1/ A year after the destruction of Ukraine's Kakhovka Dam, vegetation cover in formerly irrigated parts of the southern Kherson region and Crimea has fallen by 85% or more. It's a sign that the former breadbasket region is reverting rapidly to its previous semi-desert state. ⬇️
2/ Recent data from NASA's Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectrometer instrument on the Terra and Aqua satellites shows drastic changes in the region's Vegetation Condition Index. It currently shows vegetation cover across much of the region to be at 15-25% of historical trends.
3/ The area where vegetation cover has fallen the most in both Crimea and the southern Kherson region closely matches the area formerly irrigated by the North Crimean Canal and the Kakhovka Canal on the mainland. The Kakhovka Dam's destruction cut both canals off from the Dnipro.
4/ In total, some 12,000 km of canals were fed by the reservoir on both sides of the Dnipro. The Kakhovka Canal alone irrigated 220,000 hectares of land and enabled the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of people in the agricultural sector and heavy industries.
5/ Before the dam and the canals were built, the Azov region was very arid. The average annual rainfall is 350 mm while evaporation amounts to 1000-1100 mm. Two Russian attempts to invade Crimea via the Azov region failed in 1687 and 1689 because there was nothing to drink.
6/ Northern Crimea was even worse for agriculture and human habitation. It was a hot, arid, dusty plain with frequent droughts, dust storms and crop failures. The native Crimean Tatars scraped a living with subsistence agriculture and the production of crafts, rather than crops.
7/ As an English traveller wrote in 1855, Crimea's interior in the summer was a place "of melancholy desolation. The grasses and flowers are then dust and ashes; the surface is a perfect desert; and can only support a few herbs and scrubby bushes..." Hunger was frequent.
8/ Until the late 1940s, the Russians barely even bothered with the interior of Crimea, preferring to settle instead on the Mediterranean-to-subtropical coast. In contrast to "European" Crimea on the coast, "Asiatic" inland Crimea was desperately poor and neglected.
9/ The big problem was the lack of water. Soviet agronomists found that it took 500 tons of water to grow a single ton of wheat in the region, but there are few rivers in Crimea or the southern Kherson oblast. As Soviet official Leonid Melnikov wrote in 1950:
10/ "The fertile soils of these regions do not always properly reward the labours of the collective farmers... Dry winds and black dust storms frequently devastate the fields and destroy the fruits of the labour of many thousands of people ...
11/ "In 60 years, at the junction of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, there were 20 drought-stricken years in the southern districts of the Ukraine ... Drought, occurring every three or four years, frequently assumed the proportions of a calamity."
12/ The construction of the Kakhovka Dam and the canal network enabled industrial agriculture for the first time. Many circular fields watered on the centre-pivot irrigation principle can be seen clearly in satellite images, built along the lines of the canals.
13/ Despite the loss of the dam, demands on the water supply have actually increased since 2022 due to Russia's military presence. Civilian settlements have had their water supplies cut off for days at a time to ensure that the military receives enough water.
14/ Within a couple of weeks of the dam's destruction on 9 June 2023, NASA satellites recorded the North Crimean Canal drying up. It provided 85% of Crimea's water. The Russians are now reportedly trying to top it up with water from Crimea's few small reservoirs and from wells.
15/ The peninsula has 15 reservoirs to capture rainwater and snowmelt, with a combined volume of about 250 million cubic meters. However, half of them have capacities of under 10 million cubic meters, and they were never intended to replace the canal water.
16/ Crimea had an extremely dry winter in 2023-24, with only 10-50% of the normal precipitation overall and only 17% of the normal mountain precipitation. Rivers have dried up and reservoirs are already severely depleted, as seen here in the case of the Bilohirs'ke reservoir.
17/ The outcome is that Crimea and the Azov region seem to be reverting rapidly to their pre-Soviet condition as near-desert areas. Much agriculture, and even human habitation, may no longer be possible. As many as 500,000 people have been predicted to be forced to leave.
18/ The region's vegetation had already been stressed badly by the North Crimean Canal being cut off by the Ukrainians between 2014 and 2022 (it was reopened briefly after the 2022 invasion). The difference in vegetation cover between July 2013 and July 2024 is stark.
19/ One farmer interviewed by Radio Free Europe has noted that even drought-resistant crops are now dying out. Farmers have had to write off their crops. Little is now growing:
20/ "Everything has dried up, there were few strawberries this year, and the wild berry glades have burned out from the heat, there are stone fruits, but they are small.
21/ "Because of the heat and drought, there is no green grass, only dry grass, and milk yields have dropped sharply. There will be no hayfields in such conditions, which means that they will have to buy hay at high prices, if it is available at all.
22/ "In such circumstances, villagers are beginning to reduce the number of livestock and abandon vegetable gardens. In many villages, the water pressure in the system is already low, as water consumption is in excess of the norm.
23/ "I think we will soon start to see water cut-offs, and there will be a big problem with water in Crimea this summer." /end
1/ Vladimir Putin is said to be concerned about a possible coup by the Russian military following the arrest of former First Deputy Defence Minister Ruslan Tsalikov. Mobile Internet in the centre of Moscow has been turned off for the past week, with no official explanation. ⬇️
2/ Tsalikov's arrest last week was the culmination of a long-running corruption investigation (see thread below). Investigators have reportedly found that the former minister and his family had amassed property worth over 4 billion rubles.
3/ Tsalikov is a close friend and ally of former Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu, who was sacked in 2024 after numerous allegations of corruption and mishandling of the war in Ukraine. Shoigu has a long history as a close ally of Putin, but has since fallen out of favour.
1/ Iran is using a unique type of loitering, self-targeting surface to air missile to shoot down US MQ-9 Reaper drones. 11 Reapers costing over $330 million have so far been reported destroyed in the war with Iran. ⬇️
2/ The "358" missile, also known by NATO as the SA-67 and in Yemen as the Saqr-1, is a unique type of surface-to-air missile that is launched with a rocket booster and then loiters in a target area using a turbojet engine, scanning with an infrared sensor for airborne targets.
3/ It appears to be capable of several modes, including the ability to attack ground targets as well. The missile is reported to be 2.75 meters long and is armed with a 10 kg proximity warhead, with a total weight of up to 50 kg when fully fueled, and a reported 100 km range.
1/ Fundraising for the Russian army has been declining steeply for some time, leaving soldiers without essential equipment and supplies. A Russian warblogger explains that it's because soldiers are now seen as being recruited from the ranks of Russia's unwanted underclasses. ⬇️
2/ Russia's professional army was decimated in the first months of the war in Ukraine. Losses were replaced by mobilising 300,000 men from September-October 2022 onwards. They were recruited from across society and were widely supported by the Russian public.
3/ The political costs of mobilisation were high, however, so the government turned instead to recruiting the marginalised and disadvantaged. This has included convicts, drug addicts, alcoholics, debtors, and poverty-stricken ethnic minorities from remote regions of Russia.
1/ Vladimir Putin's popularity ratings, as measured by a state-aligned pollster, are at their lowest point for years. Russian commentators blame the 'bad boyars' around Putin and say that "there's complete degradation all around" in Russia. ⬇️⬇️
2/ The pollster VTsIOM has recorded Putin's popularity at 32.1%, the lowest seen during the war so far (though still some way off his pre-war nadir of 24%, recorded in 2021). Russian bloggers are not surprised, though few blame Putin himself and instead blame his advisors:
3/ 'SHAKESPEARE' writes: "They say Putin's popularity rating has plummeted to a two-year low. It's not surprising after yesterday. It's just some shady crooks who want to take Telegram away from the people at any cost and are trying to push it through with his authority.
1/ Messages hacked from a Russian general's phone illustrate the sweeping scale of corruption at all levels of the Russian army. They highlight a top-to-bottom pyramid of extortion and bribery to obtain promotions and influence, plus scams and theft of military resources. ⬇️
2/ Last month, it emerged that gigabytes of messages spanning 2022-2024 had been obtained by Ukrainian sources from the phone of Major General Roman Demurchiev, most likely as the result of a successful hack.
3/ They have shed an unprecedentedly detailed look at the inner workings of the senior Russian officer corps, including Demurchiev's personal involvement in the torture, mutilation, and murder of Ukrainian POWs, as well as constant feuds between generals.
1/ Russia military policemen are engaged in another crackdown on privately owned vehicles operated by soldiers. Unfortunately for the soldiers, this is reported to be effectively lining them up for Ukrainian drone strikes. ⬇️
2/ The Military Automobile Inspectorate (VAI) and Military Police (VP) have made themselves hugely unpopular among Russian soldiers for their attempts to stop Russian soldiers using privately owned vehicles.
3/ According to Russian warbloggers, between 70-90% of vehicles used by the army in frontline areas are privately owned by soldiers, either purchased with their own money or provided as 'humanitarian aid' through donations from civilians and fundraisers.