1/ I used #AutoRuns v14.09 (GUI) in my lab setup but noticed that it failed to find (or display) the malware in the Startup folder, although the file is there (screenshot below).
I checked back and forth, searched manually for the file, and restarted the OS and AutoRuns.
🧵
2/ With #Velociraptor, I ran the hunt Sysinternals.Autoruns, and with the CLI version of AutoRuns, the malware is found in the Startup folder.
3/ The same for the #Velociraptor hunt Sys.StartupItems.
4/ Am I making a silly mistake, or is this version of AutoRuns buggy? (I haven't tested an older version yet). The version I am using is the latest one available for download from the MS website).
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
1/ Customer receives an email from a network monitoring device that a host is supposedly infected with a #CoinMiner. The Task Manager on the said system shows the following screenshot 🤕.
A story of an unpatched system, incorrect scoping, and 🍀. 🧵
1/ Real-World #PingCastle Finding #13: Allow log on locally
➡️ Domain Users are eligible to log into DC's 🤯🙈
"When you grant an account the Allow logon locally right, you are allowing that account to log on locally to all domain controllers in the domain." [1]
"If you do not restrict this user right to legitimate users who must log on to the console of the computer, unauthorized users could download and run malicious software to elevate their privileges." [1]
3/ I encountered this finding several times in our AD assessments, so you better check your settings in your domain right now (better safe than sorry 🔒).
2/ @threatpunter wrote a detailed blog about WMI persistences and how to remove them.
"The simplest method to remove the entry from the WMI database is to use Autoruns. Launch Autoruns as an administrator and select the WMI tab to review WMI-related persistence." ✂️
3/ "Alternatively, you can remove the WMI event subscriptions from the command line." [2]
This is the last thread in this AD hardening measure series, but there would still be so much to discuss 😅
Here are more points you should focus on to defend your networks even better.
"Administrative accounts should never be enabled for delegation.
You can prevent these privileged accounts from being targeted by enabling the ‘Account is sensitive and cannot be delegated’ flag on them. You can optionally add these accounts to the ‘Protected Users’ group.