Thread by @hrome2

There’s been a blizzard of speculation re US/Iran diplomacy – but little analysis on what the US seeks to accomplish & what will happen to Iran if it actually succeeds.

That’s where @BrewerEricM & my piece in @ForeignAffairs comes in:

foreignaffairs.com/iran/bidens-ir…

#OOTT

1/15

US strategy can be summed up as “Plan C.”

“Plan A” was revive JCPOA. It failed. Replacement agreement is a mirage for foreseeable future.

“Plan B” was proposed by many observers & Israeli officials to significantly ratchet up pressure. US opposed this.

Enter "Plan C."

2/15

“Plan C” aims to prevent an Iranian bomb, avoid escalation, & kick the can on a diplomatic solution–with the hope that deterrence can be maintained and diplomacy could ripen over time.

3/15

The main tool is to de-escalate: lax sanctions enforcement; restrained responses to attacks; avoidance of IAEA censure; easing access to frozen FX.

I am skeptical of recent reports of an imminent US-Iran deal. But much of what has been reported would fall under “Plan C.”

4/15

In parallel, Iran has had a good few months for its foreign policy.

It's paid no price for unprecedented nuclear advancements & its geopolitical position continues to improve.

It is easy to see why Khamenei might believe he can have his nuclear cake and eat it, too.

5/15

The thrust of the paper examines what happens if “Plan C” works.

We call it “catastrophic success.”

Instead of laying the groundwork for a diplomatic solution that halts and reverses Iran’s program, the strategy risks cementing Iran’s status as a nuclear threshold state.

6/15

5 trends point in a negative direction in the coming months:

1⃣ Iran will continue advancing its nuclear program, bringing it closer to its goal of becoming a virtual nuclear weapons state.

7/15

2⃣ Ties with Russia and China will continue to improve.

These relations have limits, and they likely cannot replace what Iran would receive in a comprehensive nuclear deal w/the West. But the trendlines are positive & Iran will likely stay the course.

8/15

3⃣ Regional dynamics will likely play to Iran’s advantage. Iran normalized ties with Kuwait, UAE, and Saudi Arabia despite–or perhaps because of–its nuclear escalations.

This undermines prior US efforts to make regional benefits contingent on a nuclear deal.

9/15

4⃣ October will bring more positive news for Iran, when UN missile restrictions and sanctions expire.

Even if European states do not end up removing their sanctions, Iran will take a victory lap.

10/15

5⃣And the politics of a deal will probably get harder, not easier, as time goes on–with elections in the US and Iran and a leadership transition in Iran approaching.

11/15

There is one silver lining:

Tehran’s improved standing could reinforce its decision not to weaponize its nuclear program—at least for now. If Iran is already getting security, status, influence, etc., it may conclude that going to a bomb may not be necessary for now.

12/15

Finally, we propose 3 recs within the political & strategic constraints of Plan C:

1⃣ US should intensify efforts to deter Iran from taking key steps toward a bomb by working w/a wider array of countries to demonstrate the costs to Iran, including Brazil & India.

13/15

2⃣ US should try to complicate Iran’s outreach to Russia and China, eroding the benefits of Tehran’s pivot east.

That includes better sanctions enforcement and collaboration with some Caspian Sea littoral states to monitor and complicate Russia-Iran trade.

14/15

3⃣ Washington should not give up on diplomacy altogether.

That includes exploring how Iranian-Saudi diplomacy could open the door for regional nuclear constraints, providing some limits on future nuclear activities and assurances against weapons production.

15/15