Russian forces have faced notable challenges, dealing with substantial losses, logistical hurdles, morale issues, and equipment deficiencies. To further analyze, I will examine several training grounds to assess whether they have reached critical levels. 🧵Thread:
2/ Due to security considerations, detailed information regarding enemy personnel and vehicle concentration across russia shouldn't be disclosed. Instead, I will provide general overview of two training grounds in Rostov and Volgograd oblast
3/ Kadamovskyi military training ground in Rostov Oblast, Russia, serves as one of the several training grounds for the 150th motor rifle division, which falls under the Southern Military District. A substantial number of units from this division are currently deployed in Ukraine
4/ Upon examination, the camp seems to be heavily used, with a considerable number of vehicles utilized. Notably, the largest vehicle parking area accommodates approximately 175 trucks and other unarmored vehicles, alongside 61 armored vehicles, including tanks and IFVs.
5/ After conducting a comprehensive analysis and comparing images from February 2023, it is evident that the tented camp, situated just north of the main camp, consistently houses incoming and rotating recruits, actively preparing them for their involvement in the war in Ukraine
6/ Another training ground, actively utilized for training both active servicemembers and recently mobilized troops, is the Prudboi camp and training grounds. This site is frequently employed by the Southern Military District and notably exhibits a significant presence of tanks.
7/ Based on July 2023 satellite imagery, the largest vehicle parking area is observed to host around 85 trucks and other unarmored vehicles, complemented by approximately 50 armored vehicles, predominantly tanks.
/8 After analyzing many photos from social networks and other sources, it becomes evident that Russian forces still maintain a considerable number of tanks in operational condition. Consequently, statements insinuating that they are almost depleted of equipment are not accurate
9/ It is true that russians have been employing outdated tanks like the T55/54 predominantly in the South for the past year. Despite their age, these tanks pose a significant threat as they engage through indirect fire, corrected by drones, making them unreachable for AT means.
10/ Before concluding, it's crucial to highlight a few details: not all vehicles are stored outdoors; some are located indoors. Due to Russia's longest in the world border, the allocation of forces across various regions limits their deployment solely to Ukraine.
11/ Considering russian political instability, exemplified by the Wagner mutiny, I am inclined to think that a potential power collapse and internal struggle among elites, driven by military defeats will let us liberate all occupied territories. But we are not there yet.
12/ As predicting the number of defeats needed for the regime's collapse is nearly impossible, we must simply concentrate on continuous military defeats of russians. We must prioritize efforts both internally and externally, as our current actions are proving insufficient.
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China is reportedly ready to send peacekeepers to Ukraine, according to Welt am Sonntag, citing European diplomats. Meanwhile, Frontelligence Insight is releasing a list of Chinese companies involved in scaling Russia’s Shahed drone program. Here is the list:
/2 Despite its efforts to present itself as a geopolitical actor capable of peacemaking, Chinese companies help to scale Russia's military production. As the data show, most of these companies are either not sanctioned or face restrictions from only a limited number of countries
3/ There are serious inconsistencies in sanctions, undermining their effectiveness. To maximize impact, sanctions should be coordinated across multiple states with leverage over China, including the United States, the European Union, the Commonwealth realms, Japan, and others.
iStories recently reported that Russian recruitment was falling, citing federal budget data on sign-up bonuses. In reality, enlistment still runs above 30,000 a month, and the dip reflects changes in published data, not an actual slowdown 🧵There are a few nuances, though:
2/ They reported that several regions, including Irkutsk and Vladimir, are struggling with recruitment. That is true, and has been an issue in many areas, which helps explain the steady rise in sign-up bonuses. Some recruits even register in other regions to secure higher payouts
3/ Still, despite ever-higher bonuses, Russia has found ways to offset shortfalls by drawing from the freshly detained and pre-trial prisoners, while increasingly pressuring illegal migrants and conscripts into signing contracts.
News of Ukrainian missile production (Flamingo missile) is inspiring, both at home and abroad. Yet, unless the production site, which was opened for journalists, was staged for cameras, it is striking how many details were left exposed - enough to make geolocation possible.
2/ Equally concerning is the decision to show crew members’ faces and list their positions. In our past investigations, my team was able to identify Russian servicemen and intelligence officers using just one facial photo, tracing some even to their actual home addresses
3/ Revealing factory staff could enable local agents from locals to follow employees and, in turn, uncover the site almost certainly making it a target. The interior itself is highly distinctive, a skilled team could likely narrow its location to a handful of candidates.
Exclusive Report: Shipments of engines, cylinders, pistons, and electronics are pouring from China into Alabuga, fueling Russia’s Shahed production. Frontelligence Insight analyzed export data, closed reports, and open sources, revealing the scale of support. 🧵Thread:
2/ Russia has sharply ramped up its use of Shahed (Geran), Garpia, and Gerbera UAVs, from dozens of launches in 2022 to tens of thousands per month by 2025. While Iran played a key role early on, it became clear that the only country that could scale the production was China.
3/ One of the biggest production bottlenecks was engines and electronics, without which large-scale Shahed production would be impossible. To address this, Russia set up multiple LLCs and intermediaries to streamline industrial-scale purchases and deliveries from China
Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence has posted a 3D model of an unidentified Russian UAV on its WarSanctions platform, complete with detailed descriptions and an interactive view. Key details on the drone, in 🧵thread:
2/ It can serve as a reconnaissance drone, loitering munition, or a decoy meant to overload Ukraine’s air defenses. Structurally, the drone features a delta-wing fuselage, similar to the Geran-1 (Shahed-131) but slightly smaller.
3/ The unidentified drone is powered by a two-stroke gasoline DLE engine produced by China’s Mile Haoxiang Technology Co.
The DLE engine is mounted in the nose of the fuselage, making the drone most similar to the “Italmas” loitering munition produced by Russia’s Zala Group
If we focus on the bigger picture today, the overall situation is not that bad. We went from Russia’s 2022 demands: military downsizing, government changes, the secession of multiple regions, and other demands: to a much shorter list of demands today:
2/ Notably, Ukraine has also stepped back from its maximalist demands for a de facto return to its 1991 borders and the full withdrawal of Russian forces. Clearly, its stance against direct negotiations has been abandoned as well.
3/ Whether this will work or not is beyond the scope of this message, but interestingly, if you read some of the more-or-less “semi-independent” Russian “Z” channels, not just those that repeat state propaganda, you can see that this realization is starting to take hold