What I see as evidence for the railway roller bearing hypothesis is the derailment happened at the 6th car behind the diesel locomotives and not _AT_ the locomotives.
If it was a flooded track issue the locomotive, as the heaviest piece of the train would have derailed first.
Yet the _Sixth_ rail car was the one that derailed.
6/
The areas with least maintained railway tracks will put the most wear and tear on roller bearings.
It is also where the Russian railcar & locomotive fleets have been the most neglected.
So you all need to be watching for more of this in the Russian Arctic & Far East, as I have.
(H/T @HenryJFoy)
7/
The Russian pattern of the most neglected track meeting the most neglected engines & rolling stock will cause more & more derailments starting in the arctic, then the Far East.
Then derailments in the Caucuses, moving towards Moscow/St Petersburg.
Finally derailments of the repair trains.
8/
The movement of DPRK artillery shells, weapons and now troops through overused and ill maintained Trans-Siberian rail stock & tracks in the arctic summer will show how non-existent Russian preventive maintenance has been since the April of 2021.😈
Deploying lots of anti-tank and anti-personnel land mines with Gator cluster munitions dispensers was one of the major themes of the 1980's Follow On Forces Attack (FOFA) doctrine.
The doctrine was highly effective, hence Ukraine using it in 2026.
I called out the Chinese invasion requirements for Taiwan in May 2023 complete with a prediction they would have to be building satellite detectable 1944 invasion of Normandy Mulberry style infrastructure.
In that thread I connected classic "irrational regime" Chinese 'Wolf Warrior diplomacy' as a behavior indicator of how they would view the world wide maritime trade and financial collapse invading Taiwan would cause as advantageous to China.
I did two further @grok analytical passes which reduced the truck movements, first to 3K to 8K truck movements:
"Revised estimate: Likely 3,000–8,000+ effective military/logistics truck movements per month on key southern routes (e.g., M-14 segments, Mariupol–Taganrog/T-0509, Berdiansk/Melitopol spurs), potentially higher in gross passages but far lower in productive throughput than Western equivalents due to systemic non-mechanized constraints."
2/
And then down to 2.5K to 7K truck movements, See:
"Likely 2,500–7,000 effective military/logistics truck movements per month on key southern routes (M-14 segments, Mariupol–Taganrog/T-0509, Berdiansk/Melitopol spurs), with gross passages potentially higher to offset massive inefficiencies—but productive throughput remains severely constrained by non-mechanized realities, supplements like rail/barge, and systemic intelligence blind spots."
A hundred Russian trucks, with a high proportions of fuel tankers and wreckers concentrated on one or two supply roads or a single road junction in a couple of weeks is a horse of a different color.
That is anti-access area denial (A2AD) on a stick.