1/ The bitter feud between Yevgeny Prigozhin, Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov appears to have originated in Syria, as an interesting personal account by Prigozhin of the February 2018 Battle of Khasham illustrates. ⬇️
2/ The battle took place when Wagner attempted to seize a US-held oil refinery but was summarily wiped out by American air power. It's been discussed before by a Wagner soldier who was in the battle. Prigozhin explains what happened at higher levels.
3/ Prigozhin claims that the refinery was actually held by ISIS, with "Americans in their ranks" helping them. He says that there were periodic exchanges of fire between ISIS and Wagner, who were aiming to block the US/Kurdish advance into ISIS-held south-eastern Syria.
4/ Prigozhin says he proposed to capture the road leading along the Euphrates from Khsham to the Iraqi border. "On 2 February 2018, I discussed this plan with the Chief of General Staff and then with officers on the ground who were involved in the operation."
5/ "The operation to take control of southeast Syria was planned for the night of 7-8 February, with access to the Conoco plant and further along the road up to the border with Iraq. And once the security zone was established, Syrian army units could be launched from the south."
6/ Prigozhin was confident he had ground superiority over the US and ISIS, but he needed the Russian military to provide "air support and flawless air defences" to protect his ground force.
7/ He says "we were promised that two pairs of SU-35 fighters would be on duty at all times, flying in figures of eights over the Euphrates. So that if enemy aircraft came out, they could attack them and prevent them from hitting the moving infantry.
8/ "It was also promised that all means of air defense would be in operation: S-300, Pantsirs [air defence systems] and other available means of air defence and aviation, which at that time the Wagner PMC did not have."
9/ Prigozhin also says that the Russian MOD promised that they would warn Wagner if there was a threat of any "force majeure".
The operation was launched at 18:00 on 7 February, and at 23:45 the Wagner force attempted to storm the "ISIS" (US) positions.
10/ Then, as Prigozhin relates, the US unleashed the full range of its airpower – drones, attack helicopters, gunships and bombers, which devastated the attacking force and inflicted "a large number of dead and wounded". The attack was abandoned.
11/ Prigozhin says, without explaining why it happened, that he subsequently learned that just as the operation was being launched, Gerasimov ordered the Russian military to stand down, ground its aircraft and turn off the air defence systems.
12/ "According to information that I received from the dispatchers, it was ordered not to inform the Wagner PMC about these measures and subsequently not to contact them in any way."
13/ The Americans had seen Wagner begin advancing from 18:00 and had repeatedly challenged the Russian military to stand them down. When the Russian military disowned the Wagnerites, the US counter-attacked in full force. However, Prigozhin says, Wagner was never informed.
14/ "At 18:00, most of the military commanders left their workplace, went on vacation or even, more accurately, fled.
15/ "And when [Wagner tried to find them] after the shelling started, it turned out that some of them had locked themselves in their wagons, while others had changed their overnight location altogether, so that they could not be reached."
16/ "At 03:00 in the morning we finally managed to break into the RF Armed Forces headquarters to speak to the officer on duty.
17/ "There was a single colonel at the desk, who told us that he would try to resolve the issue so that the shelling would stop and the Wagner PMC fighters could remove the bodies of their slain comrades.
18/ "On 9 February I flew urgently to Moscow and tried to get an appointment with Shoigu to find out what really happened. I wanted to find out why all the agreements had fallen apart and why the tragedy of 8 February had occurred.
19/ "The Minister of Defence refused to receive me. I signed up on the 10th, the 11th and so on ad infinitum, but he had no time to talk to me. Then I caught him at a reception in the Kremlin, where I took advantage of my opportunity.
20/ "I approached him with a request: "Can I discuss with you the situation that occurred on 8 February near Deir ez-Zor?" He turned, calmly and arrogantly replied: “You wanted to be a hero? They were heroic. All the heroes are now here in this hall."
21/ "Here he gestured to those around him in expensive suits – "And you are just confused." That was the end of the conversation."
22/ The VChK-OGPU Telegram channel adds some additional context which also helps to explain the close relationship between Prigozhin and Russian Air Force chief Sergey Surovikin, who according to the Dossier Center was already an honorary Wagner member.
23/ According to a VChK-OGPU source, Prigozhin's plan of attack at Khsham was "actively lobbied for by Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force Surovikin."
24/ "But on 7 February it became known in the General Staff that this plan was a gamble of the Wagner PMC, aimed at obtaining access to the oil field in the interests of the business team of Gennady Timchenko, which by that time already included both Prigozhin and Surovikin.
25/ (Timchenko is an oil billionaire who was the sixth richest man in Russia as of March 2022. A long-time Putin ally, he has been sanctioned over the invasion of Ukraine. He is also reportedly one of the main backers of the Redut mercenary group, which is fighting in Ukraine.)
26/ According to the source, "Gerasimov was furious that the oligarchs were trying to make the armed forces into a servant of their business interests.
27/ "Surovikin's attempts to change Gerasimov's mind were unsuccessful and the only thing that the head of the armed forces was allowed to do was to allocate two planes to take deceased Wagner members to Russia.
28/ "Nevertheless, to this day, for his services in the Syrian campaign of the Russian Armed Forces, Sergey Surovikin receives dividends from the business projects in Syria of the Stroytransgaz joint stock company, controlled by Gennady Timchenko.
29/ "This passive income scheme is operated by Mikhail Khryapov, a friend of the Surovikin family and a member of the Stroytransgaz board of directors." /end
1/ While Telegram is only part of a wider complex of communications systems used in the Russian army, it comprises a keystone without which the wider system falls apart. A commentary by a Russian warblogger explains the Russian army's communications ecosystem in detail. ⬇️
2/ Responding to comments earlier this week by presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov, 'Vault No. 8' provides a "briefing note" on the role of Telegram in the Russian military communications ecosystem.
3/ "A typical motorised rifle regiment (today, the basic tactical unit—the military unit that holds the front line) utilises several tools to manage its troops:
1/ While the Russia army struggles with the impact of Telegram and Discord being throttled or blocked by the government, Ukraine has long used a highly sophisticated indigenously developed digital command and control system. Russian warbloggers have highlighted the contrast. ⬇️
2/ Detailed accounts such as the one in the thread below illustrate how Telegram – a commercial app run from Dubai – has been a central tool in the Russian kill chain, allowing for rapid responses to Ukrainian actions. Discord was also heavily used.
3/ Although this approach has been effective, it has now deliberately been rendered unusable by the Russian government. 'Two Majors' compares how Ukraine has approached digital command and control, and never made itself reliant on Telegram:
1/ The Russian army is reportedly forcing its soldiers to abandon Telegram and move over to the government-authorised MAX app. A Russian warblogger explains why the transition will prove to be very difficult. ⬇️
"Some challenges of switching from Telegram to MAX for our military personnel.
Telegram doesn't require a Russian number to be linked, making it difficult for adversaries to [de]anonymise users."
3/ "Max requires not only a Russian number but also real data (according to the messenger's rules), which enemy electronic warfare systems will immediately receive (although a Russian number alone is sufficient for the enemy to identify a user).
1/ Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov recently said (very wrongly) that "It's difficult, if not impossible, to imagine ... frontline communications being provided via Telegram or any other messenger." Warblogger Nikita Tretyakov has a list of other 'unimaginables'. ⬇️
2/ "What else is unimaginable?
It's unimaginable that just a week ago, our troops' communications relied on an enemy country's satellite constellation.
3/ "It's unimaginable that soldiers still obtain many essential items for war and military life (anti-thermal blankets, radios, gasoline-powered and electric tools, inverter generators, etc.) almost exclusively from their salaries or from volunteers.
1/ Russian warbloggers are outraged at being told by a journalist that it's their own fault that the Russian government is restricting Telegram. They argue that if not for the warblogger community, the military's lies would have gone unchallenged – which is exactly the point. ⬇️
2/ Komsomolskaya Pravda journalist Ivan Pankin has prompted fury with his claim that "endless nameless insiders, all those endless bloggers, the smartest people on earth who know everything and who have been spreading all sorts of nonsense" have annoyed the Russian government.
3/ He is almost certainly correct, but the warbloggers aren't having any of it and have responded angrily. They claim they have been consistently right in warning about the failures of the Russian military, to the overall benefit of the war effort and Russian population.
1/ In January 2026, Ukraine reported killing 34,000 Russian soldiers – on average 1,096 a day, or 7,846 per week. Thousands of Ukrainians have likely died in the same period. Last month in Ukraine was much bloodier than the average monthly death toll at Auschwitz. ⬇️
2/ The extraordinary lethality of the Ukraine war stands out in comparison to recent wars and mass killings:
🔺 At least 7,000 people are reported to have been killed in the recent Iranian uprising. More have died in Ukraine in each week of last month.
3/🔺 At least 84,000 people died in the Gaza war between 7 October 2023 and 10 October 2025 – an average of 3,500 per week. The number of weekly fatalities in the Ukraine war last month alone was more than twice Gaza's monthly average.