As #LennartMeriConference is drawing to a close, some take-aways from many stimulating debates on stage and in the margins.
Supporting Ukraine has become the only possible position to take. Yet the limits of Western unity are hard to hide, with constant arguments over:
🧶
- the extent and speed of military support to Ukraine, now focused on F16s
- expected outcome of the war, and what does the level of expectation mean for Western policy
- Ukraine’s path to NATO and EU membership, where major steps forward should be made this year
I just don’t get the logic of those who argue that Ukraine is unlikely to liberate all territories, and therefore we should limit Western support, but this argument keeps being made.
Fear of Russia keeps shaping NATO’s position on Ukraine.
First, the wish not to provoke Russia "too much", since "eventually we need to agree with them on European security".
Amazing how little was learned from Western attempts not to provoke Russia thus far.
Second, there is Western fear of getting into war with Russia. Indeed, even after the current war in Ukraine stops, Russia may come back. The argument that having Ukraine in NATO would make this less likely and strengthen NATO's deterrence and defence remains a hard sell.
As for the EU, there is the big question of how the EU needs to be reformed before Ukraine et al. can join.
Supporters of enlargement, incl. the Baltic states, need to seriously engage in discussions on internal reform if we really want further enlargement to happen.
My take-away on Russia’s future is dark – the post-imperial and democratic Russia we’d so wish to see is nowhere in sight. There are reasonable Russians we keep talking to and supporting, but I’m afraid this sometimes distorts Western views on Russia’s future prospects.
'Global South' has become a compulsory topic of any international security conference these days. A lot of mourning about western lack of influence on the global South regarding Ukraine. But we need to acknowledge
there is geopolitical competition going on where many countries in the global south don’t want to choose side. We need to find ways to engage these countries but should not expect them to have identical views and interests with us.
Overall, one lesson I draw is that the Baltic states have been listened to more than ever during the past 15 months but it remains hard work to influence the decisions of the EU and NATO on Ukraine, Russia, European security etc.
Finally, I’m so proud of colleagues @ICDS_Tallinn – Eeva Eek-Pajuste et al. – who have worked hard to make this happen. Sometimes we don’t fully appreciate in Estonia how important #LennartMeriConference is for our country’s international influence. Let's keep it going.
END
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Exciting parliamentary #elections in #Finland today, coming 4 weeks after elections in #Estonia. Being a keen observer of both countries, some comparative remarks.🧶
1. Strong women played a prominent role in both campaigns. Both PMs @kajakallas and @MarinSanna have been international stars with a similar security agenda: Ukraine must win, Russia must leave all territories of 🇺🇦. Marin had an important role in taking Finland swiftly to NATO.
2. However, if they were in the same country, Kallas and Marin would hardly form a coalition together due to differences over economic policy – just as it would/will be difficult in Finland to form a coalition between right-wing National Coalition and Marin’s Social Democrats.
Sharp piece on the troubles of European defence by @maxbergmann@SophiaBesch
Estonia's initiative can be a game-changer:
"if the EU can jointly procure ammunition, there is no reason why it can’t take similar steps to jointly acquire artillery or..." 1/4 foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/why-eu…
The obstacles to closer EU defence cooperation are deeper though than tension between the interests of US and European defence industries. 2/4
Countries next to Russia are facing an existential threat, knowing that their European allies are neither materially nor mentally ready to counter it for many years to come. 3/4
I’ve been talking to dozens of western journalists and diplomats over the past months on the upcoming elections in 🇪🇪. The most common question I get (in many variations): is the Russian-speaking population a threat to Estonia's security? Some reflections.🧵
No, the main threat to 🇪🇪 security is not our Russian-speaking population. It is Russia.
The possibility of Russia interfering in any country having a Russian minority has to be taken seriously.
The Russian security doctrine claims the right to interfere in external countries in order to defend Russians. This was one of the main reasons Russia presented for starting war against Ukraine.
Some thoughts on Ukraine’s victory/Russia’s defeat. During the first weeks after 24 Feb invasion, the dominant view among Western experts was that Ukraine was doomed to lose. Russia was a major power, far bigger and stronger than Ukraine – supposedly. They were wrong.🧶
Where are we now?🇺🇦victory is increasingly seen as possible, and yet many Western experts think that Ukraine liberating all of its territories is too much to expect and would be too dangerous. Perhaps they are wrong again. We should not turn this into a self-fulfilling prophecy.
As long as Russia occupies even a small part of Ukraine’s territory, there can be no enduring peace. The West cannot legitimize it without destroying the principle that borders must not be changed by force – a principle it is thus far defending, however imperfectly.
There’s an increasing amount of articles in Western media speculating about Russia’s collapse and disintegration. Having contributed to this trend myself, I think some points are worth clarifying.
First, collapse and disintegration are not necessarily the same thing. I’ve written about collapse, meaning collapse of the current regime and (perhaps) system, but this does not need to lead to Russia disintegrating into pieces – although it may.
Second, post-imperial Russia to some (incl. myself) means Russia that no longer seeks to dominate its neighbours. To others it means also disintegration of the Russian Federation, with colonised minorities establishing their own states. Again, one may lead to the other - or not.
End of 2022, 10 months of Russia’s cruel war against Ukraine.
Thinking about what has changed for Europe, I’d highlight that Ukraine has become one of the great nations of Europe. Never before has it been regarded as such.🧶
This will profoundly change the (geo)political map and balance of power in Europe for decades to come, no matter when and how exactly the war will end. Ukraine will prevail and will be shaping tomorrow’s Europe.
Ukraine’s future and its justified expectations towards the EU and NATO are creating a lot of concern in Western Europe. I wish Ukraine would be seen more as a source of inspiration, hope and strength. Europe has a strong interest in Ukraine’s victory, speedy reconstruction and