Xi's meeting with private tech titans goes beyond an alignment b/w the state & the private sector. It's part of a detailed tech security strategy by China's Central National Security Commission in "The Total National Security Paradigm (2022)," translated here for the first time:
For a project with @CSTranslate, I translated the chapter "Safeguard Technological Security" from "The Total National Security Paradigm: A Study Outline 《总体国家安全观学习纲要》" (April 2022), authored by the CCP's Office of the Central National Security Commission (中央国家安全委员会办公室). This office plays a crucial role in coordinating national security matters across the Chinese party and state apparatus. This chapter offers essential insights into how the Chinese Party-state plans to enhance its national security through technological means.
Chinese policymakers treat this technology security strategy with the gravity of a military doctrine, viewing innovation as a critical response to national security challenges.
Here are some interesting quotes and reflections:
1) The text reads more like a military directive than a typical policy document, with frequent use of terms like 'battlefield' and 'domains' to emphasize the strategic importance of techno-scientific innovation. This linguistic choice underlines the CCP's view of technology as a crucial front in its rejuvenation project:
"Techno-scientific innovation has become the main battlefield on the chessboard of global strategy, and the importance of science and technology has increased in all domains. Whoever seizes the 'tiller' of technological innovation and takes the first step in technological innovation will be able to take the lead and gain advantages.
2) Chinese policymakers have openly acknowledged existing limitations in China’s innovation capacities. This candid appraisal highlights the challenges China faces in advancing its technological development. This self-awareness has already translated into many policies in recent years:
"At the same time, it must be recognized that our innovation capabilities began at a very weak starting point, the overall efficiency of our innovation system is low, the integration of scientific and technological innovation resources is insufficient and the deployment of scientific and technological innovation forces needs to be optimized.
3) Related to the previous note that China currently is lacking in broad innovative capacity, the text stresses the importance of *autonomous* innovation, calling it "original innovation capabilities (原始创新能力)":
"We are a great power. In terms of technological innovation we must make our own unique contributions. If we always follow and imitate others, there will be no way forward. Not only will the technological gap widen, but we will also be permanently locked into the lower end of the industrial value chain. We must strengthen our confidence in innovation, seize the opportunities for innovation, uphold the core position of innovation in the overall modernization drive of our nation, put the improvement of original innovation capabilities in a more prominent position, enhance independent innovation capabilities across the board, and seize the strategic initiative in a new round of global science and technology competition.
4) The text discusses how China should strategically integrate into the global innovation systems to leverage international resources and expertise. This approach is designed to further empower Chinese entities to develop their own innovations so they become self-sustaining players:
“Independent innovation should be conducted in an open environment, and must not be carried out behind closed doors. The greater the blockades and suppression we face the less we can afford to close ourselves off. We must more proactively integrate into the global innovation network and improve our own scientific and technological innovation capabilities through open cooperation.
5) The text advocates for a concerted effort to break through geographical, organizational, and technological boundaries, framing scientific and technological advancement as a collective competitive advantage rather than isolated achievements. This systemic approach aligns national scientific and technological endeavors with broader strategic objectives:
"The competition between the world’s techno-scientific powers is about national strategic scientific and technological strengths. It is necessary to promptly deploy national laboratories, reorganize the national key laboratory system, unleash the universities’ role in scientific research, encourage the active participation of various scientific research institutes, and form strategic forces.
6) The text also calls for addressing redundancy and fragmentation in China's science and tech infrastructure so it can better support innovation. An example policy effort is the establishment of the Central Science and Technology Commission (CSTC, 中央科技委员会) under the party in 2023 to better coordinate China's science and technology policies:
"It is necessary to deepen the reform of the science and technology system, improve the science and technology innovation ecosystem, strengthen system construction and capacity building, perfect our national innovation system, address prominent issues—such as redundant resource allocation, scattered research capacities, and the indecisive positioning of main innovative functions—and enhance the overall effectiveness of the innovation system.
7) It’s not an official CCP text on technology policy without mentions of “core technologies”:
"Only by holding core technologies in our own hands can we truly take the initiative in competition and development and fundamentally guarantee the economic security of the state, the national defense, and security in other areas.
8) Chinese policymakers believe its system’s capability to mobilize resources to accomplish things is a “crucial magic weapon” for success. The emphasis on fostering a synergistic relationship between an effective market and a proactive government highlights the dual approach of the Chinese Party-state:
"Our socialist system’s ability to concentrate resources to accomplish great things is a crucial magic weapon for achieving success. Many major scientific and technological achievements in our country have been achieved by relying on this magic weapon. It is necessary to promote a better integration of an effective market and proactive government, fully leverage the role of the state as the organizer of major scientific and technological innovations, fully unleash the decisive role of the market in resource allocation, and “twist” the government, market, society and other forces into one thread, forming a powerful synergy to promote technological innovation.
9) The text has an interesting list of choke point technologies:
"Scientific and technological research must adhere to a problem-oriented approach, targeting the most urgent and pressing issues. Efforts should be concentrated on key core technologies in areas of urgent national need and long-term demand, such as oil and gas, basic raw materials, high-end chips, industrial software, crop seeds, scientific experimental instruments and equipment, and chemical preparations. The goal is to achieve autonomy in and control of key core technologies, firmly holding the initiative in innovation and development in our own hands.
10) The text notes that the dominance of Western countries was largely derived from their command of high-end technology:
"One important reason Western countries have been able to dominate the world since the dawn of the modern era is their mastery of high-end technology. It is necessary to firmly grasp the general direction of technological progress, strengthen our strategic orientation and guiding goals, accelerate the construction of a leading edge in high-end technologies, become a pace-setter in important technological fields, and become a pioneer in emerging frontier and interdisciplinary fields, so as to build a strong country in science and technology, product quality, aerospace, network, transportation, digitalization, and a “smart” society.
11) In emerging tech areas like AI and quantum technologies, Chinese policymakers want China's innovative forces to secure the "commanding heights" of global science and technology:
"Target frontiers like artificial intelligence, quantum information, integrated circuits, advanced manufacturing, health sciences, neuroscience, breeding new cultivars, aerospace technology, and deep earth and deep sea exploration. Proactively deploy a batch of strategic and reserve technology R&D projects, implement major national science plans and engineering projects, and accelerate the occupation of the commanding heights of the international scientific frontier.
12) The text advocates for strategic independence and resilience in critical technological domains, stressing that China should develop 'assassin's maces'--key technologies that provide a buffer against unforeseen technological attacks by adversaries. This is another way of phrasing the necessity for indigenous innovation inside China:
"Develop unique "assassin’s maces" to ensure protection against technological surprise attacks by enemies. If we do not have a few tricks up our sleeve, we will be at the mercy of others. General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out, "How can our country's science and technology catch up with the international advanced level? We must adopt an 'asymmetric' strategy to better leverage our own advantages." It is crucial to identify the correct follow-up and breakthrough strategies, adhering to the principles of active follow-up, careful selection, and judicious action. Enhance technological awareness and strengthen the creation of original designs. For those areas where we are confident, we should plan ahead, increase investment, and accelerate the pace of catching up.
13) This section interestingly suggests China should contribute its insights to the global innovation system and foster a benevolent cultural philosophy towards science and technology:
"Scientific and technological innovation is an important engine for the development of human society and a powerful weapon to address many global challenges. Scientific and technological achievements should benefit all mankind and should not become means to restrict or contain the development of other countries. We must proactively engage in global science and technology governance, offer insights from Chinese wisdom and foster a culture of the common good for science and technology. This approach will ensure that scientific and technological advancements contribute more significantly to building a community of common destiny for humankind.
Leveraging a newly translated high-level Chinese policy text, I outline a three-pronged framework in my report with @ITIFdc for understanding China's uneven techno-industrial ecosystem and Beijing's technology security strategy.
Writing about China's approach to technology security involves acknowledging the inherent variances within its strategies across different sectors. The landscape is marked by peaks of excellence alongside valleys of underdevelopment. This piece is a contribution to the thoughtful analyses already out there on the following questions:
▪️What is Beijing’s strategy for enhancing its technological security?
▪️What factors could influence Beijing’s technological ambitions?
▪️And how far is the Chinese Party-state willing to go to ensure this strategy’s success?
This three-pronged tech security strategy framework is inspired by the technology security chapter from "Total National Security Paradigm: A Study Outline (2022)," a volume published by the CPC's Central National Security Commission (CNSC), which I recently translated for @CSTranslate (see detailed translation in the quoted thread).
"The Total National Security Paradigm: A Study Outline (2022)" positions technological security as central to China's national strength, emphasizing innovation as the "soul of national progress".
To safeguard this 'soul', China must not only become a strong, innovative technological power but also effectively deter and offset strategic rivals, particularly those that have a technological edge over China.
Achieving this requires China to seize the “tiller” of techno-scientific innovation.
A summary of the four horsemen of China's macroeconomic slowdown and their impact on the sectors hardest hit in the Chinese economy.
1. Real estate 2. Local government fiscal constraints 3. Insufficient domestic demand 4. Economic bureaucracy
1/35
After decades of double-digit growth, China’s economy is grappling w/ a prolonged secular slowdown. The economic model China has used to drive much of its growth—namely, debt-fueled investment in real estate & infrastructure—is becoming more untenable. The four main issues: 2/35
First, China's real estate sector. Following the 08 financial crisis, China leaned heavily on real estate related investment to fuel growth. The proportion of real estate-related activities in China’s GDP surged from below 20% in 2008 to~30% by 2013. 3/35
As you read CSIA’s (China Semiconductor Industry Association, major chip trade association in China) statement on reported JP-NL-US chip export controls, note that its officially provided Eng translation does a poor job of conveying the PRC’s dismay at the measures.
1/7
It’s either an unintentionally sloppy Eng translation, or it is intentionally playing down the original rhetoric to appear more composed.
For example, in the 3rd paragraph, you can see the translation & rhetorical delta b/n the CSIA translation and my closer translation — 2/7
Parts of sentences are either omitted entirely (green highlights):
Original -
“[半导体] 是全人类消除数字鸿沟的前提”
CSIA ver. -
Omitted entirely from Eng translation.
Closer translation -
“[Semiconductor is] the precondition for mankind to eliminate digital divide.”
Want to understand the intricacies of China’s economy? Read Arthur Kroeber’s China’s Economy: What You Need to Know (2016).
Kroeber sets the expectation up front--China’s economy is like a jigsaw puzzle w/ pieces that constantly change. It takes humility & grit to grasp. 1/52
**Only after wrapping the 2016 version, did I realize there’s a newer edition of the book with updated # s and insights up to 2020. I am reading the new edition and plan to follow up with another review. 2/52
2016 Kroeber offers a robust thesis on why China’s political economy has persisted. China had bad and good examples to emulate. It learned from failed communist states and from EAsian dev neighbors (land to tiller ag reforms, export-oriented manu,& financial repression). 3/52
Some thoughts on PRC elite leadership, specifically, the ENGINEER vs. LAWYER approach of shaping state power.
w/ China’s data ambition and the eCNY as a case study.
Shifts in Chinese political elite’s degree distribution influences the way the PRC governs. 1/N
Back when PRC leadership mostly consisted of engineers, the kind of governance style is much more methodical. Gutting through provinces, reengineering the environment for policy needs, exemplified by the South-North Water Diversion Project (南水北调). 2/N
Increasingly as top PRC leadership included more lawyers, this likely led to the PRC caring more about discourse power and influencing international norms (useful Cheng Li 2016 article discusses this engineer to lawyer shift in detail: brook.gs/3O38qm8). 3/N
China’s security regulatory body to require foreign funds to set up internal Communist party cells (党支部) bit.ly/3tEmcEA Mentions PRC has broader laws stating all foreign firms must create party cells, but these rules had long been dismissed as symbolic. However, 1/N
...this time around, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) specified in a clause to its rules in early 2022 (see CSRC rules and clause here: bit.ly/3NXGlxz), on pg. 13 - 2/N
“Public fund companies shall, in accordance with the provisions of the CPC Constitution, establish party organizations, carry out party activities, and provide necessary conditions for party organizations’ activities. State-owned fund management companies shall…” 3/N