Thread by @WarintheFuture

In his 9 June speech, President Zelensky noted that “for our soldiers, for all those who are in particularly tough battles these days. We see your heroism.” Now the Ukrainian 2023 offensive has begun, some initial thoughts & analysis (based on my longer substack piece). 1/24 🧵

2/ While many describe this as a counteroffensive, I will be describing it as the 2023 offensive or 2023 campaign. This will be a campaign, consisting of multiple operations and offensives across a 1000km frontline.

3/ So far, the Ukrainian campaign has consisted of three key elements. In the preliminary phase, political strikes were conducted against Moscow and Belgorod to confuse the Russian leadership and prod it into making changes in force dispositions (including air defence).

4/ Also in this preliminary phase were the operational level strikes that targeted Russian headquarters, supply locations, and locations where Russian reserves were held, and aimed to break down the cohesion of Russian defences and ability to respond to Ukrainian attacks.

5/ The third element of the Ukrainian campaign is what might be described as Phase 1 ground operations. A broad array of attacks at several locations in the east and south is utilising at least 3, and probably more, axes of advance.

6/ These ground attacks, undoubtedly support by the Ukrainian air force and cyber/EW forces, will be seeking (as doctrine tells us) to secure decisive terrain, gain info, fix and destroy Russian forces, disrupt Russian counter attacks & set the conductions for subsequent phases.

7/ This initial phase is also about building momentum. A lot of different kinds of attacks, some to infiltrate Russian positions, some to breach through defensive zones, some to bypass, will be conducted.

8/ In these kinds of large-scale operations, with two large, well-armed adversaries, momentum builds slowly. It is impossible to draw conclusions about eventual outcomes (or the current situation) based on initial attacks, or a photo of destroyed vehicles like this one.

9/ Ultimately, what the Ukrainian high command will be aiming for is to build momentum to a point where they collapse the Russian plan of defense in the south, or east or both. This would create what Liddell Hart called an expanding torrent. This would enable exploitation.

10/ In building operational momentum – impetus across the entire campaign and not just a single battle - the Ukrainians will be seeking Russian strengths and weaknesses.

11/ All the pre-H-Hour recon in the world cannot predict exactly how much resistance the Russians will offer. You need to fight for information at the start, and throughout, a campaign like this.

12/ This initial phase of Ukrainian operations will also be trying to prod the Russians to ‘do things’. Whether it is to unmask units the Ukrainians haven’t found, headquarters that have remained hidden, or to move reserves, the Ukrainians will seek operational level targets.

13/ In finding and attacking these targets, the Ukrainians will seek to remove the command and control ‘glue’ that provides the coherence and systemic approach to Russian defensive regimes overseen by Russia’s Southern, Eastern and Central groupings of forces.

14/ Unfortunately, the nature of combat dictates that the Russians can now do the same against the Ukrainians. Thus, the ongoing importance of air defence weapons and munitions support from the West, as well as Ukrainian operational security approaches.

15/ Three themes bear emphasising at this stage of the Ukrainian 2023 offensives. First, surprise. This is a constant. We have been surprised throughout this war, and this will continue. Moscow drone attacks were a surprise, as were the Belgorod incursions. There will be more.

16/ Second, the vast majority of people, including many military commanders, only see a small snapshot of the battlefield. Often, this is also out of date. So, any assessment that makes judgements cannot have any high level of certainty.

17/ 3rd, the enemy gets a vote. As @CinC_AFU noted in his December interview with @TheEconomist, the Russians ‘are not idiots’. Despite their many missteps and reprehensible actions in this war, they will respond, obstruct and force changes to Ukrainian plans. Adaptation matters.

18/ While many will focus on the tactical aspects of this campaign, the strategic influence campaigns of Ukraine and Russia will be kicking into overdrive. We will be bombarded with different messages from many sides (especially Russian apologists) to shape our perceptions.

19/ It is too soon for any definitive conclusions. The situation will remain uncertain for some time. As I wrote in the first morning of the war, “now, more than ever, the value of rigorous, professional journalism to bring light to the darkest moments of war is vital.”

20/ As is the nature of these things, there will be dark days ahead. Tactical setbacks, reinforced by Russian misinformation, will cause many to question the progress of the Ukrainian campaign. We need to remain steadfast in our support of Ukraine through all this.

21/ I recently used the 1944 Operation Cobra as an example of an operation to penetrate defences and conduct exploitation. It unfolded slowly at first, and then burst open the German defences, allowing the allies to conduct rapid recapture of large parts of France.

22/ Rick Atkinson, in “The Guns of Last Light”, describes how ‘this thing has indeed busted wide open. Now the war of movement could begin.” Ukraine will be hope for the same from the coming weeks. As will all of us supporting #Ukraine. End.

23/ You can read a more detailed update in my latest post at Futura Doctrina.
mickryan.substack.com/p/the-ukrainia…

24/ Thank you to the following whose images and links were used in this thread: @IAPonomarenko @RALee85 @combined2forces @GeneralStaffUA @washingtonpost @DefenceHQ @Militarylandnet