Over the last 2 months, Russia has undertaken a series of thrusts in eastern #Ukraine to capture territory & weaken Ukraine’s armed forces. Soon, it will be the turn of the Ukrainians to resume their offensive operations. 1/20 🧵
2/ It is important to explore the purpose of these offensives because those planning them will have to balance multiple political, strategic and military imperatives for the coming attacks against Russian forces. abc.net.au/news/2023-03-2…
3/ Purpose in these circumstances is vital. It provides the starting point for strategy, and operational planning. But, it also ensures that those who will participate in these offensives understand why they do so.
4/ Soldiers will always follow orders. But it is purpose that inspires them, provides the foundation for extra exertions and often is the reason why so many offer their ‘last full measure of devotion’ on the battlefield.
5/ What are the elements of purpose in Ukraine’s forthcoming offensives?
6/ First, Ukraine wants to re-seize the initiative in this war. Their Kharkiv and Kherson offensives grasped the initiative from the Russians and forced them onto the defensive over winter.
7/ However, for a variety of reasons including slow arrival of western support and the injection of Russian mobilised troops, Ukrainian momentum seeped away over the Christmas-New Year period.
8/ Now, with the Russians generating some momentum with their Easter attacks, the Ukrainians will be keen to reverse this momentum and regain their battlefield advantage.
9/ In doing so, it demonstrates to Russians that nothing they do can destroy Ukrainian resolve. In this battle of wills, destroying Russian morale will be an important objective of the Ukrainian offensives.
10/ Ukraine will want to spread the word to the entire Russian invasion and occupation force that their days in Ukraine are numbered. This psychological aspect of offensive operations is very important.
11/ The Ukrainians also want to take back their territory. This is an obvious and important goal, and one constantly referred to by President Zelensky in his speeches.
12/ Large parts of eastern & southern Ukraine remain under Russian occupation. For those in areas occupied by Russia, the Ukrainian offensives will provide a ray of hope that their turn for liberation will come soon.
13/ Another obvious purpose of the offensives is to continue degrading the the Russian Army. The Ukrainians will want to destroy as much of the Russian army as possible, but this is subordinate to recapturing territory.
14/ The Ukrainian offensives will also be a vital message to the west that the Ukrainian armed forces are able employers of the military assistance provided over the last few months.
15/ Finally, the offensives matter greatly to the Ukrainian people at home and those who remain refugees abroad.
16/ Since 2014, Russia has occupied its territory and conducted a sustained information campaign against the notion of Ukrainian sovereignty.
17/ Since February 2022, the people of Ukraine have endured rape, murder, destruction of their cities, and systemic attempts by Russia to eradicate Ukrainian culture, symbols and nationhood.
18/ The offensives launched in the next few months will be heartbreakingly bloody, and may not be the final blow that destroys the Russian Army in #Ukraine. abc.net.au/news/2023-03-2…
19/ But, if the west holds its nerve, and the Ukrainians steadfastly apply their fighting power against the Russians while taking back large swathes of their land, the offensives may be the beginning of the end of this war. End.
Back in May, I explored the likely Russian objectives for its military operations in 2024, and how it was progressing towards them. Russia has built strategic momentum with its assaults on Ukraine in the past six months. However, they have largely failed to exploit their opportunties. 1/12 🧵 🇺🇦
2/ Russia has made some progress on the ground and yet even this has come at massive costs. For the gain of around 513 square km, they have lost around 180 thousand personnel. Losing 360 people for every km is a poor return on investment - in any war.
3/ And, as this graph from @ragnarbjartur shows, Russian casualties have only increased in the past six months during its 2024 offensives.
There are many aspects of the war in #Ukraine from which we might learn lessons. Strategy, tactics, equipment, technology and organisations are all worthy of study. But there is another aspect of the war also requiring study: #leadership. 1/7 🧵 🇺🇦
2/ In studying these lessons, we should understand the elements of leadership that are changing because of new technologies and different threats. Clausewitz called this the changing character of war.
3/ At the same time we need to learn - or re-learn - the timeless lessons of leadership in war. Generally this involves the uncertainty, the fog and friction of war. Clausewitz described this element of war as its enduring nature. People need to be led in this environment.
There are many lessons from the war in #Ukraine. But to be most useful, these lessons need to be considered through the context of different regions and political environments beyond eastern Europe. 1/7 🧵🇺🇦
2/ Sir Michael Howard wrote in The Use and Abuse of Military History, "without some such knowledge of the broader background to military operations one is likely to reach totally erroneous conclusions about their nature, and the reasons for their failure and success." Context matters.
3/ As such, I am starting a new series to translate the lessons from #Ukraine for application in the #Pacific. The method I will use in this study includes consideration of three key elements.
For a little while now I have wanted to write about the Russian turtle tanks. These weird and unwieldy beasts provide a discrete solution to a contemporary battlefield problem - generating successful offensive operations. 1/10 🧵🇺🇦🇺🇦
2/ On the weekend, the Ukrainian ground forces were able to capture one of these Russian turtle tanks. It will be a useful source of intelligence, particularly the EW suite that it is equipped with. But it will also provide insights into weaknesses that can be attacked with FPV.
3/ These turtle tanks have already appeared in several 'generations': Gen 1: tank with metal tortise shell; Gen 2: tank with metal tortise shell and EW suite; and, Gen 3: tank with metal tortise shell, EW suite, additional cages and mine roller.
In the past 48 hours, the U.S. and Ukraine signed a new security agreement on the sidelines of the G7 meeting being held in Italy. What is the nature of the new agreement between Ukraine and the U.S. and what are the potential implications over the next decade? 1/9 🧵 🇺🇦
2/ There are four key elements of the agreement.
3/ First, the agreement sets out a ten-year horizon. But, the deal won’t be ratified by the US Congress. And hopefully, Ukraine will be in NATO well before the ten year period ends.
I wanted to talk a little more about this great thread from @sambendett One of the interesting aspects of this thread is how it recognises the cycle of adaptation in military affairs. 1/8 🧵 🇺🇦
2/ Richard Simpkin wrote about the 50 year cycle in Race to the Swift - a great book which is still relevant after 40 years. I have also published multiple articles about the ongoing adaptation battle in this war.
3/ But we have also seen much faster adaptation cycles during this war in #Ukraine. As the thread points out, the drone-on-drone fights are happening regularly but we did not adequately prepare for this in western military organisations.