Anthony King Profile picture
Jun 14 17 tweets 6 min read Twitter logo Read on Twitter
1/16 This is a fascinating, provocative, perceptive article. I would encourage everyone interested in command @LawDavF @almurray @WarintheFuture to read it. Thanks @Beags_Beagle for your and your team's work on this. I offer a few initial thoughts.

armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Milit…
2/@Beags_Beagle and his co-authors are surely correct to argue that the bloated divisional and brigade HQs of the 9/11 Wars are obsolete. They are far too vulnerable. At a UK divisional exercise in 2016, the commander observed that his static, tented CP was 'not an act of war'
3/ Consequently, @Beags_Beagle et al. argue that CPs must consist of 3 or 4 armd vehicles which are mobile, dispersed, with low signatures. However, because they draw on a cloud, are data-centric, AI-enabled, it will be possible to bespoke the situational picture for each node.
4/ Commanders will be able to make decisions effectively. Above all they will be able to converge multi-domain effects from these data enabled nodes.
5) The article also suggests that in the near future, commanders will be able to operate from virtual CPs. And will be able to be virtually present in any node they choose.
6/ Maybe I could make a few comments aimed at divisional level - and maybe corps. In developing a data-centric divisional CP, the UAF's experiences will be useful; not definitive but useful. At this point, their C2 structure has rightly remained classified.
7/ Yet we can make some inferences. The @Beags_Beagle article proposes that the model for the future CP is a mobile one. Since manoeuvre will remain central to land operations, the movement of CP will be critical to execute command.
8/This is totally logical. Yet, Ukraine may illustrate something different. Land warfare is likely to be attritional and positional (see @AmosFox6); defense is likely to be primary. So even tactical CPs may not need to move so much; it may be difficult to do so.
9/UAF battalion and brigade CPs seem to have been periodically mobile if OS reports are true. But I wonder how much 2* CPs have moved, even advanced tactical CPs, even in during the September counter-attack, and the current #counteroffensive. It will be interesting to know.
10/Perhaps rather than thinking about tactical CPs being mobile. We could emphasise that they need to be fortified, subterranean, in urban areas, where they can hide their signatures even more. Especially since operations may be more static.
11/This article rightly stresses reach back. Assuming bandwidth, data can travel infinitely. So there is no need to aggregate staff. Reachback HQs should become much more important. Future Plans, Current Plans, and most of Intel functions could all be done back: data sent forward
12/ Indeed, the #UkraineRussiaWar illustrates this precisely. It is now in the public domain (see @washingtonpost) that @18airbornecorps and @82ndABNDiv provided essential support to UAF from Germany and presumably US: a doubly transnational C2 architecture.
13/ I think these data centric, transnational CPs may actually becoming even bigger. They need to converge multi domain effects. That will be difficult. They will need data engineers and programmers (many from tech companies). They may enlarge so the Tac HQs can shrink.
14/The article suggests that command presence could be maintained in the dispersed nodes in the combat zone virtually. I wonder about this. As the authors acknowledge it would be very expensive. And technically it looks a long way off.
15/ To link those dispersed nodes together, I might recommend a human-centric approach. (Those of you who know me know what I'm going to say!). Commanders might create closely integrated command teams, of empowered deputies, subordinates, who can as for, or even as their boss.
16/That to me would be mission command in a data-centric era.

/End
*act

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More from @antbruceking

Jun 13
1/UK Military doctrine emphasises the cognitive dimension of warfare. Avoiding attrition, the enemy's mind is the target. The contrast with current discussions of the #counteroffensive is marked. Like the FWW, it is all about re-taking terrain and settlements liberated.
2/ Are the #Ukrainians hopelessly old fashioned? No: nothing has a greater morale and intellectual effect than losing troops and ground - especially when it is vital terrain.
3/ However, critical though the current close battles are, the outcome of this #counteroffensive is probably going to be decided in the deep, where the #UAF have been striking hard and skilfully.
Read 4 tweets
Jun 7
1/The destruction of the #KakhovkaDam has rightly been deplored on humanitarian grounds. But what is its military significance, especially for understanding the Russian military and therefore the Ukrainian #counteroffensive?
🧵
2/#KakhovkaDam is an appalling act of terrorism. However, from a military perspective, it shows that the much derided Russian commanders are astute (and totally ruthless).
3/ The flooding the Dniepro river basin blocks off one possible axes of attack for the UAF for at least the next couple of crucial weeks. Viewed coldly, it is an effective military action.
Read 10 tweets
Nov 3, 2022
1/ @JohnSpencer and @LiamSCollins keenly expected book came out last month. Given my own interests in urban warfare, I was very much looking forward to it. In the light of the Ukraine War, it is highly pertinent. Having just read it, I thought I would do a short review.
2/ It may be worth readers knowing that the book is not a monograph, but a selection of the transcripts from the excellent series of @MWI podcasts which John has conducted over the last few years. It is therefore rich and wide-ranging.
3/ UUW of course connect closely with my own book on the same topic published last years. It discusses many of the same topics and some of the same battles including Fallujah 2, Mosul, Marawi, Ramadi, Sadr City, Ortona etc. Naturally, I agree with many of the arguments in it.
Read 16 tweets
Oct 5, 2022
1/Good point @LawDavF. Let's have a go at this – and try to envisage the situation by the end of November. And I would emphasise this is no more than an educated guess based on open sources like the excellent @ISW. But maybe it could start a conversation?
2/After the attrition of the last 8 months, and the UKR counter-offensive, it looks like RU has ca 80,000 troops in theatre (from July when they had 120k). UA has increased to probably 120k combat ready forces 20 Brigades trained by NATO etc? With 10 very combat capable.
3/ Kharkiv/Luhansk/Donetsk Sector: About 5 UA Brigades (20k) are committed to the Kharkiv Counteroffensive now moving against the Svatove-Kreminna axis.
Read 15 tweets
Jul 15, 2022
1/ Like everyone else, I have been troubled by the @BBCPanorama programme. It’s not an easy topic to write about but I felt impelled to articulate some thoughts. They are by no means original; I suspect that many others are thinking on similar lines.

bbc.co.uk/news/uk-620831…
2/ The programme raised many legal and ethical questions @PhilipIngMBE @simonakam @ThreshedThought. I want to talk about the operational use of SOF. To this end, let us consider a thought experiment.
3/ If the BBC allegations were false and the SAS were completely innocent all of the charges, would the international SOF campaign in Afghanistan, of which the SAS were part, be vindicated?
Read 20 tweets
May 13, 2022
1/@isw brilliant guide to Russian generals prompts me to say a few words about command in the Ukraine War more broadly. Not least because I wrongly inferred from Gerasimov’s pronouncements that the Russian command was becoming more professional in my 2019 book on command!
2/ Contemporary operations set a distinctive problem for military commanders. Commanders are not dealing with problems of scale, typical in the 20th century, but scope. They must coordinate regular and irregular forces across the domains land, air, maritime, cyber and space.
3/ Let us look at three key functions of command: 1) Mission definition: matching operational objectives to strategic goals. 2) Management: Designing and orchestrating a coherent campaign with empowered subordinates, concentrating forces 3) Leadership" Motivating troops.
Read 14 tweets

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