In this final thread in a short series, I'll look at the lessons that can be learned from Crimea's military history and the challenges that Ukraine might face if it wants to use force to retake Crimea.
2/ In the first part, I looked at Crimea's military significance, its unique geography and the difficulties it presents for invaders – as well as the defensive advantages it holds for its occupiers.
3/ In the second part, I reviewed Crimea's history of invasions from the 16th to the 19th centuries, including the initial Russian conquest of Crimea in the 18th century.
4/ In the third part, I looked at the battles for Crimea in 1918 and 1920 during the Russian Civil War, when Bolsheviks, the anti-Bolshevik White movement, the short-lived Ukrainian People's Republic and Imperial Germany competed to control the peninsula.
5/ The fourth part covered Nazi Germany's immensely bloody 1941-42 invasion of Crimea. Over 500,000 Soviet soldiers became casualties along with at least 115,000 Axis troops during 10 months of bitter fighting including the eight-month siege of Sevastopol.
6/ The fifth part addressed the 1943-44 Soviet reconquest of Crimea, when the Red Army first obtained bridgeheads on the peninsula and then swept across Crimea, rapidly clearing out the occupying Axis forces.
7/ Crimea has been invaded 9 times in the past 300 years – 1675, 1736, 1737, 1771*, 1854, 1918*, 1920*, 1941* and 1944*. Four of those invasions were effectively large-scale raids for strategic advantage; the other five (* above) were mostly successful attempts at conquest.
8/ Russia's seizure of Crimea in 2014 was more of a coup de main – its troops were already present in military bases leased from Ukraine – and was not accompanied by any significant bloodshed. However, a Ukrainian attempt to retake Crimea by force will face many difficulties.
9/ As I highlighted in the first thread, Crimea's geography makes it a difficult place to invade. There are only three narrow land routes into the peninsula. Two of them – the Chonhar Peninsula and the Arabat Spit – are reliant on bridges, while the third is a narrow isthmus.
10/ All of these invasion routes, plus the Syvash salt lagoons north of Crimea, have been used at various times, but they also present major difficulties:
🔺 The Perekop Isthmus is narrow, flat, lacks any natural cover, and has been heavily fortified for centuries.
11/🔺 The bridges from the Chonhar Peninsula can easily be demolished and the narrow peninsula, as well as the opposite shore, is still studded with WW2 fortifications. The area is also completely flat and lacks any cover.
12/🔺 The bridge to the Arabat Spit can also be demolished easily. There is no proper road along the spit, which is only 270 m (885 ft) wide at one point. Again, it's flat and completely exposed, and is particularly vulnerable to naval or air attack from the Sea of Azov.
13/🔺 The Syvash is in most places too shallow for conventional boats, too wide to swim and too deep or too muddy to wade. It's possible to cross in certain places but only at certain times and on foot, without heavy equipment, any concealment or any cover from air attack.
14/ Russia is clearly well aware of these defensive advantages and has made systematic efforts to refortify these areas. New fortifications are visible in satellite images and have been mapped (see map linked below). google.com/maps/d/u/0/vie…
15/ Notably, the Russians appear to be refortifying the “traditional” invasion routes along the Perekop isthmus and Chonhar peninsula as well as building a line of fortifications behind the entire north Crimean coastline, presumably to block any crossings of the Syvash.
16/ The experience of World War II, in particular the Axis invasion of Crimea in 1941-42 and the Soviet reconquest of 1943-44, is highly relevant to the current situation – although there are some very important differences that are worth highlighting.
17/ The Russians are now likely in a stronger defensive position in Crimea than the Soviets were in 1941 or the Axis was in 1943. The Ukrainians are certainly far weaker compared to their opponents than the invading Wehrmacht was in 1941 or the Red Army was in 1943-44.
18/ The 1941-42 invasion was accomplished without air or naval superiority. The Germans were able to breach the deep Soviet defences at Perekop and Ishun due to strong artillery and engineering support, well-trained and experienced troops, and effective combined arms tactics.
19/ They also had much better leadership than the Soviets, and the Red Army's Crimean force suffered from poor morale and ethnic discontent (particularly among non-ethnic Russian soldiers) that the Germans successfully exploited.
20/ The 1943-44 invasion did take place with Soviet air and naval superiority, although this wasn't used very effectively anywhere other than Perekop, where Soviet aircraft devastated the defending Axis forces and a Soviet amphibious landing forced the Axis into retreat.
21/ Notably, the Germans were unable to prevent the Soviets crossing the Kerch Strait to invade Crimea from the east – an important lesson for the present day. Even if Ukraine was able to retake Crimea, it would face a constant threat of Russian invasion from across the strait.
22/ In both invasions, once the peripheral defences were overcome, the invading forces were able to very rapidly advance across Crimea. The peninsula's flat, arid interior has few defensible places other than Sevastopol, the southern mountains and the Ak-Monai line in the east.
23/ Russia’s defensive plan for Crimea is clearly to block the Ukrainians in the far north of the peninsula, keeping them well away from the vulnerable interior. The new fortifications already appear to be more extensive than those installed by the Soviets or the Axis in WW2.
24/ Crimea can be resupplied by multiple land and sea routes – the ports of Yevpatoriya, Sevastopol, Yalta, Feodosiya and Kerch can all be used for resupply, and the Kerch bridge provides high-volume rail and road fixed links to Russia.
25/ In 1943-44 the Germans used merchant shipping and landing craft that were originally built (but never used) for the invasion of Britain to cross the Kerch Strait, resupply Crimea and evacuate their forces. Neither the Germans nor Soviets were able to interdict the sea routes.
26/ Ukraine is very unlikely to be able to blockade Crimea's ports. It has no significant naval capability to counter the Russian Black Sea Fleet, and no naval presence at all in the Sea of Azov. The modern Black Sea Fleet is more powerful than its 1940s equivalent.
27/ Port installations can certainly be struck with long-range missiles, but World War 2 demonstrated that ports (like Cherbourg, in the picture below) can remain operational even after suffering heavy damage from massive aerial bombardment, shelling and sabotage.
28/ While Ukraine did succeed in severely damaging the Kerch bridge in 2022, that has now been repaired and the same method of attack is unlikely to be repeatable. It does not have the means to attack the bridge by air or with long range artillery.
29/ The oft-mentioned ATACMS missile is unlikely to be effective at destroying the bridge due to its relatively small warhead (160-560 kg). US experience suggests that large (1000-2000 lb) guided bombs would be needed (see thread below).
30/ Crimea’s internal lines of communication are far better now than they were in the 1940s. It has the same railway lines, but its principal roads are now modern asphalt highways and no longer the dirt tracks that caused so many problems for earlier armies.
31/ Amphibious landings appear to be impossible. Ukraine reportedly only has one large landing craft, and such an effort would be suicidal without naval or air support. Russia has also been fortifying the coast against any conceivable amphibious attacks.
32/ Ukraine's air power is far less than that of Russia, which has many air bases in Crimea. Neither side currently has air superiority, due to the strength of their respective anti-aircraft defences – though Ukraine's defences may be more fragile than Russia's.
33/ Ukraine's options for retaking Crimea by force appear to be much the same as the Germans' in 1941 – a combined arms frontal attack at Perekop with heavy artillery, assault troops and combat engineers clearing the obstacles.
34/ However, the German experience showed that heavy casualties would be very likely with such an approach. They suffered 12,000 casualties in the battle for Perekop and Ishun. Modern weapons would likely inflict an even heavier toll on an attacker.
35/ It's also worth noting that the German victory at Perekop in 1941 was quite a close-run thing. The Soviets put up strong resistance, despite their disadvantages, and could conceivably have held off the Germans if they had been better led.
36/ The Russians would certainly resist more strongly than the Soviets did in 1941, when they were weakened by months of gigantic defeats and retreats. The Soviets viewed Crimea and its "Hero City" of Sevastopol as being sanctified by the 700,000 casualties they suffered there.
37/ Even today, Crimea's soil conceals uncounted numbers of Russian war dead. As recently as 2018, a previously unknown mass grave of Red Army soldiers was discovered at the Tatar Ditch near Perekop, where they had been killed in the 1 November 1944 assault on the Axis defences.
38/ Modern Russia has fetishised World War II, including the 1944 reconquest of Crimea, as a central element of Putin's nationalist ideology. Putin has presented Crimea's 'recovery' in 2014 as a crowning achievement. He can certainly be expected to fight very hard to retain it.
39/ This is not to say that conquering Crimea is likely to be impossible for Ukraine – but military history suggests that it would likely be a very costly and difficult exercise that would have a high risk of exhausting Ukraine's military resources. /end
1/ A military doctor who has deserted from the Russian army says she was forced to be a commander's 'field wife', had to rate crippled men as fit, saw 'undesirable' soldiers being shot by their officers, and others being "sold for slaughter" for their commanders' profit. ⬇️
2/ A female military doctor serving in the 19th Tank Regiment (military unit 12322) recorded a video about what she saw and experienced since joining the unit in June 2023. There are around 40,000 women in the Russian armed forces, mostly in medical roles.
3/ After signing a contract, she says she ended up after training "in Totskoye, Orenburg region – under the regiment commander Evgeniy Borisovich Ladnov, to the very commander who is called the 'butcher commander', the 'killer commander'".
1/ A new survey shows that global trust in the United States has plummeted since Donald Trump returned to office. Trump himself is less popular internationally than Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping. Israel and Iran come out as the least popular countries in the world. ⬇️
2/ The Alliance of Democracies has published its annual Democracy Perception Index, the world's largest annual survey on democracy. 111,000 respondents across 100 countries were surveyed between 9-23 April 2025.
3/ The survey shows that the net perception rating of the United States fell from +22% last year to -5% this year, just ahead of Russia with -9%. The share of countries with a positive image of the US dropped from 76% last year to 45% this year. China went up from +5% to +14%.
1/ The screech of drones (sound on) has become the defining sound of the Russia-Ukraine war. Two Russian commentaries describe what it's like in an environment where, according to Russian sources, Ukrainian drones outnumber Russian by seven to one. ⬇️
2/ 'Den Surca', written by a frontline Russian soldier, gives an insight into the psychological impact of 24/7 drone warfare:
3/ "There is absolutely nothing to write about. Every day is full of events and tension - but even so, nothing inside wants to even try to cling to some moment.
Several of our dugouts were burned. I passed by – I saw these pits filled with ash and burnt metal.
1/ A frustrated Russian warblogger complains at the "hopeless" nature of coordination between units of the Russian army, which he says is characterised by "arrogant disregard". It's a situation, he says, where "one branch of the military spins on the dick of another." ⬇️
2/ '13 Tactical' shows off a patch which he says is popular in the Russian army:
"Where did the INTERACTION patch come from and why is it so popular among the military?"
3/ "In addition to the number 13 and text, it depicts opossums [sic] from the Ice Age [movies], one holding a colander, the other holding a radio with a torn wire, both in armour.
1/ An ongoing crisis at Russian Railways is deepening, with a 50% cut on payments to employees and such a severe shortage of personnel that some divisions of the company are down to 40% of their intended staff numbers. Despite this, it has imposed a ban on hiring. ⬇️
2/ The state-owned railway monopoly has been facing a worsening staffing and financial crisis, brought on by a combination of a lack of spare parts caused by sanctions, economic problems and staff leaving for much better-paid jobs in the army or factories.
3/ The VChK-OGPU Telegram channel reports that the company is trying to fix the hole in its finances by drastically cutting expenses on employee costs and banning hiring new people. Bonuses have been cancelled, leading to a large reduction in salaries.
1/ Vladimir Putin was sheltered under a bomb-proof roof during today's Victory Day parade in Moscow. This appears to be the first time this has happened, highlighting the Russian government's nervousness about the threat of Ukrainian drone attacks. ⬇️
2/ In previous years, the Russian president and other VIPs have been seated in an open-air stand adjacent to the Kremlin's outer wall, overlooking Red Square. This has been the case in 2020, 2021 and 2023 (pictured here).
3/ This year, for the first time, Putin and his guests have been sheltered under a giant extended roof. This is said to be "in case a UAV appears", and may be intended to block any munitions being dropped on the dignitaries. /end