#Map Bakhmut madness
The topography at the west of Bakhmutka river provides some advantage for SE offense but at the end it favors those who is uphill.
The whole battlefield is 30km wide and 9 km deep so no deployment will hide.
*It’s made for entertainment.
1. Berkhivka hill.
It could be a good place for defense but fully exposed to the downhill attacks from the West and there are no positions to cover the area without exposure to the counter artillery. Can be used to launch an attack to a low ground.
2. Railroad between Berkhivka and Yahidne.
Position to control M03 and all the supply west of the river. The fields are smaller a assault tactics that was used by the russians may be used on the climb agains them on the fall.
3. M03 controll.
T0513 congestion would be a challenge, Paraskoviivka mine dominates the area and should be suppressed where UAV magic may come in handy.
Movement from the NW may help, large fields needs to be crossed in a single move, but they are probably mined.
4. T0513 and the vast valley around - there is no place to hide and would be abandoned once there would be a real push.
6, 7 Choke points.
There are 3 incoming roads from 🇷🇺, T0513 from Horlivka, T1302 - Lisychansk, T0504 - Popasna.
They all are comparably worst to defend than T0504 and O0506 on 🇺🇦 side but still deep behind the city, so 🇷🇺 should not wait when they would be cut off.
🇺🇦 don't really need to push that far away, securing the routes would be more than enough, but if the enemy allows all the possibilities needs to be used.
Outskirts of Berkhivka and Klishchiivka would be well above the expectations.
The Velykyi Burluk area sits on the watershed between the Siverskyi Donets and Oskil rivers. Rugged terrain and sparse roads define the region, with strategic hilltop routes bypassing small settlements.
Russians have captured Milove, a narrow stretch along the border. This secures key ravines and threatens Ambarne, potentially opening a route into the next valley with multiple operational options.
The most promising move is uniting the Oskil foothold along the Verkhmia Dvurichkova River. The area isn’t great for vehicles, but drones can control it. That alone could force a Ukrainian "withdrawal".
Pokrovsk Sector Analysis
RU forces hold dominant terrain across the Vovcha basin. The axis toward Filia is collapsing incrementally. However, AFU retains positional control on the elevated northern bank - limiting RU freedom of maneuver in the valley. /1
A key Russian option is to secure the Zirka–Yalta triangle and flood it with drone operators. With stable ammo supply, this zone could influence the entire sector. It is relatively secure from AFU counterattacks, allowing sustained drone operations. /2
The Vovcha’s meandering course compounds AFU movement constraints. With Vesele’s defensive belt compromised, the southern bank becomes indefensible over time. AFU likely to conduct phased withdrawal to preserve force integrity. /3
The war is evolving into a series of endless pockets. Russia tested its drone-oriented strategy in Sudzha and is now scaling it across the entire front in the shadow of the drone "swarm". 1/
Ukraine relies on fortified strongholds. But the joints between these defensive zones create weak noman points. Russia identifies and exploits these seams with systematic uneven pressure.
2/
By applying steady pressure across the entire line, Russia prevents Ukraine from executing effective countermeasures, one way missions insures that the point will be secured. This allows incremental gains on the flanks and creates multiple protrusions - the “claws.”
3/
Pokrovsk is the most data-rich direction, as GSUA publishes detailed reports about enemy activities in the area.
Every evening, GSUA publishes attacks and losses, showing 5-8 casualties per attack, with a noticeable correlation.
The ratio of casualties to attacks started to change after March 20, as summertime began to affect the morning and evening reporting of data.
A lot of attacks have been occurring at dusk, that will diverge the data sets.
What about the comparison of absolute numbers?
Almost every third attack happens in Pokrovsk,
but only 20% of Ivans are reported from that direction, making it seem cost-effective.
That doesn’t match the visual evidence.
By the end of November, the future appeared grim. However, recent successful operations by the AFU have brought a glimmer of hope, stabilizing the front lines pushing back the enemy.
Despite these positive developments, the battle is far from over.
0/13
1/ After stabilizing the Kursk axis, Russia may shift its focus to Pokrovsk, aiming to secure the Malynivka road junction and the Udachne mine to sustain offensive momentum.
2/ Meanwhile, AFU are working to push Russian units beyond the Solona River and maintain control over the M04 and T0515 roads, which are critical for logistics and maneuverability.
Ukraine can also prepare some alternative path to M04 over the fields towards Dobropillia.