1/UK Military doctrine emphasises the cognitive dimension of warfare. Avoiding attrition, the enemy's mind is the target. The contrast with current discussions of the #counteroffensive is marked. Like the FWW, it is all about re-taking terrain and settlements liberated.
2/ Are the #Ukrainians hopelessly old fashioned? No: nothing has a greater morale and intellectual effect than losing troops and ground - especially when it is vital terrain.
3/ However, critical though the current close battles are, the outcome of this #counteroffensive is probably going to be decided in the deep, where the #UAF have been striking hard and skilfully.
4/Will UAF have prepared the battlefield sufficiently for the major urban fights which are likely in the coming weeks at Tokmak, Mariupol, etc? The west needs to prepare for that - and support them.
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1/16 This is a fascinating, provocative, perceptive article. I would encourage everyone interested in command @LawDavF@almurray@WarintheFuture to read it. Thanks @Beags_Beagle for your and your team's work on this. I offer a few initial thoughts.
2/@Beags_Beagle and his co-authors are surely correct to argue that the bloated divisional and brigade HQs of the 9/11 Wars are obsolete. They are far too vulnerable. At a UK divisional exercise in 2016, the commander observed that his static, tented CP was 'not an act of war'
3/ Consequently, @Beags_Beagle et al. argue that CPs must consist of 3 or 4 armd vehicles which are mobile, dispersed, with low signatures. However, because they draw on a cloud, are data-centric, AI-enabled, it will be possible to bespoke the situational picture for each node.
1/The destruction of the #KakhovkaDam has rightly been deplored on humanitarian grounds. But what is its military significance, especially for understanding the Russian military and therefore the Ukrainian #counteroffensive?
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2/#KakhovkaDam is an appalling act of terrorism. However, from a military perspective, it shows that the much derided Russian commanders are astute (and totally ruthless).
3/ The flooding the Dniepro river basin blocks off one possible axes of attack for the UAF for at least the next couple of crucial weeks. Viewed coldly, it is an effective military action.
1/ @JohnSpencer and @LiamSCollins keenly expected book came out last month. Given my own interests in urban warfare, I was very much looking forward to it. In the light of the Ukraine War, it is highly pertinent. Having just read it, I thought I would do a short review.
2/ It may be worth readers knowing that the book is not a monograph, but a selection of the transcripts from the excellent series of @MWI podcasts which John has conducted over the last few years. It is therefore rich and wide-ranging.
3/ UUW of course connect closely with my own book on the same topic published last years. It discusses many of the same topics and some of the same battles including Fallujah 2, Mosul, Marawi, Ramadi, Sadr City, Ortona etc. Naturally, I agree with many of the arguments in it.
1/Good point @LawDavF. Let's have a go at this – and try to envisage the situation by the end of November. And I would emphasise this is no more than an educated guess based on open sources like the excellent @ISW. But maybe it could start a conversation?
2/After the attrition of the last 8 months, and the UKR counter-offensive, it looks like RU has ca 80,000 troops in theatre (from July when they had 120k). UA has increased to probably 120k combat ready forces 20 Brigades trained by NATO etc? With 10 very combat capable.
3/ Kharkiv/Luhansk/Donetsk Sector: About 5 UA Brigades (20k) are committed to the Kharkiv Counteroffensive now moving against the Svatove-Kreminna axis.
1/ Like everyone else, I have been troubled by the @BBCPanorama programme. It’s not an easy topic to write about but I felt impelled to articulate some thoughts. They are by no means original; I suspect that many others are thinking on similar lines.
2/ The programme raised many legal and ethical questions @PhilipIngMBE@simonakam@ThreshedThought. I want to talk about the operational use of SOF. To this end, let us consider a thought experiment.
3/ If the BBC allegations were false and the SAS were completely innocent all of the charges, would the international SOF campaign in Afghanistan, of which the SAS were part, be vindicated?
1/@isw brilliant guide to Russian generals prompts me to say a few words about command in the Ukraine War more broadly. Not least because I wrongly inferred from Gerasimov’s pronouncements that the Russian command was becoming more professional in my 2019 book on command!
2/ Contemporary operations set a distinctive problem for military commanders. Commanders are not dealing with problems of scale, typical in the 20th century, but scope. They must coordinate regular and irregular forces across the domains land, air, maritime, cyber and space.
3/ Let us look at three key functions of command: 1) Mission definition: matching operational objectives to strategic goals. 2) Management: Designing and orchestrating a coherent campaign with empowered subordinates, concentrating forces 3) Leadership" Motivating troops.