The Iranian proxy forces had this cheap victory of US forces using a drone version of a 82 year old tactic that torpedoed the USS Yorktown (CV-5) at the battle of Midway.
The Iranian drone followed closely behind a US drone to get past air defenses, just like the IJN torpedo 1/
...planes did at Midway and Japanese Kamikazes did in the last 11 months of WW2.
It is very likely the trailed US drone had no IFF transponder at all, as the MX12B micro Mode 5 Identify Friend or Foe (IFF) transponder was only certified in 2021.
In all likelihood these dead servicemen are victims of a sluggish Pentagon procurement system geared to maximize the opportunities for Congressional campaign contributions and post DoD career opportunities.
The need for micro-IFF Transponders for small drones was a stated
3/
...military requirement in the late 1990's, that is, 30(+) years ago.
This was in the aftermath of 1994 American friendly fire deaths when two USAF F-15's shot down two UH-60 Blackhawk over Kurdistan in 1994.
And even if the US drone approaching Tower 22 had a MX12B micro Mode 5 IFF transponder, there is no guarantee procedures for its use in an air tasking order were being followed.
It wasn't in 1994, which is one of the reasons why 26 US military and civilians were killed.
5/
Getting electronic identification friend or foe right takes highly professional, multi-service and well trained air defenders.
A skill category that the US Military ran into the ground early in the post Cold War "Peace Dividend."
Demobilization is always a deliberate policy
6/
...of firing all the best & most skilled specialists in the military, government and industry as "unnecessary costs."
They are always the first let go under the "End of History" delusion.
It has ever been thus in the USA.
7/
And US Military always pays dearly via:
"Learning by Doing,
Learning by Dying"
...to get those specialist military skills back again in the next war.
8/8
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THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
Bombing Accuracy, USAAF Heavy and Medium Bombers in the ETO
MILITARY ANALYSIS DIVISION
First Edition 3 November 1945
Second Edition January 1947
You find both mission failures & gross errors were "excluded data" 2/
And that both increased altitude and the number of combat boxes involved made CEP worse.
>>This is essentially a complete tactical bomber cell in a box, sized for a small mobile drone team operating at brigade level or below. It is not a strategic deep-strike weapon, and it is not pretending to be one.
I've spent the last few hours reposting my 2022 to date take down's of Alex Vershinin's "Truck beer math" (from the Nov. 2021 War on the Rocks article "Feeding the Bear") which I used to review this Tochnyi article⬇️
TLDR: Tochnyi screwed up & used Vershinin's disproven work. 1/
Specifically this bit stating Russian trucks did three trips a day because they spent one hour loading and one hour unloading trucks.
That is, like Alex Vershinin, they assumed mechanized logistics loading times with pallets & forklifts⬇️
2/
This is Alex Vershinin's truck "Beer Math" for comparison.
It assumes 45 miles vice 50 km, but both show the same mirror imaging of Western mechanized logistics on Red/Russian Army non-mechanized logistics.