A thread on Friday night’s massacre at Mpondwe Lhubirha secondary school by the ADF, during which at least 42 people including 38 students were killed, 7 others injured and at least six kidnapped and taken across the border into DR Congo.
Officials stated that around 5 ADF fighters locked the doors of the boys’ dormitory before burning it, while killing female students with firearms and machetes. A guard and three local residents were also killed. Graphic pictures of the aftermath corroborate this account.
Mpondwe Lhubirha secondary school had received significant support from community members and organizations in Hillsboro, Oregon, a suburb of Portland. oregonlive.com/hillsboro/2015…
The school is 1.6km from the Tako river, which forms the border between Uganda’s Kasese district and DR Congo’s Beni territory. West of the school in Congo is the Mwalika valley in Virunga National Park, where the ADF have maintained camps since the late 1990s.
These camps have come under intense military pressure by FARDC and UPDF in recent months, and infamous ADF commander Elias Segujja aka Mulalo or Fezza was reportedly killed during a clash in Mwalika on Feb 27. ADF responded by killing over 100 people in nearby areas in March.
Previous attacks on ADF camps in Mwalika in November saw the ADF push south and establish new camps closer to Lake Edward, consistently attacking villages near Karuruma, Museya and Kyavinyonge. Given proximity, these camps are likely the origin of the group that attacked Mpondwe.
There has been some consternation in Ugandan public opinion over the late response to the attack, which took place within 3km of a UPDF border post and within 5km of 5th Battalion headquarters. 5th Mountain Battalion responded, but arrived after the ADF fighters had already left.
Mpondwe forms the Ugandan side of the border crossing with DR Congo’s Kasindi. The crossing is amongst the most important in eastern Congo, with significant commercial traffic. The ADF had previously killed 8 civilians in Kasindi on June 11.
Attacks on schools in Uganda earned the ADF much infamy during its early years. Infiltrating through the Rwenzori mountains, 80 students were killed in Kichwamba on June 8, 1998. The ADF’s first attack into Uganda was its weeklong seizure of Mpondwe in November 1996.
Similarity to ADF’s cross-border raids into Uganda during the late-1990s have raised questions about its strategic goals. But it is crucially important to recognize the shift in its ideology and focus since pledging allegiance to Islamic State in 2017
The group, particularly in its internal propaganda releases published outside IS’s media apparatus, have emphasized establishing a place “ruled by Muslims” inside Congo, rather than using Congo as a staging ground for overthrowing Museveni, as was early leadership's objective.
It now seems that the ADF’s objectives regarding Uganda are centered more on terrorism and retaliation for Operation Shujaa than a desire to seize power in Kampala. The vast majority of its victims since 2014 have been local Congolese civilians, with more than 5000 killed.
With much of the group’s manpower now comprised of forcibly-recruited Congolese and ideologically-motivated jihadists from Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi, etc, conquering Uganda almost certainly has less salience than when the group was solely intent on taking power in Kampala.
It is far more likely that this attack, the failed Dec 2022 raid into Ntoroko and the series of suicide bombings and IED attacks in 2021 are a product of both the ADF becoming a regional hub for terrorist attacks and retaliation for significant losses during Operation Shujaa.
Outdated narratives doubting ADF’s connections to Islamic State continue to be repeated, but the debate is over. ADF's leadership explicitly says they are now ISCAP, closely communicates with IS and has received massive inflows of money & recruits from IS. nytimes.com/2023/06/17/wor…
The ADF offers Islamic State a hub for terrorist attacks throughout the region, facilitated by significant inflows of money raised by other Islamic State affiliates in Africa.
This money is laundered through a sophisticated apparatus, and my team documented a minimum of $280k being moved between Sept 2019 and Oct 2021 alone. The total is almost certainly much higher. extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/…
As long as this money continues to fuel terror plots and sustain growing membership recruited via IS networks throughout the region, the ADF will be able to sustain its armed campaign in Congo, its cross border raids into Uganda and terrorist attacks throughout the region.
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Very bizarre situation. Seems Malanga brought along his American-born son Marcel, who played football and sold used cars in Salt Lake City and was at least visited his father’s gold mining venture in Mozambique. Marcel was arrested during the attack.
The two other Americans were Malanga’s partners in the gold mining venture in Manica province, Mozambique. Cole Patrick Ducey had been involved in a patent dispute over a cannabis herb grinder, before moving to Eswatini. He was arrested during the attack.
Benjamin Reuben Zalman-Polun was also purportedly involved in the cannabis business before getting involved in the gold trade. He appears in a video during the attack, but it is unclear if he was arrested.
Worrying reports that IS-Mozambique fighters have launched a large scale assault on Macomia town, the second assault on a district capital this year and the second since SADC and Rwanda intervened in 2021. No coincidence this coincides with SADC's withdrawal.
Reports suggest around 100 IS-Mozambique fighters are taking part in the assault, overrunning Xinavane town to the southwest, clashing in Macomia town's eastern neighborhoods and cutting off the roads from Awasse to the north and Pemba to the southeast.
This closely mirrors IS-Mozambique's May 2020 assault on Macomia, during which 90-120 fighters overran Mozambican security forces and controlled the town for three days. acleddata.com/2020/06/02/cab…
EAC is denying as fake a dramatic letter of resignation by now-replaced EAC Regional Force chief. Fake or not, tensions between Kinshasa and EACRF over its role and mandate are getting quite serious, even as thousands of EAC troops have deployed to Congo
The EAC's Regional Force was designed to deploy thousands of troops into Congo to actively assist the Congolese state in dismantling rebel groups that refused to join the demobilization process. The language was pretty clear: “contain, defeat and eradicate negative forces”
Early communiques quite explicitly stated that EACRF would deploy in support of and under the leadership of FARDC, and M23 was expelled from Nairobi following attacks on FARDC positions in late March. M23 then seized Bunagana and other important positions in a June offensive.
Some interesting - and troubling - photos published by Islamic State of clashes between its "Mozambique Province" - locally called Al Shabaab - and Mozambican & SADC troops in Cabo Delgado since the beginning of "Operation Vulcão IV" on January 1 🧵
On January 8, Mozambican army and SADC troops were ambushed near Litandacua in Macomia district, during which IS claimed that a "reconnaissance plane" was captured. In today's Al Naba newsletter, IS published a photo of a fairly intact DJI Mavic 2 zitamar.com/insurgents-and…
Much more troubling were reports on January 10 that Al Shabaab fighters overran a Mozambican army base in Xitachi on N380, the main road from southern Cabo Delgado north towards Mueda & Nangade. IS published photos yesterday, showing an overran/burned base and three dead soldiers
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the horrendous atrocities that have come with it really ought to discredit anyone fantasizing about the collapse of the liberal world order and it’s replacement with some new “multipolar” or “post-liberal” successor.
There are plenty of precedents, Syria being the most blatant, but it’s no small thing that Putin explicitly framed this war as the death blow to the post-1945 order. That order and what it promised never existed as advertised, but as a set of normative expectations it mattered.
The idea that wars of naked conquest, the violent extermination of national identities or violations of basic human rights were bad…mattered. These still occurred, if course, but there existed a consensus - even if often nominal - that they were unacceptable.
In "Islamic State in Africa" we cover trajectories of nine IS affiliates - local insurgencies that pledged allegiance to IS - on the continent:
-IS Libya
-IS Algeria
-IS Sinai
-IS Tunisia
-ISWAP (Lake Chad)
-ISWAP (Greater Sahara)
-IS Somalia
-ISCAP (Congo)
-ISCAP (Mozambique)
We discuss how this process of integration into IS's global apparatus goes through three stages, with local insurgencies finding utility in IS's brand, IS-Central gauging the utility of accepting them into its umbrella, and the nature of the relationship between affiliate & core.