Mick Ryan, AM Profile picture
Mar 27, 2023 20 tweets 6 min read Read on X
Over the last 2 months, Russia has undertaken a series of thrusts in eastern #Ukraine to capture territory & weaken Ukraine’s armed forces. Soon, it will be the turn of the Ukrainians to resume their offensive operations. 1/20 🧵 Image
2/ It is important to explore the purpose of these offensives because those planning them will have to balance multiple political, strategic and military imperatives for the coming attacks against Russian forces. abc.net.au/news/2023-03-2…
3/ Purpose in these circumstances is vital. It provides the starting point for strategy, and operational planning. But, it also ensures that those who will participate in these offensives understand why they do so.
4/ Soldiers will always follow orders. But it is purpose that inspires them, provides the foundation for extra exertions and often is the reason why so many offer their ‘last full measure of devotion’ on the battlefield.
5/ What are the elements of purpose in Ukraine’s forthcoming offensives?
6/ First, Ukraine wants to re-seize the initiative in this war. Their Kharkiv and Kherson offensives grasped the initiative from the Russians and forced them onto the defensive over winter.
7/ However, for a variety of reasons including slow arrival of western support and the injection of Russian mobilised troops, Ukrainian momentum seeped away over the Christmas-New Year period.
8/ Now, with the Russians generating some momentum with their Easter attacks, the Ukrainians will be keen to reverse this momentum and regain their battlefield advantage.
9/ In doing so, it demonstrates to Russians that nothing they do can destroy Ukrainian resolve. In this battle of wills, destroying Russian morale will be an important objective of the Ukrainian offensives.
10/ Ukraine will want to spread the word to the entire Russian invasion and occupation force that their days in Ukraine are numbered. This psychological aspect of offensive operations is very important.
11/ The Ukrainians also want to take back their territory. This is an obvious and important goal, and one constantly referred to by President Zelensky in his speeches.
12/ Large parts of eastern & southern Ukraine remain under Russian occupation. For those in areas occupied by Russia, the Ukrainian offensives will provide a ray of hope that their turn for liberation will come soon.
13/ Another obvious purpose of the offensives is to continue degrading the the Russian Army. The Ukrainians will want to destroy as much of the Russian army as possible, but this is subordinate to recapturing territory.
14/ The Ukrainian offensives will also be a vital message to the west that the Ukrainian armed forces are able employers of the military assistance provided over the last few months.
15/ Finally, the offensives matter greatly to the Ukrainian people at home and those who remain refugees abroad.
16/ Since 2014, Russia has occupied its territory and conducted a sustained information campaign against the notion of Ukrainian sovereignty.
17/ Since February 2022, the people of Ukraine have endured rape, murder, destruction of their cities, and systemic attempts by Russia to eradicate Ukrainian culture, symbols and nationhood.
18/ The offensives launched in the next few months will be heartbreakingly bloody, and may not be the final blow that destroys the Russian Army in #Ukraine. abc.net.au/news/2023-03-2…
19/ But, if the west holds its nerve, and the Ukrainians steadfastly apply their fighting power against the Russians while taking back large swathes of their land, the offensives may be the beginning of the end of this war. End.
20/ Thank you to the following the images and links used in this thread: @Liberov @DefenceU @defencehq @TDF_UA @ABCNews @MaryanKushnir

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More from @WarintheFuture

May 28
Our darker angels have returned. For a decade, influential scholars argued that major war was on an irreversible decline. Pinker's 'Better Angels' thesis became almost orthodoxy in parts of the security studies world. But, as @lawdavf has written, war has a future. 1/4 🧵 Image
2/ Fast forward to 2024. PRIO records 61 state-based conflicts — the highest since World War II. 129,000 battle deaths. The fourth most violent year since the Cold War. The 2024 data from SIPRI and PRIO is unambiguous: a historic peak in state-based conflicts, the fourth most violent year since the Cold War, and a Russo-Ukrainian war that has now consumed an estimated 500,000 lives.
3/ The analytical failure wasn't just academic. Governments that accepted the 'war is fading' narrative underinvested in defence, deterrence and industrial capacity. Ukraine paid some of the price. But most Western nations are still underinvested in force structure, defence industry, war stocks and most importantly, national will to resist authoritarian aggression.
Read 4 tweets
May 11
China fields a military where 70-80% of soldiers are only children. Every battlefield death risks extinguishing a family line. This demographic reality shapes Xi's strategic calculus in ways Western analysis should pay more attention to. My new piece explores this. 1/5 🧵mickryan.substack.com/p/one-child-on…Image
2/ China's one-child policy ended in 2015. Its military consequences are only beginning. By 2015, ~70% of PLA soldiers and 80% of combat troops came from one-child households. There is almost no historical precedent for a major military force comprised almost entirely of only children.
3/ The research is sobering. Only children are measurably less trusting, less resilient, less risk-tolerant, and less competitive than those with siblings. These are not ideal traits for combat. They are increasingly the defining traits of the PLA's human capital.
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Apr 16
Some initial thoughts on the new Australian National Defence Strategy released today in Canberra. Overall, the focus and trajectory of Australia's defence strategy remains consistent with the 2024 version. There are some notable things worth highlighting. 1/15 🧵🇦🇺 Image
2/ The new NDS shifts more towards a true 'defence' strategy rather than just a 'military' strategy that was described in the 2024 version. There is stronger language around national civil preparedness, fuel security, and economic security. This is good. But these are also topics that should be in a National Security Strategy - if Australia had one!
3/ Spending. There is an uptick in spending. This is a positive. There is a claim that we might get 3% of GDP on defence at some point in the future. The reality is that because we are well short of this now, trying to fund both AUKUS and the ADF at the same time with current spending is challenging (nice word for not possible), and conventional military capabilities are degrading - and not modernising fast enough.
Read 15 tweets
Mar 22
“The advantages of threatening an American ground intervention are real. The advantages of actually committing boots on the ground are also real but more limited. The disadvantages could be numerous.” My weekly update on Iran, Ukraine and the Pacific. 1/6 🧵 Image
2/ Ukraine has achieved something significant in the south. Ukrainian attacks there have disrupted Russian offensive planning, consumed Russian reserve forces, and demonstrated that Ukrainian combined arms operations can impose genuine operational costs. But there is also a trade-off in these southern operations. Gains in the south have come at some cost to northern Donetsk, and Russian forces retain the initiative on what is Russia’s main effort on the ground: the envelopment of Ukraine’s fortress belt and the remainder of Donetsk.
3/ In Iran, the oldest lesson in strategy keeps surfacing: military success in the air and at sea does not automatically translate into political outcomes on the ground. Iran has not been beaten. The question being probably being considered in the Pentagon, Congress and the White House is whether ground forces would ensure that the military campaign achieves a decisive political outcome - or whether it would lead to a larger and more difficult American military commitment to the Middle East with uncertain results.
Read 6 tweets
Mar 18
The latest update on drone and missile attacks on the UAE has just been released. With this as context, I thought I would share some initial insights arising from this Iranian retaliatory campaign and the overall war against #Iran. 1/9 🧵
2/ First, the battlespace is not transparent. It is highly visible but high visibility is not the same as high wisdom about what is seen. And we must not fall into the trap of assuming that we actually are seeing everything we need to see rather than what the enemy wants us to see. Finally, no tech can see into the hearts and minds of soldiers and combat leaders, especially when they are functioning under conditions of existential threat.
3/ Second, Understanding the enemy, and how resilient it is, matters. The Iranians have been preparing for this fight for decades, will have many caches of weapons and have strategised how this might play out. And assuming that a few bombs from the sky topple a regime (especially when it has never been achieved before) badly under estimated the Iranians.
Read 9 tweets
Mar 17
"America & Iran are fighting two very different wars and have two different theories of victory. China & others in the authoritarian learning & adaptation bloc are observing closely & learning." An assessment of where we are, & who is learning from the Iran War. 1/6 🧵 Image
2/ This assessment examines the two wars in and around Iran: the military campaign that Washington is fighting, and the economic campaign that Tehran is waging. It then asks the following question: what are the respective theories of victory, and how does that theory play out differently for each belligerent?
3/ A theory of victory is not simply a list of military objectives. It is a coherent account of how the application of military force produces a political outcome that endures. The Trump administration entered Operation Epic Fury with a theory of the means, and a range of constantly changing ends (at least in public). It might be able to use the military to win the war, but it is unclear whether it has a longer-term plan to win the peace.
Read 6 tweets

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