This is the third in a short series of threads exploring the military history of Crimea, which may soon become a battlefield again as Ukraine seeks to recapture it.
2/ In this part, I'll be looking at the Ukrainian conquest of Crimea in 1918 and the Red Army's reconquest in 1920.
For the first part, on Crimea's military geography, see here:
4/ The 1917 Russian Revolution sparked a civil war across the former Russian Empire and political chaos in Crimea. Between December 1917 and November 1920, it was successively ruled by the Crimean People's Republic, the Taurida Soviet Socialist Republic,…
5/ … the Ukrainian People's Republic, the First and Second Crimean Regional Governments, the Crimean Socialist Soviet Republic, the South Russian Government and the Government of South Russia.
6/ The Bolshevik takeover was resisted by the White movement, a loose coalition of anti-Bolshevik forces, and by local nationalist movements which established their own 'People's Republics' in several regions.
7/ A short-lived Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) was created in 1918 with German backing. It aspired to capture Bolshevik-controlled Crimea but Germany also wanted the peninsula as a stepping-stone to the Caucasus oilfields, in support of their war effort in the West.
8/ The Ukrainians were determined to get to Crimea first, so in April 1918 UNR forces under Colonel Petro Bolbochan mounted an audacious invasion of the peninsula.
9/ Bolbochan led the Bolsheviks to believe that he would attack across the strongly defended Perekop Isthmus, but instead led his force of 9,000 men to the Chonhar railway bridge, which carried the Mariupol-Simferopol railway across the Syvash.
10/ 5,000 men of the Red Army were dug in and entrenched on the Crimean side, opposite the Chonhar Peninsula. On the night of 21-22 April, Bolbochan launched a lightning attack on their positions on the far side of the bridge.
11/ Twenty Cossacks with light machine guns crossed the bridge under the cover of darkness on a large drezin (railcar) and routed Bolshevik forces on the other side before they could blow up the bridge.
12/ Two armoured trains followed, machine-gunning the Bolshevik trenches alongside the railway line and sending the Red Army soldiers fleeing. By the morning of 22 April, the Ukrainians were in full control of the bridge.
13/ Bolbochan advanced to the rail junction of Dzhankoi by the evening and divided his force to capture the southern Crimean ports. At the same time, 30,000 men of German 52nd Division under Robert Koch smashed through the Bolshevik defences at Perekop in a single day.
14/ Bolbochan never made it to his objective at Crimea. The Germans ordered the Ukrainians to leave and established a short-lived puppet state in Crimea that lasted until the German collapse in November 1918.
15/ By 1920 the peninsula was in the hands of the White movement. The Whites' military leader in the south, Pyotr Wrangel, attempted to lead an offensive from Crimea towards the Dnipro and Donbas in September-October 1920.
16/ Wrangel's offensive was defeated by the Red Army's Southern Front under Mikhail Frunze. He was driven back into the peninsula and retreated behind the fortifications at Perekop, which he had made even more formidable.
17/ The Whites had three lines of fortifications: the old Tatar Ditch which Wrangel had deepened and steepened, a line of trenches and emplacements in front of it, and outposts 2 km beyond that. It was guarded by 750 machine guns, 180 artillery pieces and an armoured train.
18/ Fortifications had also been constructed 20 km further south in the Ishun area, another natural chokepoint created by three lakes just to the east and the Black Sea to the west.
19/ The bridges on the Chonhar Peninsula connecting the Ukrainian mainland to Crimea had been blown up and more defences had been built on the Crimean side. The Arabat Spit was guarded from the sea by the White-controlled Azov Sea Fleet and on land by a Cossack regiment.
20/ Wrangel claimed that "the Crimea is impregnable." However, he was hugely outnumbered. Frunze had vast numerical superiority – 100,000 infantry and 40,000 cavalry, against Wrangel's 33,000 men.
21/ Wrangel had about 10,000 men at Perekop, 3,000 at Chonhar, 6,000 in reserve and the rest either on the Arabat Spit or fighting Bolshevik partisans within Crimea. He also had around 200 artillery pieces, 1,500 machine guns, 5 armoured trains, 20 armoured cars and 3 tanks.
22/ Although Frunze had a nearly 3 to 1 artillery advantage, artillery did not play a major role in the offensive – largely due to the inadequacies of his own artillery commanders – and air power was not a factor.
23/ Frunze, who obviously knew his military history, wanted initially to invade Crimea via the Arabat Spit just as Peter Lacy had done in 1737. However, he had to abandon this plan as the Reds' Azov Sea Fleet was unable to leave its base at Taganrog due to sea ice.
24/ Without naval support, an advance along the spit would have been hopelessly exposed. Frunze therefore switched to making a frontal assault at Chonhar and Perekop, with the main effort at Perekop.
25/ Frunze divided his force at Perekop in two. Taking advantage of a strong westerly wind and low tide, part of his force was able to ford the Syvash after 22:00 on 7 November 1920 and wade around 5 km to the lightly defended Litovsky Peninsula.
26/ Inexplicably, the Reds did not coordinate their attack against the Litovsky Peninsula with their main effort at Perekop. It was not until 13:00 on 8 November that the assault was launched.
27/ It was a disaster – a frontal charge into machine gun emplacements with little artillery support because of their commanders' incompetence, inexperience and a lack of coordination with the artillery. Some Red units suffered 60% casualties.
28/ Frunze called up reserves and managed to make a breakthrough on 9 November. His other forces attacked from the Chonhar Peninsula at midnight on 10-11 November, using log rafts to cross the narrow strait and infiltrate the White defences under the cover of darkness.
29/ The Whites fell back from Perekop to their second line of defences at Ishun. As the Reds pursued them to Ishun, the Whites feigned a retreat then confronted them with 150 tachanki – horse-drawn wagons carrying machine guns – which mowed down the Red cavalry.
30/ The defensive line at Ishun enabled the Whites to hold off the Reds for a few more days while inflicting heavy casualties on them. However, Wrangel realised the war was lost, as the Whites could not hold off the Reds for long.
31/ There was also no realistic possibility of them holding off the Reds on the plains of central Crimea. The entire region north of the coastal mountains in the south is a flat and featureless, and lacks any natural lines of defence or cover.
32/ By this time his army was also demoralised, short of men and had lost many of its weapons. Making a stand at Sevastopol was pointless.
33/ Wrangel ordered a retreat to Sevastopol during the night of 11-12 November. From there his army used the remains of the Russian Black Sea Fleet to evacuate itself to safety in Constantinople (Istanbul) and eventual asylum in France.
34/ The Reds made a leisurely advance to Sevastopol and took the remainder of the peninsula with little resistance. They had won, but at a very high price: they suffered around 10,000 casualties, against the 2,000 sustained by Wrangel's forces.
35/ Frunze had essentially won through sheer mass. He was proclaimed a hero and the victory became a key moment for the Red Army. It's still commemorated by a diorama in the Central Armed Forces Museum in Moscow.
36/ In my next threads, I'll look at the much bloodier battles in World War II as Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union invaded and reconquered Crimea, and then draw some conclusions for today's situation. /end
1/ Russia is reportedly considering proposing a wide-ranging economic partnership with the Trump administration, including joint cooperation to push fossil fuels as an alternative to Chinese and European clean energy solutions, in opposition to curbing climate change. ⬇️
2/ Bloomberg is reporting that Russia has prepared a seven-point memo that includes a return to the dollar settlement system, reversing Putin's by now well-established policy of creating an alternative system insulated from US economic pressure.
3/ The proposals also include joint US-Russian ventures in manufacturing, nuclear energy, oil and LNG extraction, preferential conditions for US companies in Russia to compensate for past losses, cooperation on raw materials, and jointly working against clean energy.
1/ Why does the Russian government appear to be so clueless about the role Telegram plays in military communications? The answer, one warblogger suggests, is that the military leadership doesn't want to admit its failure to provide its own reliable communications solutions. ⬇️
2/ Recent claims by high-ranking officials that Telegram isn't relevant to military communications have prompted howls of outrage and detailed rebuttals from Russian warbloggers, but have also pointed to a deeper problem about what reliance on Telegram (and Starlink) represents.
3/ In both cases, the Russian military has failed abysmally to provide workable solutions. Telegram and Starlink were both adopted so widely because the 'official' alternatives (military messngers and the Yamal satellite constellation) are slow, unreliable and lack key features.
1/ Telegram is deeply embedded into Russian military units' internal communications, providing functionality that MAX, the Russian government's authorised app, doesn't have. A commentary highlights the vast gap that is being opened up by the government's blocking of Telegram. ⬇️
2/ The Two Majors Charitable Foundation writes that without Telegram, information exchange, skills transfer, and moral mobilisation work within the Russian army will be crippled:
3/ "I'd really like to add that for a long time, we've been gathering specialized groups in closed chats, including those focused on engineering and UAVs, to share experiences and build a knowledge base. Almost everyone there is a frontline engineer.
1/ Russia's Federal Customs Service is seeking to prosecute Russian volunteers who are importing reconnaissance drones from China to give to frontline troops. It's the latest chapter in a saga of bureaucratic obstruction that is blocking vital supplies to the Russian army. ⬇️
2/ Much of the army's equipment, and many of its drones, are purchased with private money by volunteer supporters or the soldiers themselves. High-tech equipment such as drones and communications equipment is purchased in China or Central Asia and imported into Russia.
3/ However, the Federal Customs Service has been a major blocker. Increased customs checks on the borders have meant that cargo trucks have suffered delays of days or even weeks, drastically slowing the provision of essential supplies for the Russian army.
1/ Leaked casualty figures from an elite Russian special forces brigade indicate that it has suffered huge losses in Ukraine, equivalent to more than half of its entire roster of personnel. Scores of men are listed as being 'unaccounted for', in other words having deserted. ⬇️
2/ The 10th Separate Guards Special Purpose Brigade (military unit 51532) is a special forces (spetsnaz) unit under the GRU. It is a 2002 refoundation by Russia of a Soviet-era spetsnaz unit that, ironically, passed to Ukraine when the Soviet Union broke up in 1991.
3/ Since the invasion of February 2022, the brigade has been fighting on the Kherson front, which has seen constant and extremely bloody fighting over the islands in the Dnipro river and delta. Russian sources have reported very high casualties.
1/ Russian warbloggers are continuing to provide examples of how Telegram is used for frontline battlefield communications, to refute the claim of presidential spokesman Dmitri Peskov that such a thing is "not possible to imagine". ⬇️
2/ Platon Mamadov provides two detailed examples:
"Example number one:
Aerial reconnaissance of Unit N spotted a Ukrainian self-propelled gun in a shelter in the middle of town N."
3/ "Five minutes after the discovery, the target's coordinates and a detailed video were uploaded to a special secret chat group read by all drone operators, scouts, and artillerymen in that sector of the front.