Although it will take many more attacks on refineries to create a real gasoline shortage in Russia (and even then, Belarus has available capacities), it is an effective strategy for many reasons:
1.) A gasoline shortage would be a political nightmare for Putin, because it would..
.. be felt and discussed by everyone. Gasoline prices are political, even in Russia. Average Russians are not willing to pay a price for the war.
2.) Refineries are important for the military. Of course the military will not feel shortages, but refineries are legitimate targets.
3.) There are very few civilian casualties. High gas prices make people angry, but nobody will starve, freeze etc. due to the attacks.
4.) Attacks on Russian refineries don't lead to rising oil prices globally, as long as crude exports continue. The effect is felt only in Russia.
5.) The damages can take several months to repair. Sanctions and drone attacks work hand in hand here, as Western parts are more difficult to obtain.
6.) Ukraine has just scratched the surface of what it can do here. Russia will try countermeasures but probably remain vulnerable.
PS, a technicality: In the Russian case, rationing of gasoline would be more likely than really high prices (the latter are tightly regulated).
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Why won't the Kremlin agree to a compromise in Ukraine? The answer lies in Putin's motives. Initially, it may have been imperialism and a desire to control Ukraine. That was bad enough, and difficult enough to stop. But after the full-scale invasion began, the motives changed.
The reason is that the Ukrainian military exposed the weakness of Putin's regime. Russia was humiliated on the world stage. Since then, it is not about domination: Putin needs to destroy Ukraine and humiliate the West because they openly challenged him and exposed his weakness.
Putin can't let Ukraine get away with this. Throughout his time in power, he has carefully cultivated a reputation for destroying and humiliating those who openly challenge him. Crucially, this destruction must be a spectacle, shocking and demoralizing. Saving face is not enough.
There are two dominant arguments in the Western discourse on Russia's war against Ukraine:
1.) Russia is weaker than it seems, the war and Putinism will go away once Ukraine kicks Russia out.
2.) Russia is stronger than it seems, so some kind of deal with Russia is necessary.
It is difficult to go beyond these lines of thought: If you point out Russian strength, there's an automatic suspicion that you want to porpose a deal with Russia, or that you're not loyal to the Ukrainian cause.
This is because the "Russia is tough" argument is often misused and distorted by pro-Russian voices ("Russia cannot be defeated") who want to stir up fear and hopelessness or suggest that there is no reasonable option but to give in to Putin. This, of course, is propaganda.
What are the effects of #sanctions on the opinions of Russians about the West and the war? There is a naïve pro-sanctions view: Sanctions lead to economic hardship which is then attributed to the war and leads to anti-war sentiment. This is certainly not happening. 1/
There is also a naïve anti-sanctions view: Sanctions lead to economic hardship, which is attributed to the West's hostility and leads to a "rally-round-the-flag" effect and stronger support for Putin. This is also not happening. 2/
From my experience, there are two groups: The "enlightened group" of educated Russians, a minority, and the "loyal group" of Russians, the majority, who rather believe in Putin and the official line on foreign policy. Interestingly, the sanctions effects on both is complex. 3/
Can Vladimir Putin drag the world into the abyss of West-China escalation? Maybe. The secret to Putin's long-term survival in power is his skill in taking everybody hostage. He excels in creating settings in which you go down if he goes down, if you like him or hate him. 1/
He did it in Russia, in Russia's neighbourhood, with many in the West, and he is of course also trying to do it with Xi Jinping. Putin's tactic should not be confused with actual "madman" behaviour. Putin will not choose nuclear armageddon. It is calculated and rational. 2/
Note how Putin tries to portray him and Xi as sitting in the same boat at the current meeting. It could be dismissed as laughable, because it is so transaprent. And certainly Xi understands what is going on. But still, if Putin goes down, it would be a huge problem for Xi. 3/
Great thread by @AlexGabuev, the best source on everything related to Russia-China! The way the use of the yuan has increased in #Russia over the last year really is remarkable. I still wonder how far it can grow from here, and if it is a local or a global phenomenon. 1/
Let's look at what the yuan can and cannot offer to Russia.
1.) Yuan is a store of value with low sanctions risk. Yuan has become the most important element in Russian foreign exchange reserves. Russia does not have any alternative if it wants to implement its budget rule. 2/
At the same time, the yuan has many (economic) disadvantages over dollar/euro as a store of value. a) China can simply devaluate the currency and its monetary policy is intransparant. b) It is more liquid than gold, but liquidity is still not great. 3/
How are Russians sending money abroad? Raiffeisen has become the most important channel. On OhMySwift.ru, Russians are reporting about their experiences with wire transfers abroad (~4700 datasets), the picture is pretty clear. Here are recent transfers to Germany: 1/
You can also order entries by bank, which is conclusive in the case of recently sanctioned Tinkoff: It stopped working, except for one yuan transfer to Hongkong. 2/
What are the most important banks for sending money abroad?
Raiffeisenbank: 1770 transfers, 83% successful
Tinkoff: 981 transfers, 59% successful
BKS: 300 transfers, 76% successful
After Tinkoff was sanctioned, Raiffeisen almost has a monopoly. 3/