1/ Back on March 2, 2023, @DefenceHQ declared it to be #MudSeason, Ukrainian as ‘bezdorizhzhia’, limiting cross country movement (CCM)/trafficability. This #NAFOWeather🧵 looks at when soil will dry sufficiently to support offensive operations.
2/ Most of the techniques referenced in the analysis originate from the #NATO Reference Mobility Model (NRMM). Documents describing the NRMM are public domain.
Cite: slideshare.net/QuestSystems/a…
3/ Processes which control vehicle trafficability are ground pressure exerted by vehicles and strength of soil. As soil dries, it can support a greater load. In addition to military applications, agriculture and land managers assess soil strength to minimize impact to vegetation.
4/ Vehicle ground pressure depends on contact area & weight of vehicle. This table categorizes vehicle types and the ground pressure identified by the Vehicle Cone Index (VCI). Track vehicles have lower VCIs while heavy multi-wheeled vehicles have higher VCI requirements.
5/ Examples of Vehicle Types and their soil strength requirements (list not meant to be exhaustive or include all vehicles operating the war in Ukraine).
6/ Graph shows the relationship between soil strength (RCI) and volumetric soil moisture (m**3/m**3) by soil type. Using the VCI strength requirements, we can link soil moisture to soil strength to vehicle type ground pressure requirements.
Cite: journals.ametsoc.org/view/journals/…
7/ Table links NRMM vehicle type ground pressure, soil strength, and soil moisture for soil type: Chernozen (FAO), Silty Loam "ML" Type (USDA/USCS). Assuming offensive operations will employ multiple vehicles and types, I use a conservative soil strength Go/No Go criteria (left).
8/ Water cycle processes which control soil moisture: Precipitation and snow melt, influences soil moisture gain or maintenance; while run-off, evaporation, transportation, and infiltration influences soil moisture loss.
9/ This is the annual soil moisture climatology for regions in the line of conflict. Soil accumulated moisture in the winter and slowly dries out through the spring and summer, but there are regional differences in the drying rate where the north is wetter longer.
10/ This is the same soil moisture climate data but focused on January-May in tabular format. Color coding the table and locations using Go/No Go criteria to get a sense of what a "normal" soil moisture looks like by region.
11/ Instead of looking at soil moisture climate data, these are analysis of soil moisture for 2022 and 2023. I extrapolated March-May for 2023 using the drying rate for the same months from 2022, again color coding using Go/No Go criteria.
12/ This is recent SMAP satellite data (13 MAR 2023). It is a bit noisy but the general pattern shows drier in the south and wetter in the north versus in 2022 for the same time. go.nasa.gov/3FGSQeU
13/ Looking at temperature, precipitation, soil and drought indicators variance from normal climatology by region, I made small changes to soil moisture drying rate, e.g., 2 weeks later in the north and 2 weeks sooner in the south.
14/ Finally, the Soil Strength Go/No Go Forecast by region for supporting multiple vehicles and types using the same road or path. This forecast is likely conservative and assumes normal rainfall for April and May. Questions and comments welcome. /end
1/ Heavy Precipitation/Snowfall *ALERT*
Wednesday Evening (MAR 29) to Friday Morning (MAR 31)
* Heavy snow likely in Luhansk and Donetsk
* Drone operations will be severely restricted
* Trafficability will be severely restricted
* Rising water will make creeks dangerous to ford
2/ 10 Day Forecast of weather for Bakhmut and Kreminna shows rate of precipitation, snowfall, & snow depth Thursday-Friday. Additional rainfall next WED. Most snow will melt by Saturday. Melting snow will make trafficability extremely difficult & rising creeks impassable.
3/ Comparing major global weather models, but agree on extreme precipitation potential next 72 hours (50-75 mm), but position of maxima varies by about 100 km which is relevant to the line of conflict.
13.2/ Temperature and precipitation along the Line of Conflict (LoC) at control points. April and May have the greatest temperature increase but lower precip from winter and summer seasons = increasing evapotranspiration (ET) (e.g., soil water loss). Source: @meteoblue
13.3/ Ukraine spring season (MAM) maps show northwest to southeast gradient of lower to higher temperatures & higher to lower precipitation indicating lower to higher ET/water loss. Source: University of East Anglia crudata.uea.ac.uk/~timo/climgen/…
1/ Who is operating the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (K-HPP)? What have K-HPP operator done that has caused the Kakhovka Reservoir to drop to 30 year low levels risking drinking water for millions and irrigation for 250 million hectares? A #NAFOWeather 🧵
2/ Kakhovka HPP is the 6th (and final) dam on the Dnipro River. The purpose of the dam is to provide water for irrigation, drinking, industry, shipping. K-HPP maintains Kakhovka Reservoir at 16m above MSL providing water for irrigation canals (e.g. NCC) & the Zaporizhzhia NPP.
3/ Who is operating the Kakhovka HPP?
Russians have occupied & operated the K-HPP since about March 1, 2022. Initially, the Ukrainian dam operator, @Ukrhydroenergo, provided technical assistance to Russian operators, but competent staff technical advise ceased after spring 2022.
24/ Aftermath of 11 NOV 2022 Russian attack on the K-HPP showed the destruction of the road and bridge decks above 3 sluice gates nearest the right bank. Thankfully, the 3 sluice gates appear to be holding water so the immediate threat of a flood averted.
25/ With the retreat completed from the right bank, the value of the K-HPP and reservoir have changed again. Since early December 2022, Russian K-HPP operators have been releasing huge amounts of water (about 3 km**3!) causing the Kakhovka Reservoir to drop to historic low levels
1/ Using dam operations (water realease) data to assess the importance of the Kakhovka HPP (K-HPP) dam and reservoir and North Crimean Canal to Russian political and military priorities, a #NAFOWeather🧵
2/ It has been almost a year since the (most recent) Russian invasion of Ukraine. Russian propaganda tries to obscure true motivations for its invasion. Looking back helps separate Russian stated "initial war aims" mis-information (below) from true objectives.
3/ On the 8th anniversary of Crimea's occupation (18 MAR 2022) Putin said "These were essential things such as gas and power supply, utility infrastructure, restoring the road network, and construction of new roads, motorways and bridges” but also said “There is more to it."
On November 11, 2022, the Russians exploded charges on the 3 dam gates on the north side (right bank) of the Kakhovka HPP Dam along with the road and railroad deck over the dam. #NAFOWeather
What is the Russian intention? Minimally, to stop UAF pursuit of the retreating Russian troops. Russians have also destroyed the Kherson energy infrastructure as part of their retreat. This is part of a systemic plan to cripple the Ukrainian economy.
But clearly, draining the Kakhovka dam may not be a Russian priority as it feeds the Crimean Canal which provides water to Crimea. In fact, restarting the flow of water was one of the first priorities after capturing the canal nationalpost.com/pmn/news-pmn/c…