The Iranian proxy forces had this cheap victory of US forces using a drone version of a 82 year old tactic that torpedoed the USS Yorktown (CV-5) at the battle of Midway.
The Iranian drone followed closely behind a US drone to get past air defenses, just like the IJN torpedo 1/
...planes did at Midway and Japanese Kamikazes did in the last 11 months of WW2.
It is very likely the trailed US drone had no IFF transponder at all, as the MX12B micro Mode 5 Identify Friend or Foe (IFF) transponder was only certified in 2021.
In all likelihood these dead servicemen are victims of a sluggish Pentagon procurement system geared to maximize the opportunities for Congressional campaign contributions and post DoD career opportunities.
The need for micro-IFF Transponders for small drones was a stated
3/
...military requirement in the late 1990's, that is, 30(+) years ago.
This was in the aftermath of 1994 American friendly fire deaths when two USAF F-15's shot down two UH-60 Blackhawk over Kurdistan in 1994.
And even if the US drone approaching Tower 22 had a MX12B micro Mode 5 IFF transponder, there is no guarantee procedures for its use in an air tasking order were being followed.
It wasn't in 1994, which is one of the reasons why 26 US military and civilians were killed.
5/
Getting electronic identification friend or foe right takes highly professional, multi-service and well trained air defenders.
A skill category that the US Military ran into the ground early in the post Cold War "Peace Dividend."
Demobilization is always a deliberate policy
6/
...of firing all the best & most skilled specialists in the military, government and industry as "unnecessary costs."
They are always the first let go under the "End of History" delusion.
It has ever been thus in the USA.
7/
And US Military always pays dearly via:
"Learning by Doing,
Learning by Dying"
...to get those specialist military skills back again in the next war.
8/8
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I asked @grok to document this Russian policy of atrocity at the link, excerpt:
"February 24, 2022–present (Full-scale Russian invasion): The scale escalated dramatically. As of May 2026, the WHO had verified more than 3,000 attacks on healthcare via its Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care (SSA). A coalition of organizations (including PHR, eyeWitness, Truth Hounds, etc.) documented ~3,095 attacks, with 1,632 damaging or destroying hospitals and clinics"
When I've talked about the legacy of Soviet industrial gigantism (one big factory) making Putin era Russia far more vulnerable to a drone strategic bombing campaign.
I've talked about this vulnerability in a couple of previous threads. Here is a shorter one:
Putin's decades long "Russian exceptionalism" propaganda campaign, that says WW2 was won on the Eastern Front, has made Russians incapable of seeing this.
There is so much to object to here that I'm going to restate some basic design observations on the FP-5 to clarify how the Russian reflexive control data fed AI slop that is polluting public discussions of the FP-5.
1. The FP-5 Flamingo is about four times the launch weight of a BGM-109 Tomahawk (i.e. ~13,200 lb), and 2-3 times the range (i.e. ~1,620 nmi) while carrying twice the warhead mass (i.e. ~2,000 lb).
2/
2. The FP-5 design concept is modelled on the USAF MGM-13 Mace GLCM as Fire Point told Ukrainian military analysts - but designed with modern technology to be extremely cheap to make (claimed 1/6 the cost of a Tomahawk - likely not counting the engine cost).
The first thing that needs to be pointed out is that in 2026 Ukraine has not only replicated, but likely exceeded, the 2018 capabilities of the USAF's Stand-off Munitions Activity Center (SMAC) at at Barksdale AFB.
Electronic warfare is always a "saving throw" with an expiration date for the defense.
Plus no one in the world, since 1989, has invested in enough mobile guns for robust AA-combined arms to screw up the simple arithmetic of a saturation drone/missile attacks.
2/
Russia burned out Ukraine's considerable stocks of 5V55 SAMs (~3,300 rounds), 9M83 SAMs (~1,000) and 9M38 SAMs (~800) by repeat saturation attacks.
Ukraine returns the favor. This is not that difficult to grasp.
Saturation attacks were central to legacy Soviet doctrine.
3/
We have just seen over Moscow today - with Ukrainian drones - the Russo-Ukrainian War's version of the RAF’s first 1,000-bomber raid of World War II, codenamed Operation Millennium, which took place on the night of May 30–31, 1942.
Operation Millennium, marked the first tactical deployment of the RAF "bomber stream".
That is, the tactic of flying a dense, tightly timed formation along a narrow corridor to overwhelm German radar networks and anti-aircraft defenses of the Kammhuber line. 2/3
When I look at the design of the air defense rings around Moscow.🧐⬇️
I can't help but think Ukraine used a 2026 "Drone Stream' to saturate one sector of these ring defenses like the RAF did to the Kammhuber line.