Recently, there have been a lot of asset thefts caused by shared #Apple IDs. We believe that the key is "apps are not bound to device codes".
1/ This is an issue prevalent in 99% of #wallets, trading apps,and other apps. It's a concern we've voiced a long time ago. However, due to it not being considered in the initial stages of app design, the majority of apps in the market have yet to rectify this issue.
2/ This lack of binding can lead to data being dragged off or maliciously synchronized to other devices, resulting in potential breaches. Combined with other techniques such as social engineering, brute force attacks to obtain passwords, this can lead to theft of assets.
3/ A word of caution for everyone: Do not use shared Apple IDs and be wary of screenshots being uploaded from your photo gallery. There have been instances where such actions led to losses.
4/ Additional note: There's possibly an element of decentralization here. If past device information is bound, it could lean towards centralization, so maintaining a balance here poses its own set of challenges.
5/ NEVER use shared Apple IDs. Not only is the risk of theft high, but your device could also become a problem. Good security awareness is paramount.
On May 20, 2023, @TornadoCash suffered a governance attack, in which exploiters took control of the governance of TornadoCash by executing a malicious proposal.
On 2023-05-13 at 7:22 (UTC), exploiters initiated the #20 proposal and explained in the proposal that the #20 proposal is a supplement to the #16 proposal and has the same execution logic.
But in fact, the proposal contract has an extra self-destruct logic, and its creator, 0x7dC86183274b28E9f1a100a0152DAc975361353d, was created through create2 and has a self-destruct function, so after it self-destructed with the proposal contract, the exploiters could still… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…
On May 11th, a user reported a phishing attack leading to the loss of their wallet assets, raising security concerns around permit signatures. This thread is dedicated to understanding the nature of this theft and how we can stay secure.🔐👇
The victim reported that they inadvertently clicked on a phishing website (syncswap[.]network) and ended up losing over $100. As insignificant as this may seem, it emphasizes the potential security risks in the blockchain space.🔗
We found an additional permit operation related to the contract caller address. To understand its implications, we need to first understand what a permit is. In the ERC20 protocol, it allows users to interact with smart contracts using an authorization signature (permit). 📝💼… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…
How effective is GPT for auditing smart contracts?
We conducted a series of tests to assess the performance of GPT-3.5(Web), GPT-3.5-turbo-0301, and GPT-4(Web) in detecting vulnerabilities within Solidity smart contracts.
On March 13th, 2023, @eulerfinance, a lending platform that operates on the Ethereum blockchain, was attacked, resulting in the attacker making off with over $190 million.
🧵👇
The attacker used flashloans to deposit funds and then leveraged them twice to trigger the liquidation logic, donating the funds to the reserve address and conducting a self-liquidation to collect any remaining assets.
Two key factors contributed to the success of the attack:
1. Funds were donated to the reserved address without being subjected to a liquidity check. This created a mechanism that could directly trigger soft liquidation.
On February 10th, the DeFi aggregator platform @dForcenet was attacked, and the attacker made a profit of approximately 3.65 million dollars.
Here is a brief report👇
1/ The attacker first borrowed 69665 WETH through a flashloan and swapped it into ETH, then added liquidity to the wstETH/ETH pool on Curve, earning 65343 wstETHCRV. Then deposited some of the wstETHCRV in the Curve wstETHCRV-gauge, receiving wstETHCRV-gauge tokens.
2/ The attacker used wstETHCRV-gauge to deposit in the dForce wstETH/ETH Vault and minted share tokens (dForce wstETHCRV-gauge) and USX tokens.
On February 2, the @BonqDAO on the Polygon chain was attacked, the total profit of the exploiter is 113M WALBT and 98.6M BEUR.
Here is a brief report:👇
1/ The key restriction of the TellorFlex price oracle update process must stake 10 TRBs at first. However, the updateStakeAmount function in TellorFlex allows for the required staked amount of TRBs by the oracle to be regularly adjusted based on the value of the collateral.
2/ The TellorFlex oracle contract initialized the stake amount to 10 and is not updated by the updateStakeAmount function, the attacker only needs to stake 10 TRBs to become price reporter and change the price of the WALBT in the oracle by calling the submitValue function.