In this final thread in a short series, I'll look at the lessons that can be learned from Crimea's military history and the challenges that Ukraine might face if it wants to use force to retake Crimea.
2/ In the first part, I looked at Crimea's military significance, its unique geography and the difficulties it presents for invaders – as well as the defensive advantages it holds for its occupiers.
3/ In the second part, I reviewed Crimea's history of invasions from the 16th to the 19th centuries, including the initial Russian conquest of Crimea in the 18th century.
4/ In the third part, I looked at the battles for Crimea in 1918 and 1920 during the Russian Civil War, when Bolsheviks, the anti-Bolshevik White movement, the short-lived Ukrainian People's Republic and Imperial Germany competed to control the peninsula.
5/ The fourth part covered Nazi Germany's immensely bloody 1941-42 invasion of Crimea. Over 500,000 Soviet soldiers became casualties along with at least 115,000 Axis troops during 10 months of bitter fighting including the eight-month siege of Sevastopol.
6/ The fifth part addressed the 1943-44 Soviet reconquest of Crimea, when the Red Army first obtained bridgeheads on the peninsula and then swept across Crimea, rapidly clearing out the occupying Axis forces.
7/ Crimea has been invaded 9 times in the past 300 years – 1675, 1736, 1737, 1771*, 1854, 1918*, 1920*, 1941* and 1944*. Four of those invasions were effectively large-scale raids for strategic advantage; the other five (* above) were mostly successful attempts at conquest.
8/ Russia's seizure of Crimea in 2014 was more of a coup de main – its troops were already present in military bases leased from Ukraine – and was not accompanied by any significant bloodshed. However, a Ukrainian attempt to retake Crimea by force will face many difficulties.
9/ As I highlighted in the first thread, Crimea's geography makes it a difficult place to invade. There are only three narrow land routes into the peninsula. Two of them – the Chonhar Peninsula and the Arabat Spit – are reliant on bridges, while the third is a narrow isthmus.
10/ All of these invasion routes, plus the Syvash salt lagoons north of Crimea, have been used at various times, but they also present major difficulties:
🔺 The Perekop Isthmus is narrow, flat, lacks any natural cover, and has been heavily fortified for centuries.
11/🔺 The bridges from the Chonhar Peninsula can easily be demolished and the narrow peninsula, as well as the opposite shore, is still studded with WW2 fortifications. The area is also completely flat and lacks any cover.
12/🔺 The bridge to the Arabat Spit can also be demolished easily. There is no proper road along the spit, which is only 270 m (885 ft) wide at one point. Again, it's flat and completely exposed, and is particularly vulnerable to naval or air attack from the Sea of Azov.
13/🔺 The Syvash is in most places too shallow for conventional boats, too wide to swim and too deep or too muddy to wade. It's possible to cross in certain places but only at certain times and on foot, without heavy equipment, any concealment or any cover from air attack.
14/ Russia is clearly well aware of these defensive advantages and has made systematic efforts to refortify these areas. New fortifications are visible in satellite images and have been mapped (see map linked below). google.com/maps/d/u/0/vie…
15/ Notably, the Russians appear to be refortifying the “traditional” invasion routes along the Perekop isthmus and Chonhar peninsula as well as building a line of fortifications behind the entire north Crimean coastline, presumably to block any crossings of the Syvash.
16/ The experience of World War II, in particular the Axis invasion of Crimea in 1941-42 and the Soviet reconquest of 1943-44, is highly relevant to the current situation – although there are some very important differences that are worth highlighting.
17/ The Russians are now likely in a stronger defensive position in Crimea than the Soviets were in 1941 or the Axis was in 1943. The Ukrainians are certainly far weaker compared to their opponents than the invading Wehrmacht was in 1941 or the Red Army was in 1943-44.
18/ The 1941-42 invasion was accomplished without air or naval superiority. The Germans were able to breach the deep Soviet defences at Perekop and Ishun due to strong artillery and engineering support, well-trained and experienced troops, and effective combined arms tactics.
19/ They also had much better leadership than the Soviets, and the Red Army's Crimean force suffered from poor morale and ethnic discontent (particularly among non-ethnic Russian soldiers) that the Germans successfully exploited.
20/ The 1943-44 invasion did take place with Soviet air and naval superiority, although this wasn't used very effectively anywhere other than Perekop, where Soviet aircraft devastated the defending Axis forces and a Soviet amphibious landing forced the Axis into retreat.
21/ Notably, the Germans were unable to prevent the Soviets crossing the Kerch Strait to invade Crimea from the east – an important lesson for the present day. Even if Ukraine was able to retake Crimea, it would face a constant threat of Russian invasion from across the strait.
22/ In both invasions, once the peripheral defences were overcome, the invading forces were able to very rapidly advance across Crimea. The peninsula's flat, arid interior has few defensible places other than Sevastopol, the southern mountains and the Ak-Monai line in the east.
23/ Russia’s defensive plan for Crimea is clearly to block the Ukrainians in the far north of the peninsula, keeping them well away from the vulnerable interior. The new fortifications already appear to be more extensive than those installed by the Soviets or the Axis in WW2.
24/ Crimea can be resupplied by multiple land and sea routes – the ports of Yevpatoriya, Sevastopol, Yalta, Feodosiya and Kerch can all be used for resupply, and the Kerch bridge provides high-volume rail and road fixed links to Russia.
25/ In 1943-44 the Germans used merchant shipping and landing craft that were originally built (but never used) for the invasion of Britain to cross the Kerch Strait, resupply Crimea and evacuate their forces. Neither the Germans nor Soviets were able to interdict the sea routes.
26/ Ukraine is very unlikely to be able to blockade Crimea's ports. It has no significant naval capability to counter the Russian Black Sea Fleet, and no naval presence at all in the Sea of Azov. The modern Black Sea Fleet is more powerful than its 1940s equivalent.
27/ Port installations can certainly be struck with long-range missiles, but World War 2 demonstrated that ports (like Cherbourg, in the picture below) can remain operational even after suffering heavy damage from massive aerial bombardment, shelling and sabotage.
28/ While Ukraine did succeed in severely damaging the Kerch bridge in 2022, that has now been repaired and the same method of attack is unlikely to be repeatable. It does not have the means to attack the bridge by air or with long range artillery.
29/ The oft-mentioned ATACMS missile is unlikely to be effective at destroying the bridge due to its relatively small warhead (160-560 kg). US experience suggests that large (1000-2000 lb) guided bombs would be needed (see thread below).
30/ Crimea’s internal lines of communication are far better now than they were in the 1940s. It has the same railway lines, but its principal roads are now modern asphalt highways and no longer the dirt tracks that caused so many problems for earlier armies.
31/ Amphibious landings appear to be impossible. Ukraine reportedly only has one large landing craft, and such an effort would be suicidal without naval or air support. Russia has also been fortifying the coast against any conceivable amphibious attacks.
32/ Ukraine's air power is far less than that of Russia, which has many air bases in Crimea. Neither side currently has air superiority, due to the strength of their respective anti-aircraft defences – though Ukraine's defences may be more fragile than Russia's.
33/ Ukraine's options for retaking Crimea by force appear to be much the same as the Germans' in 1941 – a combined arms frontal attack at Perekop with heavy artillery, assault troops and combat engineers clearing the obstacles.
34/ However, the German experience showed that heavy casualties would be very likely with such an approach. They suffered 12,000 casualties in the battle for Perekop and Ishun. Modern weapons would likely inflict an even heavier toll on an attacker.
35/ It's also worth noting that the German victory at Perekop in 1941 was quite a close-run thing. The Soviets put up strong resistance, despite their disadvantages, and could conceivably have held off the Germans if they had been better led.
36/ The Russians would certainly resist more strongly than the Soviets did in 1941, when they were weakened by months of gigantic defeats and retreats. The Soviets viewed Crimea and its "Hero City" of Sevastopol as being sanctified by the 700,000 casualties they suffered there.
37/ Even today, Crimea's soil conceals uncounted numbers of Russian war dead. As recently as 2018, a previously unknown mass grave of Red Army soldiers was discovered at the Tatar Ditch near Perekop, where they had been killed in the 1 November 1944 assault on the Axis defences.
38/ Modern Russia has fetishised World War II, including the 1944 reconquest of Crimea, as a central element of Putin's nationalist ideology. Putin has presented Crimea's 'recovery' in 2014 as a crowning achievement. He can certainly be expected to fight very hard to retain it.
39/ This is not to say that conquering Crimea is likely to be impossible for Ukraine – but military history suggests that it would likely be a very costly and difficult exercise that would have a high risk of exhausting Ukraine's military resources. /end
1/ The world is very rapidly running out of refined fuel due to the Strait of Hormuz blockade, according to a new Goldman Sachs report, with only 45 days' worth of stockpiles of jet fuel, naphtha, and LPG remaining. Rationing, surcharges, and mass cancellations are forecast. ⬇️
2/ A research note authored by Goldman Sachs strategists Yulia Zhestkova Grigsby and Daan Struyven has examined the impact of Middle East disruptions on refined product markets, finding that jet fuel and diesel are being hit far harder than crude oil.
3/ The analysts estimate that about 101 days' worth of usable global oil stocks remain in stockpiles. (While more oil than that is stockpiled, it can't all be used, as the JP Morgan report summarised below explains.)
1/ Russia's (allegedly) most incompetent general says he plans to stand for election in Tatarstan as a candidate for Vladimir Putin's United Russia party. Russian warbloggers are unimpressed at Colonel General Alexander Lapin's continued failure upward. ⬇️
2/ Lapin has repeatedly been dismissed from his positions since the start of the Ukraine war, and has attracted a great deal of criticism – likely justified – for his failures in command. Now retired, this unpopularity has not stopped him from declaring his candidacy:
3/ "At this stage in my life, I have a great desire to serve my multinational people, to defend the interests of my small homeland, to help people, to fight for truth, to fight for justice, to defend the interests of our republic and, as a whole, our great Motherland – Russia."
1/ Oil prices will rise to at least $140 per barrel by June if the Strait of Hormuz is not reopened by July, and will not return to pre-Iran War levels before 2028 even in a best-case scenario, predicts Goldman Sachs. It warns of price surges and major economic impacts. ⬇️
2/ A new report from Goldman Sachs predicts that 14.5 million barrels per day of production have been lost in April 2026. Global stockpiles are being drained at a record 11-12 mb/d which, as JP Morgan has noted, risks a cliff-edge drop in oil supplies.
3/ The longer the blockade continues, the worse the damage becomes. Goldman predicts that in all but the best-case scenario, there will be permanent reductions ("scarring") in Gulf oil production of between 0.5 mb/d and 2.5 mb/d.
1/ This is what $200 per barrel of oil would mean for US gas prices, which currently average $4.30 per gallon. It could go much higher. As one analyst says, once oil stockpiles are functionally exhausted by the end of May, "price increases become exponential rather than linear."
2/ The exponential point is reached at $250 per barrel, which is well within the range of realistic possibilities predicted by many analysts. Linearity breaks down because of:
3/ ♦️ Refinery margin blowouts — refineries pass through higher feedstock costs at elevated rates under stress
♦️ Speculation and panic premiums — markets take fright and price in fear, not just fundamentals
1/ The world faces a catastrophic cliff-edge shortage of oil due to the Strait of Hormuz blockade in the next four weeks, analysts warn. This will cause a deep recession, fuel rationing, the shutdown of entire industries, and oil prices potentially as high as $370 per barrel. ⬇️
2/ A month ago, JP Morgan published a report highlighting that the last oil shipments from the Persian Gulf countries would be delivered by 20th April. That date has come and gone, and oil shipments via the Strait of Hormuz have not resumed.
3/ Limited amounts of Gulf oil have continued to be pumped via pipelines to ports on the Red Sea and Arabian Sea. However, instead of producing enough oil supply to meet global demand, the world has been relying on emergency stockpiles.
1/ Russia faces being surrounded by Europe's mightiest power - the United Kingdom. In a commentary that highlights Russian nationalists' peculiar obsession with Britain, a warblogger predicts doom unless a military alliance is formed with China, North Korea, and Iran. ⬇️
2/ 'Tungsten' writes:
""Azerbaijan, right next door, is beginning joint production with Ukraine of anti-drone systems, FPV drones, and naval unmanned aerial vehicles.
Britain's southern thrust is on our North Caucasus through Armenia."
3/ "Norway, Denmark, and Sweden, together with Ukraine, will begin producing air defence systems and equipment for combat operations in the Arctic and North Atlantic, along the border with Russia, starting in June of this year.