One of the greatest misconceptions of the war, in my view, is that Hamas has taken heavy losses and is somehow on the ropes.
It is not. Hamas has returned to 90 percent of Gaza, mostly because Israel left every place it "cleared." The evidence for this is that Israel has gone repeatedly back into areas like Zaytun to fight Hamas again...it literally returns immediately after Israel leaves.
There is zero evidence that Hamas is under pressure. Hamas feels it is winning. Hamas may have lost thousands of its fighters, including senior commanders. But Hamas has ALWAYS been willing to take losses. It's entire history is full of it losing men, and having them detained and eliminated.
If Hamas was under pressure we would be seeing concessions. Israel claimed in November during the first hostage deal that pressure brings hostage released. Well...there is NO EVIDENCE that pressure was maintained and Hamas learned immediately that Israel was going to leave most of Gaza, all it had to do was wait.
How did Hamas know this? Probably the same way it knew on Oct 6 that Israel had been lured into believing Hamas is "deterred." Hamas passes messages to its leadership in Doha, and they talk to Doha and Doha is a major non-NATO ally and Doha and the US talk to Israel. So Hamas understood, either through channels or public details, that Israel was being asked to move to a "low intensity" conflict in December/January.
Who encouraged the US to pressure Israel to move to "low intensity" when Israel's own defense minister was saying that pressure would bring more hostage deals. Clearly Israel was asked to shift gears and probably told that if it did so then Hamas would make concessions. Israel shifted, Hamas didn't.
Then what happened? Israel withdrew from northern Gaza. Hamas rapidly returned, for instance 1,000 suspected terrorists went to Shifa hospital and were rounded up in a raid in March. But that raid also ended and Hamas returned again. We know that Israel was told by the US to basically do a de facto ceasefire for Ramadan in March. Probably Israel was told that if it did this then Hamas would also make concessions. But Hamas didn't make any concessions. Instead Israel got played again.
Then came April and by this time the US was moving to build the pier off of Gaza and the IDF withdrew from Khan Younis. Hamas returned to Khan Younis. Once again it seems Israel was told that if it held off on a Rafah op, then Hamas would make concessions in the hostage talks. Israel held off for a month. Hamas didn't make concessions. Israel got played again.
Each time Hamas was likely consulting its backers and handlers. For instance, its leadership went to Ankara, a NATO ally, in April. They were probably told "just wait a little more, pressure will build in the West and the war will end, you can keep the hostages and get the ceasefire and get the IDF to leave."
So Hamas held on. The campus protests began. Hamas rebuilt its positions and its forces. Hamas returned to most of Gaza and began coordinating attacks with PIJ, PFLP, DFLP and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades to target Netzarim. Hamas felt it was winning and in the driver's seat and dictating the tempo of the war. It had the initiative.
Hamas knew it didn't need to make any conessions in the hostage talks because its two hosts (western allies) were getting the US and the West to raise the pressure on Israel. Then comes late April and discussions begin about munitions deliveries. Hamas may have been informed about this before the leak to media on May 3-4.
After the story about the munitions pause appears, Hamas targets Kerem Shalom. It now feels it has Israel in checkmate. It can target IDF troops who were staging for an eventual Rafah op, it may have even planned to lure Israel in, or create chaos between Israel and the US.
Hamas also knows that Ankara has sought to cut off trade and Doha is calling for international intervention to stop the Rafah Op. Now Hamas also lies on May 6 about accepting a hostage deal, which it changes at the last minute, apparently with knowledge of the "mediators."
Empowered by its sense that Israel has been given a red line against an operation, Hamas feels it now has a de facto ceasefire in most of Gaza, and Israel as de facto withdrawn from most of Gaza except the Netzarim corridor. Hamas increases attacks on the corridor. Israel goes into Zaytun on the night of May 8-9.
There is a narrative also in Israeli media that "Hamas cannot be defeated" and "it was unrealistic to think the hostages will return"...but that "Israel is winning" because Hamas has lost an estimated 10-14,000 fighters. I think this number is likely exaggerated and even if it isn't, Hamas has recruited half this number in 7 months of war. It is replenishing its ranks.
Hamas is not weakened. There is no evidence that it is. It hasn't lost control of parts of Gaza and seen other polities rise in its place. It's true that it doesn't have the "infrastructure" it had before. But it can rebuild this. Labor costs are cheap in Gaza, that is how Hamas built the tunnels before.
I don't doubt that we will be fed stories about how "Israel is winning" and "take the win" and we even were fed stories about a "picture of victory" when tanks rolled into Rafah. This is all designed to lure Israel into another trap, just like before Oct. 7 Israel was told Hamas was "deterred." This conflict has been stage-managed by Hamas backers and Israel has often been played.
We've seen this before. In other rounds of fighting with Hamas, Israel "took the win" and Hamas got stronger each time, exponentially stronger. Israel Israel decides to claim it "kind of won" now...then Hamas will return easily to Gaza and rebuild and then take over the West Bank.
What's shocking is how the int'l community and NGOs don't mind Hamas running Gaza, despite it murdering a 1,000 people. Despite it parading dead bodies in Gaza to crowds. Despite its crimes against humanity. A lot of the international community is taken in by Hamas somehow, probably due to the connections it has via its backers.
Hamas is also capable of lying, via the backers, and claiming it has suffered high losses and letting Israel "take the win" while Hamas prepares the next step. Beware of stories about this, unless they can be verified. And by verified, I mean Hamas being thrown out of power.
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What is the end game of Israel's current multi-front war? This is worth considering in the wake of the strike on Hamas in Doha on September 9 and a new round of airstrikes on the Houthis in Yemen. In addition Israel continues to operate in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria. This is unprecedented in Israel's history to be fighting in so many places for so long.
There is no doubt that when it comes to tactical precision strikes and intelligence gathering that Israel has excellent capabilities. After the massive failure of October 7 Israel has clawed back this perception of being able to operate on multiple fronts at a high tempo.
However, the continues to be an elephant in the room in terms of end game and strategy. The war with Hezbollah was a trickle in 2023-2024 until Israel escalated in Sept-Nov and got a ceasefire. Since then Israel has struck Hezbollah but Hezbollah does not strike Israel. Will that be a "norm" for years?
It always surprised me that Doha didn't re-think its Hamas hosting strategy on October 7. It should have seen that Hamas was a destructive sunk cost. Doha had sent large sums to Gaza and Hamas was risking everything through its attack and massacre.
Doha could have used that as an opportunity to pivot, to get Hamas leaders in Doha to distance themselves from the disaster that Sinwar had unleashed. Doha could have leveraged its influence and probably got something out of this. It could have leaked that Hamas leaders in Doha were shocked and that they wanted the movement to go in a different direction. Hamas in Gaza could have been isolated and removed and Doha could have swept in with the "good cop" Hamas leaders from Doha and tried to get a coalition government with Abbas, something Hamas could try to control behind the scenes.
There was an opportunity on October 8 to re-think decades of failed Gaza strategy. For instance, after Oct. 7 Hamas released two American women, and also two elderly women. Clearly someone was advising Hamas abroad, likely via Doha, that holding Americans, women, the elderly, was not a good look.
The pro-Houthi griftersphere is fascinating. It’s solely made up of people who had never heard of the Houthis before October 7, 2023. They were then operationalized, or self-operationalized to suddenly back a group they knew nothing about in a country they never heard about and couldn’t locate on a map; solely because the group claimed to be fighting Israel in the name of Gaza. They adopted the cause of the Houthis, who they often confusingly claim is the government of Yemen (the Houthis are not the government); and now they are all aping eachother like leap frog to one-up how much they back “Yemen” and its “Prime Minister” after Israel targeted the Iran-backed Houthi government.
There isn’t a lone voice among these folk who cared about the Yemen civil war before 2023. It’s just people that adopted this cause and then accept any Houthi slop they are fed.
You could make up a group and claim it is fighting Israel “for Gaza” and these grifters would back it. “The Abjababians are fighting Israel to stop the Gaza war” and the next day you’d have 100 “influencers” very passionate about the Abjababians and their leader General Landocjabr…any random thing you could completely make up…put some AI slop on it and they’d consume it
I don’t know if griftersphere is a word, but I’m happy to coin it and will use it more often. It is the most appropriate word for the phenomenon of these folk.
The pro-Houthi griftersphere should be mapped and studied. It’s so obviously not authentic and so ridiculous.
I found this CNN article about Gaza city interesting because of the elephant in the room. It tells the tale of a city that was once thriving and is now a chaos of war and tragedy.
But what seems to be missing in the larger discussion is why Hamas purposely risked all this to commit the genocidal Oct. 7 attack; Hamas would have known that murdering 1,000 people and taking 250 hostage would result in a long war of destruction. They purposely set out to destroy Gaza city.
"you could still get a matcha latte on the way to a yoga studio, or relax in a park."
So shouldn't someone hold Hamas to account for having destroyed all this?
The report says "institutions set up by the militants, with help from regional governments like Qatar and a robust United Nations aid system, gave some structure to the strip’s exhausted population."
So why haven't those organizations and countries that funded Hamas-run Gaza condemned Hamas for unleashing this terrible war.
I'm fascinated and saddened every time I see a news story about Hamas in Gaza, such as the recent statements about EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas speaking with her Israelis counterpart and discussing Hamas in Gaza. It always shocks me that after 655 days of war that Hamas continues to control part of Gaza and negotiate to return to control most of it. The existence of Hamas in Gaza shouldn't even be a discussion today. It shouldn't be there. But it is. It is unclear if Hamas will be removed from Gaza. If it is to be removed there doesn't appear to be a clear roadmap for doing so. This lack of a process is part of the wider series of missteps and challenges that plagued the war for 21 months.
It's fascinating that despite murdering more than 1,000 people on October 7 and kidnapping 250; that decisions were made in the early months of the war that would result in keeping Hamas in power. Instead of being laser focused on removing Hamas, so Israelis wouldn't be kidnapped again, so they wouldn't be massacred again; the war was treated as another round in Gaza, another 2006, 2009, 2014. In fact, the plans for the offensive in Gaza were almost identical to past raids. The concept: Go into part of Gaza city or Khan Younis, uproot some tunnels; and then leave. Go into the Philadelphi corridor, clear it out and then negotiate over leaving it.
One of the early examples of a decision that was obviously made to result in Hamas staying in power, was the decision to move civilians in Gaza to be under Hamas rule. The IDF or other officials made decisions early on that under no circumstances would Israel deal with the civilians, and under no circumstances would an alternate authority be created to administer their lives in a non-Hamas zone. As such the result was to move 2 million people to remain under Hamas rule.
There is a lot of talk today about sheikhs in Hebron who want to for an "emirate" of Hebron. This is being greeted by some as a positive initiative. Let's take a look at the claims and also what the results could be.
First, the context. Israel is engaged in a 637 day war in Gaza against Hamas. Hamas still controls around 40 percent of Gaza. In Gaza, Israel has backed an initiative to have armed militias involved in some activities in the rest of Gaza. There is one named commander, Abu Shabab (not his real name obviously) and there are rumored to be others.
Some see this as a wise decision to have multiple armed gangs and militias run a post-war Gaza. Israel's current government opposes having the PA run Gaza, so the theory is that armed militias fighting eachother and Hamas is a good future.
In the West Bank the PA has been relatively successful at ruling Palestinian cities and towns for thirty years. However, Israel's current government includes parties that oppose the PA. The PA leader Mahmoud Abbas is aging and there is talk of what comes next.