Today is the day: Germany is getting its very first national security strategy.
I’ll follow the press conference at 11am and will let you know when we know more about its super secret* content.
*the strategy has been kept under close wraps.
Germany has had white books so far, but no comprehensive national security strategy. The document’s publication was delayed several times over this year - it was first supposed to be published in February, and be presented at the Munich Security Conference.
First question, rather unsurprisingly, on whether and how Germany will reach the NATO 2% goal.
You can read Germany’s new national security strategy here #sicherheitsstrategie. There is an English translation and a French summary (weird that they didn’t just do a French translation too)
Press conference on the new German national security strategy with chancellor Scholz, foreign minister Bärbock and finance minister Lindner has just ended. A quick readout (from the press conference, not the #sicherheitsstrategie ):
The point the government clearly wanted to emphasise is that it is an INTEGRATED strategy. Not a defence white book - it sees security in a wide frame and includes energy security, food security, access to medicine etc.
China came up several times, also because there were many questions from journalists.
Lindner: “China is a trade partner but a values rival”.
Baerbock: “the world isn’t black and white, China isn’t black and white, Germany isn’t black and white” #sicherheitsstrategie
So clear that in the strategy, as well as in the coming China strategy, the government doesn’t want to adopt a completely confrontational approach to China but will continue to do an Macron-like “en meme temps”.
The second big topic in the press conference was German defence spending, and the 2% questions. Government said it will reach the 2% of GDP spent on defence “on a multi year average” (so not necessarily every year) even after the special 100bn fund runs out.
Gebauer from Spiegel rightly wondered how, since we don’t see that reflected in the current financial planning. Lindner: this is not the final decision yet.
So… well see. The question remains a valid one.
Third big topic: the security council which is *not* coming.
That the German national security council isn’t coming isn’t news, it was reported beforehand as one of the reasons why the strategy took longer than anticipated . See here
But yeah, the German national security council is not coming. Of course, Scholz, Bärbock and Lindner all said they were very happy with this decision, despite the fact that one journalist after the other tried to provoke them to say otherwise.
Two final thoughts on the press conference before taking on the strategy: 1) I liked defence minister Pistorius’ statement that “armament exports are also a part of the strategic toolbox.”
So we’re moving away from the idea that arms export are solely an economic decision.
2) I find it odd that the journalists didn’t have the strategy before bc it created this weird power dynamic where the chancellor was like “did you SEE that in the strategy?” and the journalist was like “I haven’t seem anything yet”. Don’t know how normal that is,struck me as odd
I read Germany’s new national security strategy so you don’t have to.
(Though, it’s not a terrible read, so don’t let me keep you).
Thread with some thoughts and main points according to, well, me. #Sicherheitsstrategie
First the tldr: it’s s fine.
It says the right things, in the right tones. Nothing major was forgotten, nothing major gotten wrong (biggest bone of contention, imo, is 🇨🇳 and “multipolarity” ). It, however, also doesn’t really say anything particularly surprising or substantial.
Now that I have lost 90% of the readership, let’s dive into the details 😂.
I told myself to stay out of this one, but I can't help myself, so here a few thoughts on the #Macron interview.
First, as many have pointed out, if you want to engage in the discussion, read the Les Echos interview, rather than the article with quotes from Politico. lesechos.fr/monde/enjeux-i…
My assessment of the #Macron interview:
. Some good points
. Several strong - ie controversial - statements on European sovereignty which were surely meant to ruffle feathers in the US and some European capitals
. A problematic stance on Taiwan
. *TERRIBLE* timing.
Mhm. I find that headline a bit odd. Like, maybe it’s more explicit than before, and it’s the first time in a national security strategy- but that’s because it’s the first nat security strategy.
Back from @MunSecConf 2023. Always interesting, but this year more important than ever. A few observations:
For me, the theme of the conference was ‘getting the global south on board re our stance on Russia’. #Macron was the first speaker to make the point in detail, but it was also a major element of Kamala Harris’ speech, Stoltenberg, Marin and others equally emphasised it.
There is a realisation that other states don’t care as much about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as the west thinks they should. That this invasion & its war crimes are a breach of int. law that cannot stand is an argument western countries will need to make more convincingly.
Quite the grand statement “Any increase in China’s strength is an increase in the hope of peace for humanity.” - Wang Yi
Director of the Office of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, People's Republic of China, #msc2023
*Very* univocal statement by Wang Yi on #balloongate: civilian balloon which veered off course. US response was “absurd and hysterical”, “100% abuse of the use of force”. “We do not accept this.” US reaction “does not show that US is strong, on the contrary it shows the opposite”
Shooting down the balloon was “preposterous”, an action “to divert attention from US domestic problems”.
No room for interpretation here. #msc2023