1/ It has been almost a month since I provided a #MudSeason trafficability forecast. My assumption of a "normal" spring rainfall & improving trafficability were way too optimistic as it has rained Every. Damn. Day. since late March 2023. A #NAFOWeather 🧵
2/ #BLUF The trafficability forecast (below) is based on current and predicted rainfall which are well above normal for near the Line of Conflict (LoC). In general, trafficability is delayed about 1 month versus normal.
3/ Some input on #MudSeason from authoritative sources: @DefenceHQ "severe mud is highly likely slowing operations vor both sides" but "conditions can be expected to improve in the coming weeks".
4/ Some input on #MudSeason from authoritative sources: Prigozhin (authoritative?) "The offensive does not begin for understandable reasons: this is a monstrous slush" ... "The soil still needs around ten days to dry" (editorial: AFTER rain stops!)
5/ Some input on #MudSeason from authoritative sources: Estonian Defence Minister Hanno Pevkur "the biggest obstacle to a counteroffensive is weather (as) weather is quite rainy ... could be another month before we can talk about a real counteroffensive"
6/ Some input on #MudSeason from authoritative sources: "The guys from the trenches say hi to everyone, especially those who ask 'when is the counter-offensive."
8/ Example #MudSeason trafficability conditions no later than 22 April: "The soldiers of the 3rd separate presidential brigade showed the roads in Donetsk region that can only be used by military vehicles or soldiers' boots."
11/ Back to my updated trafficability forecast. Here are some of the considerations for extending the #MudSeason by about a month from "normal" spring on-set of good trafficability:
12/ Past two weeks accumulated precipitation (11-23 April) indicates 20-30 mm of rainfall. Luhansk and Donetsk will probably finish April with almost twice as much rainfall as normal.
13/ ECMWF 10 Day Total Accumulation Forecast through 4 May 2023 indicates significant rainfall predicted over Luhansk and Donetsk, decreasing amounts towards Zaporizhzhia and Kherson.
14/ Short-term ground trafficability forecast (through 1 May 2023)
15/ Copernicus C3S probability of cumulative rainfall anomaly for April-May-June:
16/ With increasing daily temperatures and decreasing humidity, soil WILL dry out providing sufficient strength to support tracked and wheeled vehicles and offensive operations. [Caveat: As long as weekly rainfall is less than 12-15 mm!]
3/ For Donetsk Oblast, area-wide precipitation received in the past 10 days was about 35 mm. This puts the most recent 30 day period +16% above normal, but the past 90 days are -16% below normal. Thus, recently precipitation was a nice catch-up from winter precipitation deficit.
1/ Heavy Precipitation/Snowfall *ALERT*
Wednesday Evening (MAR 29) to Friday Morning (MAR 31)
* Heavy snow likely in Luhansk and Donetsk
* Drone operations will be severely restricted
* Trafficability will be severely restricted
* Rising water will make creeks dangerous to ford
2/ 10 Day Forecast of weather for Bakhmut and Kreminna shows rate of precipitation, snowfall, & snow depth Thursday-Friday. Additional rainfall next WED. Most snow will melt by Saturday. Melting snow will make trafficability extremely difficult & rising creeks impassable.
3/ Comparing major global weather models, but agree on extreme precipitation potential next 72 hours (50-75 mm), but position of maxima varies by about 100 km which is relevant to the line of conflict.
13.2/ Temperature and precipitation along the Line of Conflict (LoC) at control points. April and May have the greatest temperature increase but lower precip from winter and summer seasons = increasing evapotranspiration (ET) (e.g., soil water loss). Source: @meteoblue
13.3/ Ukraine spring season (MAM) maps show northwest to southeast gradient of lower to higher temperatures & higher to lower precipitation indicating lower to higher ET/water loss. Source: University of East Anglia crudata.uea.ac.uk/~timo/climgen/…
1/ Back on March 2, 2023, @DefenceHQ declared it to be #MudSeason, Ukrainian as ‘bezdorizhzhia’, limiting cross country movement (CCM)/trafficability. This #NAFOWeather🧵 looks at when soil will dry sufficiently to support offensive operations.
2/ Most of the techniques referenced in the analysis originate from the #NATO Reference Mobility Model (NRMM). Documents describing the NRMM are public domain.
Cite: slideshare.net/QuestSystems/a…
3/ Processes which control vehicle trafficability are ground pressure exerted by vehicles and strength of soil. As soil dries, it can support a greater load. In addition to military applications, agriculture and land managers assess soil strength to minimize impact to vegetation.
1/ Who is operating the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (K-HPP)? What have K-HPP operator done that has caused the Kakhovka Reservoir to drop to 30 year low levels risking drinking water for millions and irrigation for 250 million hectares? A #NAFOWeather 🧵
2/ Kakhovka HPP is the 6th (and final) dam on the Dnipro River. The purpose of the dam is to provide water for irrigation, drinking, industry, shipping. K-HPP maintains Kakhovka Reservoir at 16m above MSL providing water for irrigation canals (e.g. NCC) & the Zaporizhzhia NPP.
3/ Who is operating the Kakhovka HPP?
Russians have occupied & operated the K-HPP since about March 1, 2022. Initially, the Ukrainian dam operator, @Ukrhydroenergo, provided technical assistance to Russian operators, but competent staff technical advise ceased after spring 2022.
24/ Aftermath of 11 NOV 2022 Russian attack on the K-HPP showed the destruction of the road and bridge decks above 3 sluice gates nearest the right bank. Thankfully, the 3 sluice gates appear to be holding water so the immediate threat of a flood averted.
25/ With the retreat completed from the right bank, the value of the K-HPP and reservoir have changed again. Since early December 2022, Russian K-HPP operators have been releasing huge amounts of water (about 3 km**3!) causing the Kakhovka Reservoir to drop to historic low levels