3/ With this implementing act the Commission intends to introduce a new vehicle class running exclusively on CO2 neutral fuels (aka #eFuels) with a view to clarify that these cars meet the 2035 fleet target. Debateable whether that is really a non-essential element.
4/ Given that this implementing act will be adopted under the 1999 comitology decision (as the Euro 6- Regulation pre-dates the Lisbon Treaty), the European Parliament (by absolute majority) and the Council (by qualified majority) can still reject the draft implementing act.
5/ The Commission can then still start a legislative procedure in order to implement Recital 11 (which would the legally safe way anyway: politically contentious matters have to be settled by those who have the legitimacy to do so: Parliament and Council).
6/ I still find it contradictory to adopt a delegated/implementing act (which in itself may not take political decisions) in order to settle a political conflict. This is legally and politically shaky.
What remains: A Member State threathens with an EU consitutional crisis (disregard of the outcome of a legislative procedure) and gains nothing substantial in return. A political stunt that could or must have been avoided. To be continued ... /END
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Was steckt hinter dem Zaubertrick der Kommission beim #VerbrennerAus, das @Wissing dazu gebracht, seinen verantwortungslosen Widerstand einzustellen? Schnell gesagt: nicht viel. Ein kurzer Thread:
1/ Bereits in dem Gesetzgebungstext zum #VerbrennerAus, wie ihn das Parlament angenommen hat (europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document…), steht drin, was Wissing jetzt bekommen hat: der rechtlich unverbindliche Erwägungsgrund 11 wird in eine rechtlich unverbindliche Erklärung übertragen.
2/ Umgesetzt werden soll das durch einen "delegierten Rechtsakt" in der Verordnung über die Typgenehmigung von Kraftfahrzeugen (Euro 5 und Euro 6): eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/…
Die Kommission hat heute ihren Vorschlag für ein #RechtaufReparatur vorgestellt. Worum geht es? Was muss verbessert werden, damit wir von einem echten Recht auf Reparatur sprechen können:
1a/ Core to the proposal is the obligation to repair in Article 5. Good: irrespective of the location of the producer, a good must be repaired by somebody if requested by the consumer. Bad: Possibility to refuse the request by reference to the blurry concept of 'impossibility'.
1b/ Obligation to repair is limited to products mentioned in Annex II, which can be extended by the European Commission by means of a delegated act (hello, my old friend!). Proper dynamisation of the scope of the obligation to repair is crucial.
EU found an antidote to Hungarian blackmailing: Learn and remember. 🇭🇺 withdrew its veto against corporate minimum tax (15%) and Ukrainian financial support. In return, 55% instead of 65% of cohesion funds remain frozen due to rule-of-law conditionality: politico.eu/article/eu-dea…
Of course, it should be noted that we speak of 55% of cohesion funds that are suspended, which equals an amount of 6.3bn Euro (instead of 7.5bn Euro which the Commission originally proposed). So that makes 18% of the enture EU funds that Hungary receives. BUT: ...
For the first time ever both the @EU_Commission and the @EUCouncil have not caved into Hungarian blackmailing. And, in return, Hungary gave up its tactical veto. That is, honestly, big as a political precedent and to be repeated in the future.
I raised today an action for annulment in my capacity as MEP at the CJEU against the Taxonomy Delegated Act. The @EU_Commission has exceeded its powers. Moreover, single MEPs must get an enforceable minority right at the CJEU to review a violation of their rights. A thread 👇🏻
1️⃣ With the delegated act the COM qualified energy production from nuclear power and fossil gas as sustainable economic activities. Dealing with nuclear power and gas is, however, a political and not a technical question. It was not for the COM to decide: eulawlive.com/op-ed-the-taxo…
2️⃣ The CJEU has previously decided that the COM may only decide on non-essential elements of an act. The essential ones are those that imply political decisions, which are needed when balancing conflicting interests. That is what the DA was about. eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/…
German chancellor @OlafScholz just held a remarkable speech in Prague on the future of Europe. (1) It approves the idea of @EmmanuelMacron to create a European Political Community with prospective accession countries. (2) It suggest a switch from unanimity to majority voting. 1/6
(3) It prefers majority voting to enhanced cooperation. (4) As a step toward majority voting the constructive abstention should be introduced. (5) The internal market must be upgraded to a real circular European economy. (6) In terms of migration we need more legal migration. 2/6
(7) Germany wants a reform of the fiscal rules along the lines of the recent proposals. (8) Reference to SURE can be understood as introducing debt-financed funds with dedicated and earmarked spending plans. (9) The rule of law must be defended by all means available. 3/6