🧵Ukrainian Counter-offensive
The Normandy Comparisons
As Kiev's Summer 2023 campaign faltered repeatedly, a whole chorus of Western apologia arose to help feed and bolster the failure
This was in direct parallel with Western largesse in continual supply of arms and ammunition
The NATO-sourced Normandy analogies were clearly deliberate, pre-meditated and coordinated
Just as the offensive's obvious long-planned Main Effort - Tokmak-Melitopol - was timed exactly to the anniversary of the Normandy D-Day landings i.e.,
6 June
It seemed to be another effort too to counter vast evidence that many of Kiev's troops would actually rather sympathize and work with those SS formations among Normandy's Axis occupiers
An obvious magical date may confound those westerners complaining NATO is on the wrong side
This Ghost of Normandy's effect was ongoing, as if an insurance policy for military failure
Ukraine partisans adopted sage personae of patience and broad meta-historical vision and erudition
...while assuming AFU command and staff acted from purely professional military motives
Now after three whole months the Normandy analogies even have a rearguard, well received among the faithful...
a la 'That's war. War is slow'
So, is the Ukrainian counteroffensive a failure?
How does it really compare to the Normandy campaign?
And what does all this show about the current state of the West's military culture?
The 1944 Normandy Campaign is one of the most analyzed and debated in military history
It generated controversies hotly contested to this day
One of the best accounts is Carlo D'Este's classic Decision in Normandy
Core to D'Este's discussion is an intense scandal around alleged under-performance by Montgomery
Monty had direct command for the Normandy Campaign. He aroused complaints of slow progress, and of lying over plans and timetables
For example, Ike's deputy Tedder wanted him sacked
Monty did under-perform, even when viewed against his own planning and orders
Notoriously, the key hub of Caen was meant to be taken fast following the D-Day landings, but Caen was mostly beyond reach for over a month
D'Este, himself a veteran officer, gives a fair assessment and is generous on Monty's abilities and achievements
And D'Este treats 'phase lines' properly as planning guides - not as orders or performance measures per se
Kiev's AFU is no different in this regard and yes, its command must be flexible in plans and orders as for any army
But those invoking a Normandy analogy invite competitive audit too
And their claims do not survive careful comparison
AFU under-performance in Zaporozhye would translate into a failure in Normandy comparable to the Anzio landing if not the 'disaster' (or sacrifice) at Dieppe...
For this audit we can scale mapped results against Normandy, Summer 1944
Of course success in warfare is not property speculation
But 'he who lives by the real estate portfolio dies by it' (or maybe ought to!)
And Kiev's sponsors have often treated such activities as identical
After three whole months the AFU's obvious Main Effort on its southern front would have failed to even reach the suburbs of Caen
Where viewed against the American 'hell of the Bocage', the AFU's thrust on its right flank would have been yet worse...
Results are hardly much better if generously including AFU advances on the Vremyevsky Ridge
I maintain that west-flank push was a feint, but we can allow that efforts may shift where opportunities arise
Nonetheless, an 'AFU-NATO D-Day' failed spectacularly by their own measures
If viewed against Normandy's phase lines from COSSACK planning too, the AFU's counteroffensive failed
It may even seem indistinguishable in that sense from the coastal raids of Churchill's 'peripheral strategy' in the Mediterranean fiasco of Kos and Leros
Back to Monty: how were things after 3 months?
The British took Antwerp but Monty gave a halt order
It was really the worst mistake of his career as it allowed German 15th Army to escape and their defences to recover
But Western military standards were much higher back then...
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🧵Ukrainian Nazis
or 'the Rise and Fall of the Weird Reich'
Pt 1
Not only Russians have long alleged that Kiev's post-coup regime not only tolerated Nazism but oversaw its revival to foment anti-Russian and other racist hatred and criminality
NB: original jpeg creator unclear
Wherever did critiques of Ukraine get that idea of a revived Nazi danger?
Are they exaggerated?
Here is some investigation to test Russia's allegations and complaint
The Region witnessed large-scale Nazi atrocities up close in World War 2
Just as it experienced the manipulation of ethnic identities - 'Ukrainian' prominent among them - to help carry out such atrocities
The AFU’s main indirect fire arm has an unusual “deconstructed” quality which defies normal military organization (like much of the AFU)
TLDR: AFU artillery brigades have not deployed as actual brigades
Some background first...
The Russia-Ukraine War shows a prevalence and importance of artillery, a term usually meaning mortars, howitzers, rocket tubes, precision-guided munition and some long-range missile strike
This thread discusses mostly the 2nd & 3rd above, but not exclusively
It’s institutional
Artillery assumed high status in military cultures since its birth. The destructive technology of indirect fire nearly always dwarfed and out-ranged that of main rival arms infantry and cavalry
It attracted huge investment
and loathing: overrun gun crews could expect no quarter
🧵 THE BAKHMUT CRUCIBLE
Part 1
Ukrainian Logistics: Varicose Veins vs Interior Lines
The eastern Ukraine town Bakhmut, known by Russia as Artyomovsk, has posed a crucial defence for the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) and their colleagues among the Interior Ministry's National Guard (NGU) troops, Border Guards (DPSU), Police, & sundry volunteer formations and units
This is a simple analysis of mostly Ukrainian sources to illustrate Bakhmut's importance, while proving that Russia’s Special Military Operation from February 2022 (SMO) systematically coordinated an efficient & logically sound war effort centered around and onto the Bakhmut Axis
🧵UKRAINE'S MILITARY CRISIS: an Order of Battle study #RussiaUkraineWar
How did Russia's army, with far fewer deployed troops than Ukraine's, expand territorial dominance in Ukraine far greater than it had on 24 February?
Short answer?
Ukraine’s army was too big for its boots
The above assertion's not even abstract hyperbole
Through April and even more recently, after nearly half a year’s escalated combat with Russia, mobilized Ukraine still sought boot donors to shod its troops, whether as recruits and conscripts, or already in training or the field
"But", I hear you say, "more and bigger tubes, ATGMs, AFVs, UAVs, gutsy troops PLUS mighty NATO & $$$, means more CAPABILITY!"
Not necessarily
Russian early success in Ukraine proves the old adage "the bigger they come, the harder they fall"