#ESETResearch confirms Lazarus is linked to the recent #3CX supply-chain attacks. Based on code similarities and network infrastructure, we connect the 3CX incident with a Linux case of DreamJob, a long-term Lazarus operation using job offer as lures. 1/6 welivesecurity.com/2023/04/20/lin…
First, let’s look at the timeline. It shows that the trojanized macOS version of the 3CX Desktop App was ready two months prior to the distribution of the Windows version. Also interesting is that the attack was in preparation as early as December 2022. 2/6
It was reported that Mandiant has found Mac malware they call SIMPLESEA inside the 3CX network. While we do not have the sample, their description of this malware overlaps with second-stage Linux malware we found while investigating a recent Operation DreamJob case. 3/6
This second-stage Linux malware, which we call SimplexTea, also stores its single-byte-XORed configuration in a file named “apdl.cf”, implements a stream cipher based on A5/1, and connects to journalide[.]org, a domain mentioned in the 3CX incident summary. 4/5
Three 32-bit integers, 0xC2B45678, 0x90ABCDEF, and 0xFE268455, used a key material for a custom implementation of the A5/1 cipher, were used in Windows malware that dates back to the end of 2014: the infamous cybersabotage of Sony Pictures Entertainment. 5/6
#ESETResearch discovered an attack by APT group Tick against a data-loss prevention (DLP) company in East Asia and found a previously unreported tool used by the group. welivesecurity.com/2023/03/14/slo…@0xfmz 1/6
In 2021, in the DLP company’s network, the attackers introduced trojanized installers of the legitimate application Q-dir, part of a toolkit used by the company. When executed, the installer dropped the open-source ReVBShell backdoor and ran the original Q-dir application. 2/6
Subsequently, in 2022, on customers of the DLP company’s software, the trojanized Q-dir installers were deployed using remote support tools. Our hypothesis is that this occurred while the DLP company provided technical support to their customers. 3/6
#ESETResearch analyzed a new #MustangPanda backdoor. Its C&C communications is done over #MQTT using the open-source QMQTT library, so we named it MQsTTang. This library depends on parts of the Qt framework, statically linked in the PE. welivesecurity.com/2023/03/02/mqs… 1/5
A sample of MQsTTang was identified by @Unit42_Intel on 2023-02-17. As stated in that thread, the backdoor uses the legitimate MQTT broker 3.228.54.173. This has the benefit of hiding their actual C&C servers from victims and analysts.
#ESETResearch analyze first in-the-wild UEFI bootkit bypassing UEFI Secure Boot even on fully updated Windows 11 systems. Its functionality indicates it is the #BlackLotus UEFI bootkit, for sale on hacking forums since at least Oct 6, 2022. @smolar_mwelivesecurity.com/2023/03/01/bla… 1/11
BlackLotus brings legit but vulnerable binaries to the victim’s system (#BYOVD) to exploit #CVE-2022-21894 and bypass UEFI Secure Boot on up-to-date Windows systems. In some samples, these binaries are downloaded directly from the MS Symbol Store. cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvenam… 2/11
Although the vulnerability was fixed in Microsoft’s January 2022 update, its exploitation is still possible by bringing vulnerable drivers to the system, as the affected binaries have still not been added to the UEFI revocation list. msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/e… 3/11
While #infostealer detections trended downwards in 2022, decreasing by 10% in #ESET telemetry, #banking malware doubled in numbers YoY. #ESETresearch 1/4
This phenomenon was caused by the prevalence of the web skimmer JS/Spy.Banker, also known as #Magecart. Throughout the year, it consistently accounted for about three-fourths of banking malware detections. It was also the third most detected infostealer overall in T3 2022. 2/4
Despite its prevalence, Magecart wasn’t the only banking malware to stand out this time: LATAM banking trojans had a strong end of the year; the detections of #Grandoreiro, #Casbaneiro, #Mekotio, and several others spiked significantly in T3. 3/4
👏 Proofpoint for this blogpost on #TA866. @ESETResearch have been tracking this group for a while and we assess with medium confidence that TA866 and #AsylumAmbuscade are the same group. 1/4
In their February 2022 espionage campaign, attackers delivered a LUA downloader that installed #AHKBOT / #SunSeed AutoHotkey, the same implant used in recent crimeware campaigns. 2/5
Targets included several European Ministries of Foreign Affairs and other organizations related to the Russia-Ukraine war. 3/5 proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat…
#ESETesearch discovered Dolphin, a sophisticated backdoor extending the arsenal of the #ScarCruft APT group. Dolphin has a wide range of spying capabilities and is deployed on selected targets only. welivesecurity.com/2022/11/30/who… 1/6
The backdoor was used as the final payload of a multistage attack in early 2021, involving a watering-hole attack on a South Korean online newspaper, an Internet Explorer exploit, and another ScarCruft backdoor, named BLUELIGHT, previously reported by Volexity and Kaspersky. 2/6
While BLUELIGHT performs basic reconnaissance, Dolphin actively searches the drives of compromised systems for files of interest and exfiltrates them to Google Drive. Its other capabilities include keylogging, taking screenshots and stealing credentials from browsers. 3/6