Thread: This is a poor reading of Hayek.
The Use of Knowledge in Society (AER, 1945) does not say what Acemoglu *thinks* it says. Prices are not aggregative devices. They are knowledge-economizing devices that are cheaper than *any* other devices. #econtwitter
The problem starts with fact that there is a great deal of knowledge that is simply tacit and impossible to code. Moreover, the *value* of that tacit knowledge is impossible to code as well. For example, riding a bike is hard to express into a book/code. So is coding its worth
But, the time-price, the price of an instructor, the price of a parent's time etc. are going to express the value of using this knowledge. Prices economize on all the knowledge we need to collect about bikes. They tell us how much knowledge is necessary.
This may seem like a boring point but it changes entirely the meaning of prices as a *technology*. To plan prices, you must collect *more* information. You need to use more inputs because you arent being told which knowledge-inputs matter or how to use them efficiently.
And I am not even allowing for *errors* in planning here. I am just talking about the cost and efficient use of knowledge.
The reason why I love econometrics but hate its use for planning is that it is so much costlier to plan than the only thing you can do is use *past* observations to predict prices. Its the cheapest way to collect *all the information* (rather than the relevant one).
But its still pretty bad because you need to collect the data, weigh it, employ resources to assemble etc. And its still only going to be a rearview mirror of *past* efficient uses of knowledge.
So, its not costlier *now* (at t_1) to collect *all* the tacit knowledge in the world. Its also growing costlier at the margin because the best way to do so is still a rearview mirror approach whose productivity erodes with distance from t_1 (and productivity is tied to cost-duh)
Think of my point in the sense of a production function where A is price-determination as a technology. For Hayek, A_free is > A_planned. It scales up the production function more because it cut costs of knowledge more.
And here is the kicker that people dont get. Any new technology like coding, AI etc. scale up ALL price-determination systems by the same scalar.
If X=coding power today, then
Q_free=(A_free*X)KL
Q_planned=(A_planned*X)KL
By simple definition Q_free>Q_planned still greater by a factor of (A_free - A_planned).
This means that coding power may make central planning cheaper *NOW* relative to *YESTERDAY*. But it is *NEVER* cheaper than freely determined prices.
2. No, Africa would be better off. We know that more rugged areas in Africa (ruggedness made the slave trade harder) are richer than less rugged areas. This is strong supportive evidence that where the slave trade could flourish, the worst off people were.
3. No, *America* was not made richer. It was made *poorer*. Let me elaborate a bit here.
Personal experience: I shopped a replication papers showing that the famous Piketty and Saez paper in the QJE was sloppily made, had tons of typos and tons of huge historical errors (like omitting that all state/local gov employees didnt file taxes) and told that it didnt matter
This was ultimately published in the Economic Journal -- doi.org/10.1093/ej/uea…. It showed that this was an immensely flawed paper.
In fact, that paper was strategically conceived. There were two problems with the P&S paper in QJE. The first was the assumptions and treatment of the data. The second was the data itself. We tried doing a paper that merged the two issues into one. It was too big.
We take inspiration from Robert Higgs' 1992 "Myth of Wartime Prosperity" in the Journal of Economic History but shift from the USA to Canada.
Higgs had found that all claims of rising living standards were ill-founded. Most of this was the result of bad statistics, bad understanding of economics and wartime distortions to the meaningfulness of prices to convert quantities into "GDP" as a measure of wellbeing
Thread: Forthcoming in Southern Economic Journal, @JustinTCallais and I have a piece titled "Intergenerational Income Mobility and Economic Freedom" #econtwitter
We argue that @MilesCorak and others were right to point out that income inequality reduces the chances at upward *relative* intergenerational income mobility. However, we also argue that this effect is mitigated by the role of institutions.
For example, a 1% increase in the level of inequality in Authoritarian Russia is the not the same as a 1% increase in economically and politically free Ireland or Canada.
Thread: I hate this graph because of its implicit message (i.e., we dont do this anymore). It ignores so much evidence about industrial innovation in byproducts development 1/n
My friend and colleague Pierre Desrochers (we co-authored four articles together on markets and the environment) for example showed how many byproducts from waste were developed in Britain during the industrial revolution cambridge.org/core/journals/…
Here is an example from Canadian history. On this picture you see a bunch of "bucherons". Notice the width of the saw they use. Its huge -- tons of sawdust made from this which is essentially waste. Today, there are saws thick of 0.5mm.
Thread: This is for a working paper of mine. Its testing whether the Conquest of Quebec by the British in 1760 was marked by a change in market integration. This graph shows the coefficient for Qc City prices on the lagged price in Qc City #econhist#econtwitter
The idea is that market integration should lead to prices in other regions at time t should become more relevant than in region i at time t-1. A falling coefficient on the lagged prices should be indicative of this.
The coefficients also gradually exclude French rule years to see what happens as "more British rule years" enter the estimation.