1/ At least 2,500 scientists are reported to have left Russia since the start of the war in Ukraine in February 2022 and the number of published scientific papers has collapsed. This comes as the result of isolation due to sanctions, visa restrictions and state paranoia. ⬇️
2/ Novaya Gazeta Europe (NGE) reports on the outcome of a survey of the international ORCID database, which lists more than 20 million scientists globally. Registration in ORCID is mandatory for publishing employees of large Russian universities.
3/ The data indicates more than 130,000 scientists resident in Russia in October 2023. The share of these changing their residence from Russia to a foreign country was practically unchanged from 2012 to 2021, but jumped to 30% in 2022.
4/ NGE estimates that, based on the trendlines, around 2,500 scientists have emigrated since 2022. The number of foreign scientists choosing to come to Russia has also dropped by over two-thirds.
5/ Many of the emigrants are likely to be younger people, as older, more established scientists face more professional and personal difficulties from emigration. Younger men are also more likely to be subjected to mobilisation and have a bigger incentive to leave Russia.
6/ According to one university professional interviewed by NGE, "the best are trying to leave immediately after completing their bachelor’s, master’s and postgraduate studies." Unlike IT workers, scientists are not exempted from being mobilised to fight in Ukraine.
7/ While most emigrating Russian scientists left for the US, Germany and the UK before the war, since February 2023 other destinations have been prefered, in particular Uzbekistan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and the UAE with a 300% growth in Russian scientific immigration.
8/ The top three destinations are now Germany, the US and Israel – which has had a 175% increase. However, Russian scientific immigration to the UK, France and the US has fallen by more than 20%.
9/ The impact on Russian science is already visible, with a sharp fall in the number and quality of published papers. The share of global science attributed to Russia has fallen from 2-3% to only 1-2%. Russian participation in international scientific conferences has shrunk.
10/ The collapse has been particularly noticeable in the proportion of academic conference papers with a Russia-affiliated author. Around 35,000 had at least one Russia-based author in 2021 but this dropped to about 20,000 in 2022 and only about 11,000 in 2023.
11/ One publication, the UK-based Journal of Physics: Conference Series, illustrates this trend starkly: papers by Russian authors presented in the series fell from nearly 6,000 in 2021 to only 106 by November 2023, despite Russia traditionally being a leader in physics research.
12/ The reasons for this are not hard to find. Scientists are often physically unable to attend conferences due to visa restrictions and bans on direct flights between Russia and the West. Russian scientists were also removed from international collaborative programmes.
13/ Russian scientists report an growing atmosphere of fear and paranoia at home, as well as a shortage of equipment and scientific supplies due to sanctions. Contact and collaboration with foreigners is regarded with increasing suspicion by the authorities.
14/ In some instances, distinguished scientists working on hypersonics and quantum technology have been charged with treason and illegally sharing information in a number of high-profile cases, even though they are said to have had official permission to collaborate.
15/ The impact on Russian science is likely to last for decades. The losses are not all one way, however, as Russia's withdrawal from the global scientific community is likely to hinder collective efforts on issues such as climate change. /end
1/ An ongoing 'massacre' of Russian tankers in the Sea of Azov is prompting apolexy and denunciations from Russian warbloggers. They ask what is going on, and some suspect a conspiracy: "incompetence of this level does not exist". ⬇️
2/ Contrary to some claims, these are not 'shadow fleet' tankers; they are instead small coastal and riverine vessels with capacities of a few thousand tons each. Russia appears to be using them to bring fuel into Crimea to break the Ukrainian drone blockade of the highways.
3/ However, Crimea's Black Sea ports are effectively unusable due to the constant threat of Ukrainian unmanned surface vessels (USVs). Crimea's principal Azov port, Kerch, is relatively small. Vessels have to queue up in the roadsteads outside the port, completely undefended.
1/ Heavy drones, which the Russians largely lack, are providing a significant advantage for Ukrainian infantry logistics on the battlefield. Meanwhile, says a Russian source, the Russian infantry face a "reverse evolution" of their equipment under harsh battlefield conditions. ⬇️
2/ Recently reported Ukrainian advances are likely to have been made possible by innovations in drone-supported logistics, with heavy drones now being used to transport large quantities of equipment, supplies, and weapons.
3/ Ukraine's heavy drones such as the Vampire drone bomber (called 'Baba Yaga' by the Russians) are a capability that Russia has consistently failed to replicate. Instead, Russian soldiers seek out downed Ukrainian heavy drones and repair them for reuse.
1/ Russian mobile air defence teams are stuck in queues outside gas stations and are being denied preferential access to scarce fuel, a Russian source says in a plea to a warblogger for help. The problem has arisen because the teams don't drive military-registered vehicles. ⬇️
2/ A relative of a member of a Russian mobile fire group (MOG) writes to ask the governor of the Belgorod region to intervene:
"Greetings. I'm writing to you on behalf of my father, who is currently shooting down drones with the Belgorod BARS [reserve forces] unit."
3/ "He's asking you to raise the issue of fuel supplies for mobile task forces. Considering that our new acting governor [Alexander Shuvaev] is a military man, I'm sure (or at least want to believe) that he or his aides are reading your posts and will be able to reach them…
1/ Russia's fuel crisis has developed rapidly and with increasing nationwide severity. A Russian commentary notes that the Russian government only has limited options for dealing with fuel shortages, but these are being overtaken by a fast-growing black market in fuel. ⬇️
2/ 'Federation Towers' highlights how quickly Russia has been plunged into a full-scale fuel crisis:
"The Russian fuel market held up smoothly for all four years of the Special Military Operation."
3/ "In one week in July, it suffered a blow on two fronts: gasoline prices rose by 2.1%, diesel by 3.4%, and gas stations in dozens of regions are experiencing physical shortages of fuel.
1/ It's logistically impossible for Russia to protect all of its strategic sites with its limited number of missile-based air defence systems, warns a Russian warblogger. Huge sites and obscured visibility requires many such systems but reduces the effectiveness of each. ⬇️
2/ 'Military Informant' highlights the practical difficulties of using SAM systems to provide adequate protection:
"When discussing the protection of rear-line facilities from cruise missile attacks, one thing is often forgotten."
3/ "People often ask, "Where are the Pantsir/Tor missiles?" But the fact is that protecting every strategically important facility with its own "reliable, classic ground-based air defence" against low-altitude, relatively fast targets with complex trajectories has long been…
1/ In a stark illustration of the impact of Ukraine's drone strike campaign against Russian refineries, videos from occupied Mariupol show vehicles all but absent from the streets, with burned-out trucks visible along the roads. A Russian commentary highlights the crisis. ⬇️
2/ 'Novorossiya Militia Reports' writes:
"If anyone is monitoring the situation, they should know that Ukraine is delivering an average of two [destroyed] refineries to us per day."
3/ "The authorities' statements about the normalisation of the fuel situation in a "week" or "two" are surprising.