1/ A year after the destruction of Ukraine's Kakhovka Dam, vegetation cover in formerly irrigated parts of the southern Kherson region and Crimea has fallen by 85% or more. It's a sign that the former breadbasket region is reverting rapidly to its previous semi-desert state. ⬇️
2/ Recent data from NASA's Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectrometer instrument on the Terra and Aqua satellites shows drastic changes in the region's Vegetation Condition Index. It currently shows vegetation cover across much of the region to be at 15-25% of historical trends.
3/ The area where vegetation cover has fallen the most in both Crimea and the southern Kherson region closely matches the area formerly irrigated by the North Crimean Canal and the Kakhovka Canal on the mainland. The Kakhovka Dam's destruction cut both canals off from the Dnipro.
4/ In total, some 12,000 km of canals were fed by the reservoir on both sides of the Dnipro. The Kakhovka Canal alone irrigated 220,000 hectares of land and enabled the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of people in the agricultural sector and heavy industries.
5/ Before the dam and the canals were built, the Azov region was very arid. The average annual rainfall is 350 mm while evaporation amounts to 1000-1100 mm. Two Russian attempts to invade Crimea via the Azov region failed in 1687 and 1689 because there was nothing to drink.
6/ Northern Crimea was even worse for agriculture and human habitation. It was a hot, arid, dusty plain with frequent droughts, dust storms and crop failures. The native Crimean Tatars scraped a living with subsistence agriculture and the production of crafts, rather than crops.
7/ As an English traveller wrote in 1855, Crimea's interior in the summer was a place "of melancholy desolation. The grasses and flowers are then dust and ashes; the surface is a perfect desert; and can only support a few herbs and scrubby bushes..." Hunger was frequent.
8/ Until the late 1940s, the Russians barely even bothered with the interior of Crimea, preferring to settle instead on the Mediterranean-to-subtropical coast. In contrast to "European" Crimea on the coast, "Asiatic" inland Crimea was desperately poor and neglected.
9/ The big problem was the lack of water. Soviet agronomists found that it took 500 tons of water to grow a single ton of wheat in the region, but there are few rivers in Crimea or the southern Kherson oblast. As Soviet official Leonid Melnikov wrote in 1950:
10/ "The fertile soils of these regions do not always properly reward the labours of the collective farmers... Dry winds and black dust storms frequently devastate the fields and destroy the fruits of the labour of many thousands of people ...
11/ "In 60 years, at the junction of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, there were 20 drought-stricken years in the southern districts of the Ukraine ... Drought, occurring every three or four years, frequently assumed the proportions of a calamity."
12/ The construction of the Kakhovka Dam and the canal network enabled industrial agriculture for the first time. Many circular fields watered on the centre-pivot irrigation principle can be seen clearly in satellite images, built along the lines of the canals.
13/ Despite the loss of the dam, demands on the water supply have actually increased since 2022 due to Russia's military presence. Civilian settlements have had their water supplies cut off for days at a time to ensure that the military receives enough water.
14/ Within a couple of weeks of the dam's destruction on 9 June 2023, NASA satellites recorded the North Crimean Canal drying up. It provided 85% of Crimea's water. The Russians are now reportedly trying to top it up with water from Crimea's few small reservoirs and from wells.
15/ The peninsula has 15 reservoirs to capture rainwater and snowmelt, with a combined volume of about 250 million cubic meters. However, half of them have capacities of under 10 million cubic meters, and they were never intended to replace the canal water.
16/ Crimea had an extremely dry winter in 2023-24, with only 10-50% of the normal precipitation overall and only 17% of the normal mountain precipitation. Rivers have dried up and reservoirs are already severely depleted, as seen here in the case of the Bilohirs'ke reservoir.
17/ The outcome is that Crimea and the Azov region seem to be reverting rapidly to their pre-Soviet condition as near-desert areas. Much agriculture, and even human habitation, may no longer be possible. As many as 500,000 people have been predicted to be forced to leave.
18/ The region's vegetation had already been stressed badly by the North Crimean Canal being cut off by the Ukrainians between 2014 and 2022 (it was reopened briefly after the 2022 invasion). The difference in vegetation cover between July 2013 and July 2024 is stark.
19/ One farmer interviewed by Radio Free Europe has noted that even drought-resistant crops are now dying out. Farmers have had to write off their crops. Little is now growing:
20/ "Everything has dried up, there were few strawberries this year, and the wild berry glades have burned out from the heat, there are stone fruits, but they are small.
21/ "Because of the heat and drought, there is no green grass, only dry grass, and milk yields have dropped sharply. There will be no hayfields in such conditions, which means that they will have to buy hay at high prices, if it is available at all.
22/ "In such circumstances, villagers are beginning to reduce the number of livestock and abandon vegetable gardens. In many villages, the water pressure in the system is already low, as water consumption is in excess of the norm.
23/ "I think we will soon start to see water cut-offs, and there will be a big problem with water in Crimea this summer." /end
1/ What is the war in Ukraine even for?, asks a Russian warblogger and paramilitary leader. After four years, the shifting goals of the Russian government have left many of its citizens confused about what its aims are in Ukraine, making it unclear what victory actually means. ⬇️
2/ Zakhar Prilepin sums up the complaints of many warbloggers about the vagueness of Russia's objectives:
"Yesterday, I received a lot of congratulations, and the phrase "I wish you victory!" was a common one.
I hope people say it ritualistically, not seriously."
3/ "It's not even that Russia can't win yet. The point is that we don't have such a goal. We're not planning to go to Kyiv, and we're not planning to go to Odesa. This means there will be no demilitarisation or denazification.
1/ The results of Russia's war have been "mediocre", says a Russian warblogger who is fighting in Ukraine. The army is beset by "corruption, scheming, and collusion", and by the mass intimidation and coercion of soldiers by commanders. He sees tough challenges still to come. ⬇️
2/ 'Vault No. 8' writes:
"The war was not easy from the outset.
The enemy still retains counterattack capabilities; over time, the enemy has become capable of targeting the economy of pre-war Russia and conducting mass terror and sabotage, including in Moscow."
3/ "However, it was only in the fourth year of the war that we began to properly employ strategic strike weapons, which began to yield maximum success. Only in the fourth year of the war did we bring the drone component up to a modern level.
1/ Russia is "entangled in too many sins" for it to have succeeded in Ukraine over the past four years, argues Russian warblogger Yuri Podolyaka. He sees the war as a "salvation plan" for Russia that went badly wrong and "laid bare" the country's problems. ⬇️
2/ "Four years ago, a special military operation began...
It obviously didn't go according to plan. Or rather, not according to the plan our military and political leadership had originally.
As a result, the country changed irreversibly.
3/ "No matter how much anyone would like to turn everything back. And this, perhaps, is the most important result of these four years. Difficult years. But, apparently, necessary. Since God decided so.
1/ Four years on from the start of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian warbloggers are reflecting on the changes that the war has wrought in Russia. Some Russian soldiers are wondering what it was all for. ⬇️
2/ Nikita Tretyakov writes:
"Our varied thoughts and questions converge on one thing: what is going on out there, in the rear, while we are here, far from our families, loved ones, and past lives, defending the Motherland as best we can and seemingly honourably as possible?"
3/ "What is going on there in this very Motherland behind our backs?
Why does it feel more and more uncomfortable to walk around our cities in military uniform – now including Donetsk and Luhansk – every year? Is it even inappropriate?
1/ With manpower increasingly in short supply, Russia is reportedly turning instead to womanpower. Women, particularly convicts and migrants – some still only teenagers – are being forced to join the army, in some cases to serve in frontline combat roles. ⬇️
2/ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reports that the Russian prison service is putting female convicts under intense pressure, including through starvation, to sign contracts to join the army. Hundreds of women – both Russians and foreigners – are thought to have signed up.
3/ The Uzbek human rights organization Ezgulik reports that it has received letters from the relatives of dozens of Uzbek women who say they are being abused and mistreated to force them to sign military contracts.
1/ It's generally been assumed that the Russian government wants to force its soldiers off Telegram and onto the government-approved MAX app. However, it seems that MAX may also be banned for military use, and an unnamed specialised military messenger may be imposed instead. ⬇️
2/ The generally reliable Fighterbomber Telegram channel reports on a possible ban of both MAX and Telegram in the military (referring to "Laos" as a commonly-utilised euphemism for Russia, to evade the censors):
3/ "Sources within the Security Council suggest that, amid the suppression of Telegram by all available means, Lao troops have received orders banning the use and installation of the world's most secure national messenger on devices with advanced multimedia capabilities,…