#Hybrid: Durov’s arrest in France is suspicious: 1) he knew he was wanted for the quality of content moderation on Telegram platform, used by Russia for spreading disinformation; 2) Durov appears to have deliberately chosen to fly to Paris, even though he was avoiding Western ⤵️
jurisdiction so far; 3) The French arrest warrant was valid only for French territory, which may explain why Durov chose to fly to France and not another European country, where he was immediately arrested; 4) As a French citizen, he will not be extradited, although Russia ⤵️
would like to have him back; 5) One working theory may be that Durov chose to collaborate with the French police, without being clear in return for what, to show that he is not working with Russian states to destabilize France/the West;⤵️
6) This event will likely have an impact on Telegram content (1 billion users worldwide); 7) It is a signal to @elonmusk and others that they are not immune from punishment for contributing to disinformation, with destabilizing effects on Western states.
Russia is disoriented and doesn’t know how to intervene in Durov's case. Moscow plans to speak to the French opposition about it. Russian Duma Committee on International Relations Chairman Slutzky announced he will hold talks on Durov's arrest with @MLP_officiel.
@MLP_officiel The ‘power’ and ‘fear’ of setting a precedent, applied to those who do not comply despite their wealth and connections.
@MLP_officiel Tomorrow the French prosecutor's office will make a statement. Durov risks 20 years in prison on all the charges taken together. The biggest mystery is why Durov decided to travel to France. I suggested the theory that he did it deliberately.⤵️
@MLP_officiel Should the theory that Durov deliberately headed to Paris prove wrong, Moscow could try to broker a swap deal. Russia has already launched an info campaign in support of Durov, calling him a “political prisoner.” This is another Assange-style narrative for Moscow’s propaganda.
@MLP_officiel Experts explained that Telegram has an emergency plan in case of Durov's arrest. The access key to the Telegram operating system will be changed immediately. To gain access to the necessary docs to build a solid case against Durov, a diplomatic cooperation with UAE is required.
@MLP_officiel Ukrainian sources claim that Telegram is being used by Russian military and intelligence services abroad. If access to it is lost, military and hybrid operations (and the people behind them) could be unveiled and compromised.
@MLP_officiel Meanwhile, Russian-linked cyber groups have carried out massive DDoS attacks against several French public services websites (health, etc.). This is a response by non-state actors, something Russia has neither denied nor self-attributed.
@MLP_officiel The case is highly political (cross-border) in nature. @EmmanuelMacron did not hold back without commenting: 1) Durov's arrest is not "political" (as Russia claims); 2) this case was opened because of France's rule of law, not an attempt to use censorship (as @elonmusk claims).
@MLP_officiel @EmmanuelMacron @elonmusk The EU says this issue is beyod its competence. However, Brussels is one of the strongest actors in countering Russian hybrid interference in the media sphere. If Telegram is regulated as a result of Durov's deals with Paris, it will help the EU fight Russian disinfo & more. 👇
#Geopolitics: The abduction of Maduro and his wife by the US, together with the CIA's admission that it had prepared the operation since mid-December, prompted my curiosity about the role of the intelligence services in reshaping US foreign policy in the hemisphere. Given the well-known vicissitudes surrounding US pressure on Venezuela, I would like to highlight several key aspects that indicate the interaction between intelligence and US decision-makers. A long🧵:
1) Firstly, the CIA is the world's leading intelligence agency regarding Latin America, due to its interest in the region since the late 1940s and during the Cold War. That's why, to contain the Soviet risk of spreading left-wing regimes in what, since the Monroe Doctrine, was labelled as the "backyard" of the US sphere of influence, the CIA (and, briefly before that, the FBI) was involved in covert and espionage operations across Latin America. The academic literature provides ample detail on how the US utilised its intelligence services to advance its strategic interests in Guatemala, Ecuador, Argentina, etc. (Gates, 1987; Becker, 2020; and Mistry, 2021 - instrumental reading, if no AI is used). ⤵️
2) Secondly, because of the granular knowledge of Venezuela since before the Cold War, it took only a couple of weeks for the US to organise the abduction of Maduro. This operation was different from what the CIA had organised in the region in the past - coups d'etat to remove governments, leading to military dictatorships and crimes against humanity committed by them during the Cold War. Since the opposition in Venezuela doesn't have the resources to rise against the military, which Maduro groomed for years to secure loyalty, the US didn't even consider engaging with it (something confirmed by D. Trump during today's press conference). Instead, the CIA carried out a plan according to which Maduro had to be brought to the US, serving the urgent needs of domestic (mobilising the Republicans and the rest of the society, including among the leftist segments - to tame "the Mandami effect") and foreing policy of the US (projecting power, especially against China, which just finished conducting drills in the proximity of Taiwan). ⤵️
#Geopolitics: The events in Venezuela are consequential for the dynamics of the rest of the world: 1) It's right to point out that Trump's moves from "isolationism" to "interventionism" in US foreign policy (both for domestic goals at home and to project power globally). He claims that by intervening in Venezuela, the US aims to dismantle drug-smuggling routes. Fearing invasion, Maduro's government proposed cooperation in this field, but Washington refused the offer;⤵️
2) The EU has been reluctant to push back against the US military interventionist agenda. No statement has been issued by the EUDEL in Caracas or in Brussels on the current US interventions in Venezuela. "Wait and see" by the EU in Venezuela might be explained by the strategic prioritisation of Ukraine and the Taiwan Strait. Individually, France has condemned the move by the US, considering it against international law (such interventions can be approved only by the UN Security Council);⤵️
3) Ukraine's stance is a mixture of support for removing an illegitimate Venezuelan leader by the US and support for international law for the follow-up after the capture (sequestration) of Maduro and his wife by the US. The UN officials called the episode a dangerous precedent because it's based on no international mandate. The unknown risks are for the further decisions of the US, which could also be on a military invasion, seeking to oust the regime and bring the opposition to power. Such a scenario could spark a military confrontation, including a civil war, unless Maduro's regime does not capitulate;⤵️
#EU: Orban's ability to persuade Trump to meet Putin in Hungary highlights several points of interest (in addition to what was underscored by @alemannoEU): 1) Both Trump and Putin aim to further peace talks, but they face overlapping manoeuvring hurdles. Trump cannot persuade the EU to accept peace conditions under the current status quo (occupied territories, non-NATO membership, etc.). Putin's main limit is Brussels' desire to support Ukraine by using Russian assets to finance the country;⤵️
2) Speaking from Budapest will reinforce the negative perception of Orban as not being an EU guy, yet Trump and Putin hope to support Orban's political survival. With weak support in surveys, Orban needs to garner legitimacy from abroad. While Brussels supports his electoral rival Magyar, Orban can rely on Trump (a leading voice of the Western sovereignist movement) and Putin (who opens the door to the Global South); 3) The EU will not be at the table, but Orban's gesture again challenges the EU's unity. It's likely that Orban may try to attract other leaders from CEE to travel to Budapest by inviting them to Trump's visit (however, the Polish president has recently met Trump in DC). Putin's visit will again demonstrate that Hungary does not intend to implement the Rome Statute, which would imply arresting Putin under the ICC arrest warrant;
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4) Trump wants to signal to the EU on European soil that peace talks are a priority for the US administration. This doesn't necessarily mean that Trump intends to favour Putin. In all circumstances, Trump is self-centred. And when meeting with Putin, he seeks to project strength over Russia; 5) Putin will be unable to travel directly to Hungary; his itinerary will likely include Turkiye and Serbia (neither of which has confirmed Putin's visit in the upcoming weeks), the only two significant players in the EU's neighbourhood where Russia has some leverage
#Moldova: The elections on 28 September will reveal the country's future direction. To truly understand what is at stake, a binary analysis is not very helpful. Here is my take on these critical elections: 1) PAS has been leading in the polls, but the "Patriotic" Bloc, which advocates restarting strategic dialogue with Russia, is not far behind; 2) The leaders of these political forces have used the narrative of "war" to rally voters. PAS utilised videos from Ukraine showing attacks from the Russian side. The "Patriotic" Bloc has also invoked the war, accusing PAS of intending to provoke a conflict in Transnistria.⤵️
3) The Moldovan authorities, which are politically subordinate to PAS, are closely monitoring the actions of opposition forces. More than 250 searches have been carried out in the past few days, with over 100 individuals being investigated. All of these targeted opposition forces; 4) The "Great Moldova" Party was excluded today, mainly due to a hidden alliance with the political parties of Ilan Shor ("Victory" Bloc). The votes for this party (ranging from 5-10%) could shift towards the "Patriotic" Bloc.⤵️
5) Another political party likely to be excluded is the "Heart of Moldova," which belongs to the "Patriotic" Bloc and is suspected of illegal financing (no final court decision has been made). Whether the Central Electoral Commission will decide to exclude the entire Bloc remains to be seen. However, by doing so, PAS risks facing adverse assessments from international observers, which could affect the legitimacy of the elections;⤵️
#EU_Enlargement: It was back in 2023, when I argued that Hungary was pursuing a strategy of "blockades and unconditional support" within the framework of the EU's eastern enlargement policy: ⤵️
1) Orbán wielded his veto power over Ukraine. He even organized a multi-week referendum (accompanied by a powerful propaganda) to cement the Hungarian public's negative vote on Ukraine's EU accession (anti-Ukraine legitimacy among the Hungarians); ⤵️
2) Initially, Orbán spoke out against alleged violations of the Hungarian minority's rights and then warned that Ukraine was too large and problematic to be absorbed into the EU. ⤵️
#EU: The outcome of the Romanian elections highlighted several risks for the EU: 1) Both exponents of the US-based MAGA movement and Russia have supported, in one way or another, the far-right candidate, George Simion; ⤵️
2) Fear and revenge are two key emotional factors that can have a tremendous impact on voter behavior within EU member states, using all big platforms (but mainly X, Facebook and TikTok); ⤵️
3) Disinformation and propaganda were present in the Romanian elections, used both to mobilize voters and to fuel speculation about interference by external state actors in favor of one of the candidates (either Russia or France and Moldova); ⤵️