Dara Massicot Profile picture
Aug 12, 2024 18 tweets 4 min read Read on X
Russia begins its response to Ukraine's incursion into Kursk. Multiple ministries are involved and the command structure is still forming. Someone in Ukraine knew what they were doing and exploited a weak seam in Russian C2. A few important issues to watch: 🧵 Image
Russia has declared its defense operation to be a "counter-terrorist operation" (KTO in Russian). This is a domestic operation and the FSB and Rosgvardia have roles along with the military. This is what the war in Chechnya was called from 1999 until it ended./2
Putin has instructed the FSB (+ its border troops) and Rosgvardia to defend the borders and assist this operation. He also told the military today that their main task is driving out Ukrainian forces from Russian territory and countering Ukrainian recon and sabotage groups /3
Who is responsible for what in Kursk? FSB Border troops and Rosgvardia have responsibility for the border and ensuring its defense. For the military: Kursk is located in Moscow Military District, but the troops forward deployed IVO Ukraine belong to the Leningrad MD. /4 Image
The entirety of the area was formerly the Western Military District (2010-24). Russia decided to split it up in March-April 2024 to cope with NATO expansion. It named two commanders: Lapin (LEMD) and Kozovlev (MOMD). / 5
The Operational Group of Forces North received a name change and upgrade about 1-2 weeks before it attacked Kharkiv in May. Prior to May it was a territorial defense group. So for the past 3 months it's been transitioning from a defensive to offensive orientation, meaning /6
..that this Russian Op Group was much weaker than the others: from May - Aug it had a major reorganization, a new commander, and attacked Kharkiv early. It's MOD units are now bogged down in Kharkiv and that offensive is not making progress. / 7
Someone in Ukraine knew where to press. The AFU attacked a weak spot (Kursk) of the weakest Op Group. A C2 scramble between FSB border guards, Akhmat fighters, and any MOD forces that could rally ensued in week 1. /8
Russia has experience in creating a combined C2 structure that involves internal security agencies and the military from its experience in the second Chechen war. In the 90s, a joint command was established in what was then the North Caucasus MD HQ. /9
rand.org/content/dam/ra…
I raise this because Bortnikov and Gerasimov worked with this specific C2 arrangement in Chechnya. While today's situation is much different, they remember how to work together. Implementation is a different matter of course, but I note the experience. /10
I haven't seen a KTO headquarters established yet. Who could lead it? All military district commanders are dual hatted as operational group commanders and their forces are engaged. MOD options could be: Lapin, Kozovlev, Nikiforov, Gerasimov. /11
It's Lapin's AOR, but Op Group North is weak. The territory is Moscow MD, but Kozovlev and many of his forces are in eastern Ukraine. Nikiforov is Ground Forces commander and former op group commander, his name is circulating online. Gerasimov also given the stakes/12
Rosgvardia's tasks will be to set up cordons, roadblocks, and other barriers. FSB border guards in the area have been taken prisoner already, to include conscripts , a very politically sensitive issue for Putin. /13
FSB assets will be doing recon and trying to sweep up AFU teams, and interrogation. Russian forces are already taking small numbers of AFU teams as prisoner. Here I worry about what comes next because the FSB uses horrible torture methods. /14
Russia's MChS (Ministry of Emergency Situations) is also now engaging with evacuations of towns. Russia is showing videos of some armor moving and eventually I would anticipate more helicopter, VKS assets. They will probably use artillery especially if the towns are emptied. /15
This AFU operation has successfully exploited seams of responsibility between the FSB, Rosgvardia and MOD. I suspect targeted leaks will emerge between MOD/GRU and FSB over who is responsible for intel and defense failures. /16
AFU invaded Russia despite 2 years of partial mobilization in Kursk, 10 years of legislation to make power ministries coordinate better, and a 2023 offer from Prigozhin to help guard the border (Shoigu rejected it). Bardak as usual. Now the reaction begins. /17
This war has left Russia's borders weak, the army engaged in Ukraine and not immediately available to defend border regions, and FSB border troops not supported. The Russian system's instinct will be to overcorrect and swing harshly at Kursk. /end

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More from @MassDara

Dec 8, 2024
There are many rumors that Russia is evacuating its bases at Tartus and Khmeimim in Syria, but most assets remain there. If evacuation happens, it will be obvious. A brief thread on what is happening now and what future moves would look like. 🧵
As of 7 December, most of Russia’s ships are in or near port in Tartus. Follow @KaptainLOMA for updates on their presence.
These ships cannot return to the Black Sea while Turkey has closed the straits under the Montreux Convention so they would have to attempt a very long journey to the Baltic Fleet, or try to find a temporary accommodation nearby at a limited number of ports (Libya, Sudan, Algeria)
Read 12 tweets
Dec 5, 2024
One of Russia’s top priorities in Syria is maintaining base access. Syria is a critical waypoint for Russian activities elsewhere in the region. Watch for signs that PMCs are redeploying to Syria. By now, Russia probably has made its assessments and is executing plans. (1/3)
Z channels lament the loss of experienced commanders like Surovikin/Prigozhin. Surovikin has been tapped before to address hard problems like this and received awards for his Syrian command (old photo). There are politics involved now, Gerasimov tapped in Chaiko. Let’s see. (2/3) Image
Russia has some tactical aviation bandwidth it could surge, limited by base capacities (+ base protection capacity which has never been robust), and spare PMCs not in Ukraine. Long range strike options limited by Ukraine ops and on hand/resupply capacity to ships at Tartus. 3/3
Read 4 tweets
Nov 13, 2024
I've returned from a research trip to Ukraine, where I met many people in Kyiv and along the frontlines. They are brave and kind in ways that words fail to capture. The situation is serious and urgent for many reasons. I share my thoughts in the thread below. /1 Image
Image
As officials and others have already said publicly, Ukraine is facing a shortage of manpower - infantry in particular. Mobilization has not brought relief for many reasons. More impacts in the story below. /2 ft.com/content/adbef9…
Manpower and force employment issues are challenges right now, and manpower is stretched across the front. A shortage of western weapons was not the most critical issue during this particular snapshot in time, although it has been in the past. /3
Read 17 tweets
Sep 16, 2024
Today, Putin increased the military’s size for the 3rd time since 2022. Can they sustain 1.5M postwar, at a time when the budget will be under pressure to procure equipment? Not without tradeoffs. See my new report for more on this and other tradeoffs👇 carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/…
My report discusses why an increase to the standing army’s size by 30% to 1.5 million, simultaneous to a sweeping procurement program, would require a significant reordering of Russia’s economy and labor market beyond where it is now- the Kremlin has not wanted to do that so far.
1.5 million makes more sense as a temporary wartime number that can be readjusted down to the more financially manageable 1 million postwar via a new order /ukaz.
Read 11 tweets
Sep 6, 2024
A brief 🧵about updates and observations about Russian forces' response in Kursk and Russian operations in Donetsk near Pokrovsk. I start by including guidance from Admiral Stockdale, as it's been meaningful to me in my analytic practice, perhaps others will find it helpful too. Image
Since this thread, Russia has set up a command structure for Kursk. It's been declared a "counter-terrorist operation) and Defmin Belousov set up a "coordination council" that meets every day and named Yunis-Bek Yevkurov as the deputy./2
On 20 August, Russia announced the creation of three operational groupings in Belgorod, Briansk, and Kursk to better manage the forces in the area. The idea makes sense but is somewhat undermined by the hodge- podge of units available for the area /3
Read 28 tweets
May 12, 2024
Shoigu is out as Defense Minister, moving into head of Security Council. Andrei Belousov , an economist, is taking over. My quick thoughts on what it means for MOD, and what to look about changes possible in the near term. /1 Image
First, Shoigu is moving into a respectable and powerful position because he is loyal, and he and Putin are friends. it’s a signal that Putin listens to chatter and understands that Shoigu needed to leave the MOD, where he was just tolerated by his ministry and other agencies. /2
Belousov has no military experience at all or background in the military. He’s an economist. This will raise questions within the military who will fear a repeat of serdyukov. So I anticipate some unformed officer favorites appointed to leadership positions to balance this. /3
Read 9 tweets

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