1/ A year after the destruction of Ukraine's Kakhovka Dam, vegetation cover in formerly irrigated parts of the southern Kherson region and Crimea has fallen by 85% or more. It's a sign that the former breadbasket region is reverting rapidly to its previous semi-desert state. ⬇️
2/ Recent data from NASA's Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectrometer instrument on the Terra and Aqua satellites shows drastic changes in the region's Vegetation Condition Index. It currently shows vegetation cover across much of the region to be at 15-25% of historical trends.
3/ The area where vegetation cover has fallen the most in both Crimea and the southern Kherson region closely matches the area formerly irrigated by the North Crimean Canal and the Kakhovka Canal on the mainland. The Kakhovka Dam's destruction cut both canals off from the Dnipro.
4/ In total, some 12,000 km of canals were fed by the reservoir on both sides of the Dnipro. The Kakhovka Canal alone irrigated 220,000 hectares of land and enabled the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of people in the agricultural sector and heavy industries.
5/ Before the dam and the canals were built, the Azov region was very arid. The average annual rainfall is 350 mm while evaporation amounts to 1000-1100 mm. Two Russian attempts to invade Crimea via the Azov region failed in 1687 and 1689 because there was nothing to drink.
6/ Northern Crimea was even worse for agriculture and human habitation. It was a hot, arid, dusty plain with frequent droughts, dust storms and crop failures. The native Crimean Tatars scraped a living with subsistence agriculture and the production of crafts, rather than crops.
7/ As an English traveller wrote in 1855, Crimea's interior in the summer was a place "of melancholy desolation. The grasses and flowers are then dust and ashes; the surface is a perfect desert; and can only support a few herbs and scrubby bushes..." Hunger was frequent.
8/ Until the late 1940s, the Russians barely even bothered with the interior of Crimea, preferring to settle instead on the Mediterranean-to-subtropical coast. In contrast to "European" Crimea on the coast, "Asiatic" inland Crimea was desperately poor and neglected.
9/ The big problem was the lack of water. Soviet agronomists found that it took 500 tons of water to grow a single ton of wheat in the region, but there are few rivers in Crimea or the southern Kherson oblast. As Soviet official Leonid Melnikov wrote in 1950:
10/ "The fertile soils of these regions do not always properly reward the labours of the collective farmers... Dry winds and black dust storms frequently devastate the fields and destroy the fruits of the labour of many thousands of people ...
11/ "In 60 years, at the junction of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, there were 20 drought-stricken years in the southern districts of the Ukraine ... Drought, occurring every three or four years, frequently assumed the proportions of a calamity."
12/ The construction of the Kakhovka Dam and the canal network enabled industrial agriculture for the first time. Many circular fields watered on the centre-pivot irrigation principle can be seen clearly in satellite images, built along the lines of the canals.
13/ Despite the loss of the dam, demands on the water supply have actually increased since 2022 due to Russia's military presence. Civilian settlements have had their water supplies cut off for days at a time to ensure that the military receives enough water.
14/ Within a couple of weeks of the dam's destruction on 9 June 2023, NASA satellites recorded the North Crimean Canal drying up. It provided 85% of Crimea's water. The Russians are now reportedly trying to top it up with water from Crimea's few small reservoirs and from wells.
15/ The peninsula has 15 reservoirs to capture rainwater and snowmelt, with a combined volume of about 250 million cubic meters. However, half of them have capacities of under 10 million cubic meters, and they were never intended to replace the canal water.
16/ Crimea had an extremely dry winter in 2023-24, with only 10-50% of the normal precipitation overall and only 17% of the normal mountain precipitation. Rivers have dried up and reservoirs are already severely depleted, as seen here in the case of the Bilohirs'ke reservoir.
17/ The outcome is that Crimea and the Azov region seem to be reverting rapidly to their pre-Soviet condition as near-desert areas. Much agriculture, and even human habitation, may no longer be possible. As many as 500,000 people have been predicted to be forced to leave.
18/ The region's vegetation had already been stressed badly by the North Crimean Canal being cut off by the Ukrainians between 2014 and 2022 (it was reopened briefly after the 2022 invasion). The difference in vegetation cover between July 2013 and July 2024 is stark.
19/ One farmer interviewed by Radio Free Europe has noted that even drought-resistant crops are now dying out. Farmers have had to write off their crops. Little is now growing:
20/ "Everything has dried up, there were few strawberries this year, and the wild berry glades have burned out from the heat, there are stone fruits, but they are small.
21/ "Because of the heat and drought, there is no green grass, only dry grass, and milk yields have dropped sharply. There will be no hayfields in such conditions, which means that they will have to buy hay at high prices, if it is available at all.
22/ "In such circumstances, villagers are beginning to reduce the number of livestock and abandon vegetable gardens. In many villages, the water pressure in the system is already low, as water consumption is in excess of the norm.
23/ "I think we will soon start to see water cut-offs, and there will be a big problem with water in Crimea this summer." /end
1/ Russian warblogger Lev Vershinin wonders how Russia has managed to revert to 18th century standards of brutal military discipline, as seen in this video. How did it "become so savage in just one generation?", he asks. ⬇️
2/ The video shows a commander (almost certainly Russian, despite Vershinin's disingenuous uncertainty in the post below) savagely beating several men. They have apparently retreated ("rolled back") without authorisation from a mission or frontline position.
3/ “I came across some front-line footage. Not AI. But I don’t know which side it was filmed on. Neither the Russian language nor the swearing mean anything, because the war is essentially a civil one. So, it could be both.
1/ A Russian soldier says that he and his comrades were told by their commander that "a single shell is worth more than all your lives". The men were sent on suicidal missions without artillery support, without supplies, and had to scavenge for weapons on the battlefield. ⬇️
2/ In a video explaining his decision to desert from the Russian army's 144th Separate Motorised Rifle Brigade (military unit 11739), 36-year-old Anton Aleksandrovich Shirshin describes his commanders as brutal and corrupt.
3/ He was forced to join the army after being blamed for a traffic accident. The police offered him a choice between imprisonment followed by being conscripted to join the army, or joining the army voluntarily. He chose the latter option.
1/ Continuing his review of how Ukraine is employing Palantir Technologies' platforms in its war with Russia, Belarusian-Russian journalist Alex Zimovsky breaks down in detail Palantir's capabilities and usages, according to public statements and reports. ⬇️
2/ (For a briefer summary see the linked thread below.)
3/ "Palantir's platforms (primarily Gotham for data fusion and targeting, MetaConstellation for multisensor orchestration, and their derivatives, integrated through the Brave1 Dataroom) serve as the primary "operating system of war."
1/ Russian warbloggers are increasingly admitting that Russia is suffering steady attrition from endless swarms of Ukrainian drones. '13 Tactical' posts a lament about Russia's strategic dilemma as it faces escalating costs in its war in Ukraine. ⬇️
2/ The Russian military volunteer Dmitry Tinkov, writing on the '13 Tactical' Telegram channel, reviews the current situation and is very unhappy at what he sees, but takes refuge in half-hearted bravado as the only solution that he sees:
3/ "I think there are three underlying factors at the root of all our problems:
1. Those at the top genuinely believed they could reach an agreement on our terms.
2. They don't know what to do next with Ukraine (= what the outcome should be).
1/ The powerful AI-driven Palantir platform is becoming Ukraine's 'operating system' for the war with Russia. Belarusian-Russian journalist journalist Alex Zimovsky warns that it's "heading towards the point where Palantir will soon become a scary name for children in Russia." ⬇️
2/ Zimovsky has been assessing how Ukraine uses Palantir. He writes:
"As of May 2026, the American company Palantir Technologies has become a key element of Ukraine's AI- and big data-based war management architecture."
3/ "The system is based on the Gotham and MetaConstellation platforms, which integrate into a single combat environment:
→ UAV video feeds
→ satellite reconnaissance
→ SIGINT / electronic intelligence
→ radar data
→ OSINT and open sources
1/ After mobilised Russian troops were threatened with being sent to their deaths if they didn't sign contracts making them permanent soldiers, they were promised a big cash bonus if they did so. There's just one problem: they've now been scammed out of the payments. ⬇️
2/ 'Vault No. 8,' a serving Russian soldier, writes that the mobilised residents of the Moscow region who are serving in his unit are now complaining bitterly that they have been scammed:
3/ "As some may recall, last fall was marked by the slogan, "Mobilised men! Sign a contract or run to attack!"