I just spent a week in Beijing, for the first time in many years. A few thoughts. The war in Ukraine is creating huge strains in China's relations with the US and the EU. This is because the war has pushed China into closer alignment with Russia, Iran and DPRK. /1 @CER_EU
What drives China's foreign policy is an obsession with the US - and its efforts to stymie China's emergence as a great power, for example through controls on the export of hi-tech goods. Feeling insecure, China's leaders need all the friends they can find. /2
Russia is a useful friend, on UNSC with diplomatic clout in M East & Africa, lots of oil & gas, and a leader who shares Xi Jinping's world view - that the decadent West is in decline, a multipolar world is emerging, and big countries should enjoy spheres of influence. /3
So Russia must not lose - that would be a humiliation for China. By default, China has also become more closely allied with Iran & DPRK, Russia's friends (and suppliers of arms). Being in an axis of autocracies is not where many Chinese officials & academics want to be. /4
They emphasise how China is pro-globalisation and global rules, while Russia, Iran and DPRK are not, and are seeking to undermine the international order. They say China wants to lead the global south, not an axis of autocracies. /5
But the US and the EU are fed up with China's indirect support for Russia's war effort - it is not supplying arms but is selling important components and dual use goods. And buying much oil. The US is threatening sanctions against Chinese banks. This is causing much concern. /6
Many Chinese officials & academics want good relations with Russia and the West. But they know that Xi will not abandon Russia, even if ties with the West fray. But there is also another factor causing strains between China and the West: China's new economic strategy. /7
China's growth was driven by property and construction. But no longer. Xi wants the new driver to be not personal consumption but 'new quality productive forces' - ie, making high-tech goods. Both US & EU fear over-capacity and the dumping of these goods on their markets. /8
The European Commission has recently got tough on China, investigating Chinese exports of EVs, trains, solar panels, wind turbines & scanning equipment that it thinks have benefited from excessive subsidies. This is a response to the lack of action by the Chinese... /9
when the EU complains about its annual €400 billion trade deficit, and China's reluctance to open its markets further. The US is imposing new tariffs on Chinese steel and hitting China's shipping. So, both Ukraine & economic tensions are pushing China's ties to US & EU..../10
into a downward spiral - even if the current diplomacy is polite. China hopes to pull EU away from alignment with US. But so long as China supports Russia's war effort & fails to do more to open its markets, the EU will stay close to US. And China will stay close to Russia. ENDS
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Having recently had the chance to talk to people in the British govt (and one key EU govt) I am getting more optimistic about the chances of a deal on the NI protocol before the 25th anniversary of Good Friday Agreement in April. Short thread. @CER_EU /1
Both sides know both will need to move from their core positions, and the UK, at least, seems to think that this will happen. The optimists in the govt reckon that the EU understands the need to reduce friction on GB-NI border, to make life easier for firms in NI and GB. /2
But won't ERG make a big fuss if - as a quid pro quo - the UK has to accept ECJ role in policing protocol? One senior Brit wasn't worried: 'If Chris Heaton-Harris and Steve Baker [the 2 key ministers responsible for NI] say the deal upholds integrity of the UK, ERG'll be OK.' /3
Liz Truss deserves credit for changing her mind and deciding to go to the inaugural meeting of the European Political Community in Prague on Oct 6. When I asked her about it last summer she was hostile, saying that Europe had enough organisations already. A short thread. /1
But she listened to officials and to Macron and other leaders who argued that, given Russia's aggressive behaviour, European heads of govt needed a forum in which they could co-operate and better align their approaches to Russia. Truss could foster some friendships in Prague. /2
When I wrote a paper on EPC 2 months ago I argued that it would only work if it was inter-governmental. Some wanted a 'communautaire' model, dominated by the EU as a bloc and run by the Commission. But then UK and other non-EU countries would fear being treated as 2nd-class. /3
This proposal on the European Political Community by 4 experts - @pisaniferry@D_Schwarzer@Shahinvallee & @prof_mayer - is well-argued and interesting. But it would have benefited from some input from people other than French & Germans. A short thread. /1
I think one of @EmmanuelMacron's several rationales for the EPC is the desire to 'socialise the British' - include them in a European forum so that they rebuild some ties and contribute geopolitically. Yet the @dgapev@Grand_Continent@Bruegel_org paper ignores the Brits. /2
Of course I am not suggesting the EPC should be organised mainly around British preoccupations - but if Macron wants the British involved, their concerns shouldn't be ignored. Many senior people in Paris get the point. In Paris I have found 2 schools of thought on EPC. /3
The invasion of #Ukraine will have consequences - a thread. 1) Russia's economy already faced multiple problems - inability to diversify from hydrocarbon exports, the dead weight of corruption, stagnant living standards; sanctions (esp tech bans) & isolation will hurt economy.
2) Cut off from West, Russia has no choice but to become junior partner of China. Beijing is ambivalent on invasion - it won't criticise Russia in public and blames the US, but values stability & territorial integrity. It never recognised S Ossetia/Abkhazia or annex'n of Crimea.
3) NATO, strengthened with a core mission of territorial defence, will push extra troops and infrastructure into front-line states. US will recommit to European security (even if Republicans win White House). (Turkey's support for Ukraine will damage its ties to Russia.)
.@CER_EU's annual report has my essay on how the world has changed in the 25 years since our birth: cer.eu/about/annual-r…. A 14-tweet thread on the 10 main points. At our birth the West & its values were pre-eminent. Now democracy is in retreat and authoritarianism is stronger.
1) The US was the sole super-power and clearly committed to European security. But Afghanistan, Iraq, the financial crisis & Trump's antics tarnished its reputation. Trump nearly quit NATO and Europeans cannot assume that the US commitment to their security is immutable.
2) Globalisation seemed unstoppable. WTO's Doha round of liberalisation started in 1995; China joined WTO in 2001. But now globalisation is in retreat, at least rhetorically. Doha died & WTO cannot settle disputes. FTAs are unfashionable cf onshoring and shorter supply chains.
A few take-aways from hearing Hungarian opposition leader @markizaypeter at @ChathamHouse, in conversation with @fromTGA. He came across as pleasant and thoughtful - but I was left wondering if he can be rough enough and tough enough to defeat Orban. /1 @CER_EU
He declared he was the opposite of what Orban claims to be - a right-wing Christian conservative. Orban's ideology was corruption and he was building a 1-party state through control of media and courts. He would restore checks & balances via a referendum on a new constitution. /2
Priorities as PM would be to join European Public Prosecutor, to help fight corruption; set up an anti-corruption agency; open up files from Communist era [Orban was a Comm youth leader]; start process of joining euro; fight COVID-19 (HU had world's worst death rate in 2021)./3