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Apr 24 20 tweets 7 min read Twitter logo Read on Twitter
THE BRITISH ARMY AND THE DEFENCE COMMAND PAPER REFRESH 2023. 🧵
British Army's 2021 Future Soldier strategy was seen more as a structure driven by costs than than a structure defined by strategy, even though it the Integrated Review got more things right than wrong.
(1 of 20)
This is the British Army of today. Three primary elements: the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps HQ, the Field Army and Home Command. Total headcount reduced to 72,500, the lowest it has been for 200 years. Three divisions, but only one of these is deployable.
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The Field Army's three divisions yield eight combat brigades, but only four of these have Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) enablers. So basically only half of the Army is actually usable. Which is a bummer.
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This is the overall structure of the Field Army. Regular Army infantry battalions rely on the Army Reserve to provide a 3rd rifle company. Take away the Army Reserve and it looks even more anaemic. It's a far cry from the Cold War Army of 1980s. (Reserves shown faded)
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The goal of the 2021 IR and DCP was to make defence relevant and credible, while making it more affordable and sustainable going forward. In the light of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, we now need to ask ourselves what did we get right and what needs to change?
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We knew Russia was the principal threat while China was a secondary challenge. We recognised the danger posed by Iran, North Korea, and Islamic terror groups. We also acknowledged the risk of a Black Swan, the totally unexpected scenario that erupts out of nowhere.
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We realised that our armed forces needed to offer utility LOCALLY, in the Euro-Atlantic Sphere, but also GLOBALLY, in the Indo-Pacific sphere. Therefore, the Army needed to be "Expeditionary by Design."
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The UK's integrated Operating Concept has been validated by events in Ukraine. This envisages the British Army prioritising the FIRST BATTLE / DEEP BATTLE over the SECOND BATTLE / CLOSE BATTLE. It is about getting there first to prevent territory from being lost.
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The First Battle / Deep Battle concept is about degrading enemy forces at standard off distances using long-range artillery like 52 calibre 155 mm guns and MLRS systems. Unfortunately, we lack mass in this area and need more indirect firepower.
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In war the only certainty is uncertainty. Which means we'll be surprised and lose ground. So as much as might wish to fight the First Battle / Deep Battle over the Second Battle / Close Battle, we will need to conduct combined arms manoeuvre to retake it.
(10 of 20)
The trouble is that while light Infantry equipped with MRAPS and ATGM like Javelin are very good at fighting defensive battles, to attack you need MBTs and IFVs to conduct combined arms manoeuvre. Essentially, it means you need a mix of light and heavy forces.
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Again, the British Army scores well in this area. Its planned brigades offer a balanced mix of capabilities suitable across multiple scenarios. But if there's one criticism, we may be too focused on light forces with a lack of protected mobility and firepower.
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So, how to make sense of this?
1⃣The British Army needs to do more to restore a capacity for high-end war fighting at scale.
2⃣ It needs additional artillery, including more MLRS, air defence and attritable UAS
3⃣ If Warrior is retired, it will need a new IFV.
(13 of 20)
4⃣ The British Army needs more MBTs. Assuming 2 square brigades, with 2 x Type 44 regiments each plus training and reserve MBTs, we will need to upgrade all 227 Challengers.
5⃣The Deep Reconnaissance Strike brigade is a paper formation until Ajax finally delivers.
(14 of 20)
6⃣Does the British Army really need a Security Force Assistance Brigade and an Army Special Operations Brigade? Couldn't the Ranger Regiment perform both roles assisted by 16 Air Assault Brigade as a supporting Tier 2 SOF unit?
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7⃣ If we're short of frontline troops, can we afford to resource the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps HQ? Can someone else do this, so we can focus on delivering hard power?
8⃣Speaking of HQ units, can we reduce the total number and the number of personnel within each?
(16 of 20)
Being realistic, we cannot expect to generate more than the 8 brigades we have today. But let's reorganise them:
2 x Armoured (with Challenger & new IFV)
2 x Mechanised (with Boxer ICV)
2 x Light Mech. (with Foxhound & Mastiff MRAPs)
1 x Army Spec. Ops.
1 x 16 AAB
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The evolution of the British Army 2025 plan would look something like this. While the only uplift in frontline headcount would be making the SFAB battalions regular infantry again, additional CS and CSS enablers are needed to make more brigades sustainable.
(18 of 20) Image
The extra investment required to achieve this would be 227 Challenger 2s upgraded instead of 148, a new IFV to replace Warrior (600 in total), more MLRS (72 HIMARS), and more air defence systems (48 SkySabre instead of 24). Everything else is in the budget.
(19 of 20) Image
Army 2025 Refine could potentially look like this. It provides two deployable divisions (one expeditionary + one manoeuvre) plus a special operations division. This may not be affordable today, but we could start to move towards it from 2025 onwards.
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More from @nicholadrummond

Apr 11
The US Army’s Next Generation Squad Weapon (NGSW) program has been controversial. Few people expected SIG to win with what many perceived to be an evolutionary approach. The smart money was on Textron and its innovative cased-telescoped ammunition and weapon technology.
1/12
What made NGSW controversial is that US Army wanted a bullet that could defeat Level IV body armour at 600 metres. This resulted in an ammunition that matches .300 Winchester Magnum, a long-range sniping cartridge. (7.62 mm versus .300 WINMAG)
2/12
The NGSW competition was about how to package a US Government-furnished 6.8 mm EPR-style projectile in the smallest possible cartridge and weapon system. Three companies were down-selected GD-OTS, SIG Sauer, and Textron.
3/12
Read 12 tweets
Mar 17
The UK’s purchase of Archer may seem illogical to some, but is actually a clever solution with multiple benefits.
1️⃣ AS90 is no longer fit for purpose. The Army desperately needs a 52 calibre howitzer and it cannot wait for MFP to deliver in 3-5 years time. For the UK to lead the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, it must have credible tube artillery now.
2️⃣ Archer was available immediately
3️⃣ Archer was not expensive.
4️⃣ If Archer is not chosen for the MFP requirement subsequently, it will likely be easy to sell on to another customer.
Read 11 tweets
Mar 14
A few thoughts about #IR23 and its implications for the forthcoming Defence Command Paper. 🧵

IR21 was prescient and correct in identifying Russia and China as the two major threats. Russia was always the more immediate challenge due to its proximity, and IR23 reflects this.
1/ Image
IR21 recognised that resource constraints meant that our approach to the Indo-Pacific needed to be a "tilt" not an outright "pivot." The AUKUS construct is the perfect embodiment of this aspiration, especially as the threat posed by China is expanding not contracting.
2/ Image
The duality of Euro-Atlantic and Asia-Pacific roles means that seven Astute Class submarines is insufficient. In fact, many would argue that seven submarines is not even enough for Euro-Atlantic commitments. In other words, the UK's SSN fleet may need to grow.
3/ Image
Read 21 tweets
Jan 30
These five armies all have one thing in common: they're using the same camouflage pattern uniforms. This makes it hard to distinguish between them. Not a good look. Is Crye Precision / MTP really so good that nothing else will do? Or are our armed forces just fashion victims?
Why is this a problem?
You need to be able to tell your own forces apart from those of the enemy. If the enemy is wearing the same uniform as you and is indistinguishable, there’s a risk of friendly fire fire incidents, blue-on-blue, as they’re called.
1/
In Ukraine, we’ve seen both sides wearing armbands to show who they are, which shows that force ID is an issue. But if you need to wear a bright blue and yellow armband, it defeats the purpose of having a camouflage uniform.
2/
Read 11 tweets
Jan 25
Ukraine says it needs 300 tanks to replace losses and conduct “combined arms manoeuvre.” This is the modern equivalent of Blitzkrieg and describes a tactical approach through which tanks and infantry supported by artillery and air power retake lost ground.
1/
NATO and its partners could potentially provide five different tanks types:
1️⃣ M1A1 / M1A2 Abrams
2️⃣ Leopard 2 A4 / A5 / A6
3️⃣ Challenger 2
4️⃣ Leclerc
5️⃣ K2 Black Panther
All are equally capable and quantifiably better than anything the Russians have fielded in Ukraine.
2/
The US Abrams is highly capable and sophisticated. But its gas turbine engine is thirsty (even though newer models have an auxiliary power unit). It’s more difficult and expensive to support,but also more difficult to maintain and this may be its Achilles heel.
3/
Read 13 tweets
Jan 21
To clear-up the misunderstanding about Germany issuing "licences" for the export of tanks. This is not a German thing. Every NATO country that exports military weapons requires customers to have an END USER CERTIFICATE that confirms they are ultimate user of the capability.
Why? To stop weapons ending-up in the wrong hands. For example, the electronics in upgraded T-72s come from a French company that didn't require an end user certificate, or licence. Their products should never have been exported to Russia. So, yes, end user certificates matter.
Over the years, we have seen South American and African regimes somehow mange to obtain weapons that they should not have been allowed to receive. If we do not control arms traffic, then convicts will become more likely.
Read 4 tweets

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