There’s been much futile speculation in US and Europe about whether/how to push Ukraine to peace negotiations.
The real question is, how to push Russia to stop the war and not even think about restarting. Biden has practically encouraged Russia to continue, not stop, the war. 1/ Will Trump put pressure on Russia? Will Europe make a new push - on Russia, not Ukraine?
It's kind of simple. Ukraine needs more military aid now and security guarantees for the future. Europe needs to get stronger. The costs of war for Russia need to become unbearable. 2/

Back from Kyiv, once again impressed by the Ukrainians’ determination to fight for freedom.
Some take-aways:



Zelensky will soon present his “victory plan” to Biden, incl concrete steps Biden should take before leaving office. This will be the last chance for Biden to improve his legacy on Ukraine, tainted by extreme caution and exaggerated concern about escalation.

I’m getting questions from journalists covering EU top jobs #EUCO about whether Kaja Kallas is too anti-Russian to lead EU foreign policy. Some comments here.
I think the appointment of Kallas would be a sign that EU countries acknowledge the need to be tough with Russia. 1/ As long as Russia continues its brutal war against Ukraine, the EU has to maintain the course of assisting Ukraine and putting maximum pressure on Russia. There is constantly a need to do more in this regard. This is commonly agreed policy and the way towards a just peace. 2/

Indeed. I’ve heard similar talk from various foreign policy wonks in Europe, wishing to define it as a goal that Ukraine should just keep the territories it has and give up the rest. This is an utterly dangerous idea and out of touch with reality. A couple of thoughts👇

https://twitter.com/general_ben/status/1786288984236191987

Aiming for a settlement where Ukraine gives up some of its sovereign territory means aiming for a situation where the core norms of international security are no longer credible. It means creating bigger and costlier problems for the future. A whole new international (dis)order.

For sure, Russia wants to make everyone in the West believe there is no way Russia can be defeated in Ukraine, since it is so much bigger and stronger – even the Pope helps spread the Russian narrative; many Europeans tend to believe it and hence wish for negotiations. 1/ The problem is, the option of reaching sustainable peace by going for a negotiated compromise with Putin’s regime does not exist. 2/

Quite a lot of international attention to the Russian arrest warrant against Estonian PM Kaja Kallas.
Why did Russia do it and what can it achieve? 🧵1/ Kaja Kallas has been one of the most vocal proponents of supporting Ukraine and increasing the cost of war for Russia. Under her leadership, Estonia has been shaping EU and NATO policies regarding the war. No doubt Russia wants to shed a negative light on her. 2/

Some observations from Western debates on Russia, continuously reproducing lack of resolve and strategic clarity.
Western views on Russia are oscillating between overestimating and underestimating Russia’s power. Both are dangerous. 1/ Some claim that Russia cannot be defeated, it’s too big, its defeat would be too dangerous. So we are supposed to find a way to end the war in Ukraine asap. - As if there was a quick way out. There isn't. 2/

It is tempting to see Russia’s latest hybrid attack against Finland – i.e. use of migrants as a tool of malign influence – as a consequence of Finland’s NATO accession. However, let’s not forget that👇 1/ - Russia conducted a similar operation against Finland already in 2016. Not being in NATO did not prevent hybrid attacks.
- Just imagine if Finland was not in NATO today, how much more vulnerable it would be to any kind of Russian pressure. 2/

We really don't know if the latest cable damage in the Baltic Sea, reported yesterday by Sweden, is related to the previous ones. But we do know that
- our critical infrastructure is vulnerable to hybrid attacks
- there may be more to come 1/ - Russia is deeply unhappy with the changed balance of power in the Baltic Sea, where Russia's position is weaker than at any time during the past 300 years
- Russia avoids military conflict with NATO but actively tries to weaken NATO, using various non-military means 2/

Some post-Vilnius reflections:
In the media, the misperception that Ukraine was asking for NATO membership immediately, which was unrealistic, keeps coming up – and then the actual outcome is presented as a realistic one. This is false:
🧵 Neither Ukraine nor its strongest supporters asked for membership now, but a clear path and commitment. The problem with the communiqué wording is that it leaves too much uncertainty, which may be an encouragement to Russia.

Ukraine-NATO vicious circle:
1) NATO is not inviting Ukraine to join because the war goes on and Ukraine is not winning.
2) The war is prolonged and Ukraine is not winning because it gets limited military aid from NATO countries.
1/ 3) Ukraine gets limited military aid because
a) the West is afraid of pushing Russia to the corner, i.e. afraid of Russia’s defeat
b) the West has limited stocks
2/

I’m hearing the argument from the US and Germany that #Ukraine’s #NATO membership might weaken NATO’s deterrence for the current eastern flank countries – so, I’m told, think twice if you want Ukraine in NATO.
Some thoughts on this👇 Unlike some of our western allies, eastern flank countries are convinced that Ukraine’s membership will strengthen NATO, especially NATO's ability to deter the Russian threat.

As #LennartMeriConference is drawing to a close, some take-aways from many stimulating debates on stage and in the margins.
Supporting Ukraine has become the only possible position to take. Yet the limits of Western unity are hard to hide, with constant arguments over:
🧶 - the extent and speed of military support to Ukraine, now focused on F16s
- expected outcome of the war, and what does the level of expectation mean for Western policy
- Ukraine’s path to NATO and EU membership, where major steps forward should be made this year

Exciting parliamentary #elections in #Finland today, coming 4 weeks after elections in #Estonia. Being a keen observer of both countries, some comparative remarks.🧶 1. Strong women played a prominent role in both campaigns. Both PMs @kajakallas and @MarinSanna have been international stars with a similar security agenda: Ukraine must win, Russia must leave all territories of 🇺🇦. Marin had an important role in taking Finland swiftly to NATO.

Sharp piece on the troubles of European defence by @maxbergmann @SophiaBesch
Estonia's initiative can be a game-changer:
"if the EU can jointly procure ammunition, there is no reason why it can’t take similar steps to jointly acquire artillery or..." 1/4
foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/why-eu… The obstacles to closer EU defence cooperation are deeper though than tension between the interests of US and European defence industries. 2/4

I’ve been talking to dozens of western journalists and diplomats over the past months on the upcoming elections in 🇪🇪. The most common question I get (in many variations): is the Russian-speaking population a threat to Estonia's security? Some reflections.🧵 No, the main threat to 🇪🇪 security is not our Russian-speaking population. It is Russia.
The possibility of Russia interfering in any country having a Russian minority has to be taken seriously.

Some thoughts on Ukraine’s victory/Russia’s defeat. During the first weeks after 24 Feb invasion, the dominant view among Western experts was that Ukraine was doomed to lose. Russia was a major power, far bigger and stronger than Ukraine – supposedly. They were wrong.🧶 Where are we now?🇺🇦victory is increasingly seen as possible, and yet many Western experts think that Ukraine liberating all of its territories is too much to expect and would be too dangerous. Perhaps they are wrong again. We should not turn this into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

There’s an increasing amount of articles in Western media speculating about Russia’s collapse and disintegration. Having contributed to this trend myself, I think some points are worth clarifying. First, collapse and disintegration are not necessarily the same thing. I’ve written about collapse, meaning collapse of the current regime and (perhaps) system, but this does not need to lead to Russia disintegrating into pieces – although it may.

End of 2022, 10 months of Russia’s cruel war against Ukraine.
Thinking about what has changed for Europe, I’d highlight that Ukraine has become one of the great nations of Europe. Never before has it been regarded as such.🧶 This will profoundly change the (geo)political map and balance of power in Europe for decades to come, no matter when and how exactly the war will end. Ukraine will prevail and will be shaping tomorrow’s Europe.

Thanks for the thread @LianaFix
Let me add some reflections of mine.
I used to have respect for Merkel, though I was critical of some of her policies (energy, esp Nordstream; excessive belief in talking to Putin) and failures to deliver (German military, support to 🇺🇦)

https://twitter.com/LianaFix/status/1596216853579399168

Just imagine if Putin had annexed Crimea while Schröder was in power – there would have been no EU sanctions, no common European/transatlantic condemnation.
Remember how different the European and German debate was in 2014,

8 months since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Russia’s ability to wage conventional war keeps weakening. Russia’s defeat is slowly, painfully coming closer.
It's crucial - and increasingly costly - to step up Western support.
Some reflections 1/ The price of the war for Western countries is becoming painful for large parts of citizens, and it will get worse as winter approaches.
Putin is betting on the use of energy as a tool to break Ukraine and its Western supporters. 2/