What you are seeing here in these Black Sea storm are wind fields causing a mass casualty event with Russian VKS rotary wing aircraft in Crimea, S. Ukraine & S. Russia.⬇️
Any rotary wing craft w/o a hanger & unable to fly out before the storm will be heavily
The historical example here is the 1989 Mother's Day Microburst that destroyed the US Army helicopter fleet at Fort Hood.
A microburst disabled 2/3 of all the AH-64A Apaches in the world with that one weather event. 2/
Plus one hundred other US Army helicopters were damaged as well.
The winds in this Black Sea storm are 26 meters/sec, or lightly under 65 miles an hour sustained winds.
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The old Soviet Union put all of its hardened aircraft shelters in Western Ukraine facing NATO.
Eastern Ukraine, Crimea & Russia...?
Not so much. 4/
So we are going to be seeing a lot of Russian VKS helicopters rotors looking like this sort of wind storm driven modern art.
And that is only the beginning of the logistical problems the Russians are going to have from this storm.
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Semi-tractor trailers have a really hard time in high winds.
The Youtube video below gives you a good idea what Black Sea storm winds are now doing to Russian Semi-tractor trailer rigs on roads from Crimea & Rostov-on the Don.
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There are a lot of Semi-tractor trailers cycling out of Crimea from both Krasnoperekopsk and Dhzankoy resulting in huge miles/kilometers long traffic jams.
Imagine what this storm is going to those rigs right now. 7/
Crimea has lost at least 1/4 of its power and Rostov-on-Don is suffering a huge geography focusing storm surge that will beach a large number of fuel barges RuAF forces depend upon.
Russian landing craft operating from Yevpatoriya northwards are facing 9 meter (30 ft) waves.
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And as @CovertShores has pointed out, the booms covering Sevastopol and the Kerch Straits Bridge are also eating those same 9 meter waves.
Both targets will be naked for Ukrainian boat-drones immediately after the storm abates.
With neither operable booms on the water, nor operational helicopters in the air, Russian fleet and bridge infrastructure will be uniquely vulnerable to Ukrainian boat-drone interdiction efforts for a week to 10 days, minimum.
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And clearing the Black Sea "Snowmageddon" Storm-overturned Russian semi-tractor trailers piling up right now on Russian ground lines of communications to the Russian Army in Ukraine will take several several days.
(Note: US Semi-truck used for illustration)
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I'm thinking now that this Ukrainian attack against Russian power for their electric railways in Donetsk, slowing supplies to Avdiivka, included the weather report on this
Black Sea Storm to leverage Ukraine's "Death of a Thousand Cuts".
" Please summarize the pre-World War 1 to 1942 career of merchant armed raiders and compare that data to Ukraine's recent drone attack in the Mediterranean with a drone armed commercial vessel."
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This is @grok's final summary:
"In essence, Ukraine's approach modernizes the raider concept—swapping guns for drones and merchant disguises for stealthy launches— but lacks the historical volume due to the conflict's constraints.
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In Donetsk, reconnaissance operators face constant drone surveillance, electromagnetic degradation, and hyper-local combat conditions that invalidate long-held assumptions about stealth and standoff intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).
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This article contends that NATO must, with urgency, reform its reconnaissance doctrine, training, and force structure to survive and efficiently operate in a drone-saturated battlefield."
Every competent USN surface officer knows in their gut an anti-aircraft cruiser should not be operating with downed identification friend or foe (IFF) and Link-16 data link with no E-2 Hawkeye AEW support.
That sound drama isn't World War One or any "medium intensity" conflict since 1918.
It is the sound of how 21st century Peer-to-Peer conflict is fought.
A conflict Western ground militaries are obsolescent in equipment to face.
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That Russo-Ukraine War video is a soundscape US Army National Training Centers are too obsolete/incapable of replicating, because US Army flag ranks are allergic to training with high densities of small/cheap/many FPV drones.
SHORAN was a WW2 blind bombing system using two radio stations and an electromechanical computer.
In 1938 an RCA engineer named Stuart William Seeley, while attempting to remove "ghost" signals from an experimental television system, discovered he could measure distances 2/
...by time differences in radio reception.
Instead of building a radar unit with this discovery, he proposed using this technique for precision ground-based radio beacon navigation bombing aid.
One the DCMA quality inspectors on my team worked at an EMALS contractor in Texas.
I can't say more than the Chinese tested their EMALS at subsystem level (unlike the USN) with the knowledge the four catapults needed to be independent of each other for operations,
...based on how the USN f--ked up their EMALS design.
That is, when any single EMALS catapult on the Ford class goes down for any reason. They all can't be used.
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As strategypage dot com put it in 2019:
"EMALS proved less reliable than the older steam catapult, more labor intensive to operate, put more stress on launched aircraft than expected and due to a basic design flaw if one EMALS catapult becomes inoperable,
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