1/ Russian sources reportedly say that Sergei Shoigu's plan to defang the Wagner Group failed because he didn't anticipate Yevgeny Prigozhin's personal popularity. Prigozhin had prior knowledge of the moves being made against him, leading to his strike against Rostov-on-Don.
2/ Shoigu is nonetheless said to be unsackable due to knowing too many secrets and having too extensive a network of loyalists to be easily uprooted. Meanwhile, Putin is said to have been in complete confusion and reportedly put the FSB in charge during the mutiny. ⬇️
3/ The VChK-OGPU Telegram channel reports that a source has told it about what happened on the Russian government side immediately before Wagner's mutiny:
"The harbinger of a coup in Russia is always a strengthening of the protection of state institutions.
4/ "A few days before the escalation of the situation with the Wagner PMC, the FSO [Federal Protective Service] suddenly asked Rosgvardia [Russian National Guard] chief Zolotov for assistance from fighters of Dzerzhinsky division.
5/ "The Rosgvardians reinforced FSO patrols near the Kremlin, the White House [the Russian government's main office], the presidential administration and other government facilities in the capital.
6/ "On 27 June, the reinforcements were withdrawn as suddenly as they appeared and the main state institutions were guarded as normal.
7/ "In addition to the strengthening of the security of the buildings, operative groups of the Central Security Service and the Main Staff of the Ministry of Defence flew to the war zone in advance, supported personally by Defence Minister Shoigu and his high-ranking entourage.
8/ "A group of officers of the Main Personnel Directorate of the Defence Ministry also flew to Rostov. They all were told there that by 1 July, the Wagner PMC shall be disbanded and cease to exist.
9/ "Newly arrived task force units and operational staff on the ground were ordered to make this transition without any excesses.
Thus, with Moscow's approval, the operation to disband Prigozhin's army was to take place.
10/ "The protracted conflict between the defence minister and the head of the PMC was to have been ended. But things did not go according to plan.
11/ "According to the sources of VChK-OGPU, Shoigu was initially motivated by someone to take very drastic measures against several leaders of Wagner. Under any circumstances, Prigozhin and his associates, which included [Dmitry] Utkin, were to be interned.
12/ "But they did not take into account the popularity of the country's chief chef with front-line officers, soldiers and service operatives. All possible scenarios for the detention of Prigozhin and his men have been made available to the latter.
13/ "As the VChK-OGPU source believes, they did not envisage the main thing – the unwillingness [of the military] to take the side of the extremely unpopular Special Military Operation leaders, Shoigu and Gerasimov.
14/ "That is when a missile strike was launched against Wagner's positions. After the failed missile strike on Wagner's positions the action unfolded.
In a matter of hours the headquarters of the southern grouping and the city of Rostov-on-Don were taken.
15/ "The Defence Minister fled to Moscow.
Then within twenty-four hours the Wagnerites effectively approached the capital."
16/ As many commentators noted, Shoigu disappeared from view during the mutiny. According to VChK-OGPU, it was because he was effectively put into protective custody by the FSO while negotiations took place between the government and Prigozhin over his future.
17/ "Several VChK-OGPU sources confirmed information that after fleeing Rostov and the rapid advance of the Wagner PMC towards Moscow, Sergei Shoigu was effectively isolated by the FSO, he was not allowed anywhere under the pretext of personal security.
18/ "In reality, Shoigu was at this point the object of negotiations between Prigozhin and Lukashenko. It was because of Shoigu that Prigozhin initially broke off the negotiations (Putin refused to give up his defence minister).
19/ "However, the situation became more difficult by the hour, the convoy was rapidly approaching Moscow. As a result, Putin effectively met all Prigozhin's demands by pushing back on Shoigu.
20/ "But even then he was not taken out of the isolation, because FSB Deputy Director Korolev personally initiated an urgent revision of all materials regarding the Defense Ministry (the issue regarding Deputy Minister Tsalikov is still open, by the way)."
22/ "[Aleksey] Dyumin also persuaded Putin of the need to "remove" Shoigu. But Putin decided otherwise – to make Shoigu into an almost-hero who defeated Prigozhin.
23/ "The source believes that the point here is that Shoigu is extremely dangerous in the event of resignation because of his knowledge, the huge number of people loyal to him in senior positions and his leverage over processes in the Kremlin.
24/ "This is not the harmless [Dmitry] Medvedev or [Vladislav] Surkov, whose silence and inaction can be bought with money, this is more serious. Putin is not ready for such a conflict right now," reckons our interlocutor."
25/ The FSB is said to have played a central role in dealing with the mutiny. During Wagner's march on Moscow, VChK-OGPU published a cryptic account from a source: "In fact, the country is currently under the control of the FSB. Everywhere there's fear and confusion."
26/ The channel reports that another source in the Russian government "speaks of Putin's utter confusion [during the mutiny] - he was only seen this way in 2014, when a Malaysian civilian Boeing was shot down by mistake."
1/ Could Dmitri Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council, be lying about the current level of recruitment to the Russian army? This appalling and unprecedented scenario is considered by Russian warbloggers, who smell a rat in his claims of success. ⬇️
2/ 'Artjockey' has spotted something odd about recent claims made by Medvedev, and suspects statistical cheating:
"The day before yesterday, Medvedev announced that the contract recruitment plan was being met, and that talk of mobilisation was an enemy plot."
3/ "He backed up his statement with statistics:
▪️ During the first 6 months [of 2026], “about” 200 thousand people and 16 thousand volunteers signed contracts;
▪️ Of these, 40,000 joined the unmanned systems forces.
1/ A massive new mobilisation in Russia this fall is increasingly being forecast by Russian warbloggers. They are, however, cautious about this prospect given the strains on the Russian economy and the chaos that accompanied the 2022 mobilisation. ⬇️
2/ 'DsHRG Rusich' comments:
3/ "We've already been mobilising (partially) since 2020. Another mass recruitment will most likely indeed happen, and it will probably happen after the Duma elections in September. Various crazy bans, internet restrictions, etc. are being prepared for this, among other things.
1/ With rumours of a new mobilisation in the fall sweeping the Russian blogosphere, one warblogger wonders: what's the point? He points out that the land that Russia has seized is essentially worthless, having been destroyed, depopulated, and strewn with mines. ⬇️
2/ Roman Alekhin probably isn't doing himself any favours (he's already been declared a 'foreign agent' by the Kremlin), but he is at least willing to go where other warbloggers haven't been willing, and question the purpose of continuing the war:
3/ "[Analyses] lead to one conclusion that could prevent a crisis or mitigate its impact: ending the conflict.
At the same time, depending on the conditions, ending the conflict could lead to different consequences.
1/ Russian online marketplaces are reportedly trying to discourage their sellers offering non-lethal military equipment, for which Ukraine has targeted them. According to one such seller, fees of as much as 60% are now being charged on such equipment by the marketplaces. ⬇️
2/ The 'Forge of Mordor' channel, which makes and sells equipment to soldiers, comments:
3/ "Everyone feels sorry for Wildberries, but in reality, they're doing the following:
- Banning the sale of weapon modifications (or rather, imposing an additional fine)
- Multiple increases in commissions for everything war-related.
1/ Another Wildberries warehouse is on fire, this time in Sarapul, after a Ukrainian drone strike. As the ongoing massacre of Wildberries facilities continues, Russian warbloggers are becoming steadily more irate about air defence failures. ⬇️
2/ 'Combat Reserve' is furious, pointing to the lack of willingness among commanders and officials to take responsibility (a long-running problem; see the thread below).
1/ Russia's mobile fire teams (MOGs), which are the backbone of its defences against Ukrainian drones, are poorly paid and lack the benefits given to soldiers. Despite the dangers – MOGs have been attacked – their members do not get the benefits or pay that soldiers receive. ⬇️
2/ The authorities in Krasnodar Krai have announced that they will form mobile fire teams from employees of critical infrastructure and enterprises in Kuban to protect these facilities.
3/ Workers will be able to sign contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defence, and a monthly salary of 50,000 rubles [$627] will be provided. Fire team members are guaranteed not to be deployed to Ukraine (though how iron-clad this guarantee really is remains to be seen).