1/ A year after the destruction of Ukraine's Kakhovka Dam, vegetation cover in formerly irrigated parts of the southern Kherson region and Crimea has fallen by 85% or more. It's a sign that the former breadbasket region is reverting rapidly to its previous semi-desert state. ⬇️
2/ Recent data from NASA's Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectrometer instrument on the Terra and Aqua satellites shows drastic changes in the region's Vegetation Condition Index. It currently shows vegetation cover across much of the region to be at 15-25% of historical trends.
3/ The area where vegetation cover has fallen the most in both Crimea and the southern Kherson region closely matches the area formerly irrigated by the North Crimean Canal and the Kakhovka Canal on the mainland. The Kakhovka Dam's destruction cut both canals off from the Dnipro.
4/ In total, some 12,000 km of canals were fed by the reservoir on both sides of the Dnipro. The Kakhovka Canal alone irrigated 220,000 hectares of land and enabled the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of people in the agricultural sector and heavy industries.
5/ Before the dam and the canals were built, the Azov region was very arid. The average annual rainfall is 350 mm while evaporation amounts to 1000-1100 mm. Two Russian attempts to invade Crimea via the Azov region failed in 1687 and 1689 because there was nothing to drink.
6/ Northern Crimea was even worse for agriculture and human habitation. It was a hot, arid, dusty plain with frequent droughts, dust storms and crop failures. The native Crimean Tatars scraped a living with subsistence agriculture and the production of crafts, rather than crops.
7/ As an English traveller wrote in 1855, Crimea's interior in the summer was a place "of melancholy desolation. The grasses and flowers are then dust and ashes; the surface is a perfect desert; and can only support a few herbs and scrubby bushes..." Hunger was frequent.
8/ Until the late 1940s, the Russians barely even bothered with the interior of Crimea, preferring to settle instead on the Mediterranean-to-subtropical coast. In contrast to "European" Crimea on the coast, "Asiatic" inland Crimea was desperately poor and neglected.
9/ The big problem was the lack of water. Soviet agronomists found that it took 500 tons of water to grow a single ton of wheat in the region, but there are few rivers in Crimea or the southern Kherson oblast. As Soviet official Leonid Melnikov wrote in 1950:
10/ "The fertile soils of these regions do not always properly reward the labours of the collective farmers... Dry winds and black dust storms frequently devastate the fields and destroy the fruits of the labour of many thousands of people ...
11/ "In 60 years, at the junction of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, there were 20 drought-stricken years in the southern districts of the Ukraine ... Drought, occurring every three or four years, frequently assumed the proportions of a calamity."
12/ The construction of the Kakhovka Dam and the canal network enabled industrial agriculture for the first time. Many circular fields watered on the centre-pivot irrigation principle can be seen clearly in satellite images, built along the lines of the canals.
13/ Despite the loss of the dam, demands on the water supply have actually increased since 2022 due to Russia's military presence. Civilian settlements have had their water supplies cut off for days at a time to ensure that the military receives enough water.
14/ Within a couple of weeks of the dam's destruction on 9 June 2023, NASA satellites recorded the North Crimean Canal drying up. It provided 85% of Crimea's water. The Russians are now reportedly trying to top it up with water from Crimea's few small reservoirs and from wells.
15/ The peninsula has 15 reservoirs to capture rainwater and snowmelt, with a combined volume of about 250 million cubic meters. However, half of them have capacities of under 10 million cubic meters, and they were never intended to replace the canal water.
16/ Crimea had an extremely dry winter in 2023-24, with only 10-50% of the normal precipitation overall and only 17% of the normal mountain precipitation. Rivers have dried up and reservoirs are already severely depleted, as seen here in the case of the Bilohirs'ke reservoir.
17/ The outcome is that Crimea and the Azov region seem to be reverting rapidly to their pre-Soviet condition as near-desert areas. Much agriculture, and even human habitation, may no longer be possible. As many as 500,000 people have been predicted to be forced to leave.
18/ The region's vegetation had already been stressed badly by the North Crimean Canal being cut off by the Ukrainians between 2014 and 2022 (it was reopened briefly after the 2022 invasion). The difference in vegetation cover between July 2013 and July 2024 is stark.
19/ One farmer interviewed by Radio Free Europe has noted that even drought-resistant crops are now dying out. Farmers have had to write off their crops. Little is now growing:
20/ "Everything has dried up, there were few strawberries this year, and the wild berry glades have burned out from the heat, there are stone fruits, but they are small.
21/ "Because of the heat and drought, there is no green grass, only dry grass, and milk yields have dropped sharply. There will be no hayfields in such conditions, which means that they will have to buy hay at high prices, if it is available at all.
22/ "In such circumstances, villagers are beginning to reduce the number of livestock and abandon vegetable gardens. In many villages, the water pressure in the system is already low, as water consumption is in excess of the norm.
23/ "I think we will soon start to see water cut-offs, and there will be a big problem with water in Crimea this summer." /end
1/ Russian senior commanders are bogged down with bureaucracy, according to a Russian war blogger, due to an insistence on 'hypercentralism' – the practice of making the administration of a unit the responsibility of one person, without delegation of responsibility. ⬇️
2/ The pseudonymous 'Vault No. 8' comments that whereas the US has long understood the need to unburden senior officers, Russia "loaded them to the maximum, saying that the top brass knows better how to manage and distribute resources."
3/ He provides "a few small details of this phenomenon in matters of supply," beginning with waybills to provide vehicles with fuel:
"There is a separate sheet for each vehicle. Some sheets have separate points: permission to drive up to 200 km/h and drive at night."
1/ Russian firefighters have failed to extinguish an out-of-control fire at an oil depot in Saratov, caused by a Ukrainian drone strike, despite repeated attempts. The attack is said to have caused fuel shortages for the nearby military airfield. ⬇️
2/ The Engels oil depot was targeted on the night of January 7-8 and has been burning out of control ever since. Attempts by firefighters to use a foam generator to extinguish the blaze have been unsuccessful. They are now reportedly waiting for new equipment and foam.
3/ Engels-2 air base is home to the 121st Guards Heavy Bomber Aviation Regiment with the Tu-160M and 184th Heavy Bomber Aviation Regiment with the Tupolev Tu-95MS strategic nuclear-capable bombers. Both bomber types have repeatedly carried out long-range attacks against Ukraine.
1/ A top-level scam at the Russian Ministry of Defence, in which decrepit old ships were used for one-way trips to transport weapons and equipment to Syria as part of the 'Syria Express', may have reduced Russia's ability to evacuate its equipment following Assad's fall. ⬇️
2/ The VChK-OGPU Telegram channel reports that top Russian defence officials purchased old cargo ships destined for scrapping, for the price of new ships, redesignated them as military transports, and used them to transport arms to Syria before selling them to Turkish scrappers.
3/ The scam was reportedly the work of former Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu (l) and his deputies Timur Ivanov (c) and Dmitry Bulgakov (r). All three have since been sacked, and Ivanov and Bulgakov have been charged with large-scale corruption.
1/ The military commander of the Wagner Group, Anton "Lotus" Elizarov, is reported to have been fired. The move is said to be the result of interpersonal conflicts and Wagner's disastrous defeats in Africa in 2024. A former GRU major is slated to replace him. ⬇️
2/ The Russian warblogger Anastasia Kashevarova writes that Elizarov left the Wagner Group before the New Year at the instigation of Yevgeny Prigozhin's son and heir Pavel, who took over Wagner following his father's death in August 2023.
3/ Kashevarova presents a number of reasons for Elizarov's dismissal:
"1. When the brigade commander was chosen, not all commanders were present at the Council.
1/ Russian air defence crews reportedly shot down Azerbaijan Airlines Flight 8243 with two missiles fired from a Pantsir launcher near Grozny, after being 'blinded' by a Russian electronic warfare system, according to a detailed account of the incident on 25 December 2024. ⬇️
2/ An account published by the VChK-OGPU Telegram channel, which has often published information that appears to have been leaked from sources in the Russian security forces, describes some of the preliminary findings of the official Russian criminal investigation.
3/ It reports that Grozny was guarded by the following air defence systems: two Pantsirs, an S-300 (recently delivered from Syria) and a Buk air defense system. One of the Pantsirs was installed in the Visaitovsky district north-west of Grozny.
1/ Russian Defence Minister Andrey Belousov recently boasted that 96% of injured Russian soldiers treated in hospitals were able to return to duty. However, Russian milbloggers point out that that is only because badly wounded men are usually left to die on the battlefield. ⬇️
2/ The '5 mg KGV' Telegram channel highlights Belousov's fallacy in claiming a mere 0.5% mortality rate with the (very graphic) illustration of the case of a soldier who went 32 days without evacuation after having his leg blown off by a drone-dropped munition.
3/ "Due to the impossibility of timely evacuation, the soldier ended up on the operating table 32 days later (!). Active growth of granulation and protruding bone fragments in the area of traumatic amputation are visible.