The Iranian proxy forces had this cheap victory of US forces using a drone version of a 82 year old tactic that torpedoed the USS Yorktown (CV-5) at the battle of Midway.
The Iranian drone followed closely behind a US drone to get past air defenses, just like the IJN torpedo 1/
...planes did at Midway and Japanese Kamikazes did in the last 11 months of WW2.
It is very likely the trailed US drone had no IFF transponder at all, as the MX12B micro Mode 5 Identify Friend or Foe (IFF) transponder was only certified in 2021.
In all likelihood these dead servicemen are victims of a sluggish Pentagon procurement system geared to maximize the opportunities for Congressional campaign contributions and post DoD career opportunities.
The need for micro-IFF Transponders for small drones was a stated
3/
...military requirement in the late 1990's, that is, 30(+) years ago.
This was in the aftermath of 1994 American friendly fire deaths when two USAF F-15's shot down two UH-60 Blackhawk over Kurdistan in 1994.
And even if the US drone approaching Tower 22 had a MX12B micro Mode 5 IFF transponder, there is no guarantee procedures for its use in an air tasking order were being followed.
It wasn't in 1994, which is one of the reasons why 26 US military and civilians were killed.
5/
Getting electronic identification friend or foe right takes highly professional, multi-service and well trained air defenders.
A skill category that the US Military ran into the ground early in the post Cold War "Peace Dividend."
Demobilization is always a deliberate policy
6/
...of firing all the best & most skilled specialists in the military, government and industry as "unnecessary costs."
They are always the first let go under the "End of History" delusion.
It has ever been thus in the USA.
7/
And US Military always pays dearly via:
"Learning by Doing,
Learning by Dying"
...to get those specialist military skills back again in the next war.
8/8
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Homicide statistics since the early 1960s are not comparable to earlier periods because medical advances have turned many fatal injuries into survivable ones.
I'm tempted to say the difference between military flag ranks who are competent at 2026 peer to peer warfare, and those who are not, is the understanding and application of attritional loss curves to combat loss rates, electronic warfare and logistics.
The set of curves I had an AI produce for me above have been used for air warfare many times starting at the end of WW2, in the USSBS after WW2 and by many classic RAND airpower studies from the 1950's to 1980's.
2/
All post 9/11/2001 Western flag ranks are counter-insurgency (COIN) trained & experienced.
They have no gut feel at all to statistical attrition models at all.
These "COIN-head" flags may prove to be highly resistant to changing this. Which is required to deal with drones.
2/
The effectiveness of drones is directly affected by the electronic warfare competence of the drone users.
The fact that the US Army defenestrated every EW practitioner in the 2000's and has compete "EW virgins" as flag rank leadership means it will fail with mass casualties in its first major drone war combat.
1/3
3. The shooter arrived at the hotel the day before the event.😯
4. TSA rules require firearms to be transported in checked baggage, unloaded, and locked in a hard-sided container, declared to the airline at check-in.
2/
5. Local DC law requires firearms in vehicles to be inaccessible from the passenger compartment and unloaded.
6. Washington DC is not a "safe passage" jurisdiction for non-residents without a license. The shooter lacked this license.
3/
USN flag ranks & their staffers have been fighting the idea of distant economic blockade of China tooth an nail as a response to China invading Taiwan for 30 years.
They really don't want a recent precedent of a successful blockade...
...to prevent their Carrier fleet Pickett's charge into the South China Sea.
Specifically distant blockade as a strategy against China makes having/regaining 100 Cold War era
2/3
...frigates and destroyer tenders supporting them on distant blockade stations outside the 2nd Island chain, "budget relevant" for a military strategy of conducting three years of blockade enforcement.