Thread by @antbruceking

1/ Strategy for Ukraine:

The west’ strategy for #UkraineRussiaWar 2024 has become an urgent question. Many commentators @shashj @KofmanMichael @RALee85 @HoansSolo @Jack_Watling have already stressed that we are approaching a crux maybe even a climax in this War.

2/Ukraine’s counter-offensive of 2023 failed. Frankly, it was never likely to succeed, as much as its proponents claimed. UAF were trying to breach heavily fortified, prepared Russian positions, without air superiority, or favorable combat ratios.

3/ Even if UAF had breached the Surovikin Line it seems probable the offensive would have culminated in an urban battle around Tokmak, Melitopol, or Mariupol. They just didn’t have the combat power.

4/Despite horrendous losses in men and materiel Russia has endured, it has regenerated its force. It has fortified the territory it has taken. It has about a three to one advantage in artillery on current figures.

5/It is imperative that Ukraine win this war. Russian aggression has to be resisted and repelled. Recently, President #Zelensky still defined winning as retaking all Ukraine’s stolen territory including the Donbas and Crimea.

6/Ukraine has the right to its land. A full re-integration of Ukraine would be just. But is it realistic? Is it the basis of a coherent strategy for 2024? I do not think it is. Indeed, a maximalist Ukrainian strategy may be counter-productive, discouraging Western support.

7/The 2023 Ukrainian offensive failed. It seems improbable that a 2024 Offensive would be any more successful. The conditions are worse. Combat ratios have shifted in Russia’s favour, even if almost all its professional troops who started this war have been killed or wounded.

8/Russia has re-equipped. Its fortifications have been strengthened. Without a massive increase in UAF troop numbers, firepower, and airpower, it is almost inconceivable that a major offensive could succeed – maybe even unwise to mount it.

9/ So should Ukraine and the West therefore just give up and admit defeat? NOT AT ALL. This war can and has to be won. A realistic assessment that another Ukrainian counter-offensive cannot succeed, recommends only a refinement of strategy – not an admission of failure.

10/On 24 February, most observers believed that Ukraine was doomed. Russia would defeat UAF and depose Zelensky. In the event, Ukraine inflicted a terrible defeat on Russia in 2022, it defended most of its territory, it united itself as a genuine, democratic republic. It won.

10/ The fact that it is unlikely to be able to re-integrate the Crimea, and much of Zaporizhia and the Donbas in 2024, cannot take away that remarkable victory of 2022.

11/However, to hold onto that victory in 2022, Ukraine – and its western backers – need a new strategy. Instead of pursuing an unrealistic strategy of expelling Russian from the territory it has taken, the new strategy should focus on consolidating what it has.

12/ A strategy of aggressive defence is required. Russia may continue to hold the terrain it illegally invaded. But the prize of any further aggression against the Republic of Ukraine must be catastrophic. It must be impossible for Russia to encroach upon Ukrainian terrain.

13/ In order to repel Russia forces and to deter the Kremlin, a new strategy is required. What are its main features:
(1) Build a network of interconnected citadels in and around frontier towns and villages, each one of which the Russians could only take at great cost.

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(2) Massive artillery and rocket strikes to repel any Russian incursions against those citadels.
(3) Strike Russian forces, C2 nodes, logistics hubs deep in Russian-held territory in Ukraine.

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(4) Major artillery/rocket/UAV bombardments of Crimea supported by naval attacks and blockade against Sevastopol
5) Continue kinetic and cyber attacks against CNI in Russia.

16/Ukraine cannot execute this strategy alone. Increased western support throughout 2024 and into 2025 is imperative here. Without it, Ukraine’s victory may descend into a defeat.

What should the West do?

16/ Training:
(1) Expand the training of Ukrainian troops. It should accelerate the training and education of staff officers to generate brigade, divisional and corps level HQs capable of conducting combined arms operations – not just tactical missions.

18/ Weapons:
(2) Increase the production and supply of artillery shells.
(3) Increase the supply of advanced missile, rocket and artillery systems (ACATMS etc).
(4) Increase the supply of air defence systems and fighter aircraft

19/ Political:
(5) Agree to admit Ukraine to NATO, on the day after the war is over. The west has a duty to do this. Even more important, NATO membership is the only way to guarantee Ukrainian security in the long term.

20/Conclusion: A full re-integration of Ukraine is unlikely. That is deplorable. But if this war ends in 2025, with most of Ukraine intact as a thriving republic, a NATO, and eventually EU, member state, that is no defeat – especially when we think back to the 24 February 2022.

21/ Better a successful pragmatic strategy, than a morally justified, but impractical one.