1/ Tens of gigabytes of secret data on Russia's strategic electronic warfare systems has been hacked by the pro-Ukrainian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK). They say that Russia's EW shield is "not just fragile - it's full of holes" due to multiple flaws and vulnerabilities. ⬇️
2/ Two weeks ago, the RDK announced that it had obtained a large quantity of data on Russia's EW systems, including technical specifications, diagrams, official correspondence, equipment setup methods, drawings, test reports, and functional information.
3/ RDK commander 'Fortuna' says that "We got more than just the external appearance. We see the internal logic, architecture, connections between nodes, we know who designed it, which companies supplied the units, which research institutes are responsible for the developments."
4/ "We received a number of important military developments along with protocols, engineering solutions and approvals from the Russian Ministry of Defence. In addition, we managed to establish the entire chain of enterprises involved in production and supply.
5/ "And it is also important that all the persons involved in the development and creation of these stations were identified. Upon completion of the operation, the RDK had their names, addresses, car numbers, places of work."
6/ RDK announced in a YouTube video that it had obtained data on the following:
🔺 "ANCHAR-K — a polar warfare naval station. An automated station for electronic suppression of satellite communication lines in Arctic conditions. It is installed on icebreaker-class ships.
7/ "Developed as a response to the vulnerability of the Russian Federation in high-latitude areas."
8/ The system is intended to disrupt signals from satellites, aviation radars and ship navigation. However, the documents obtained by the RDK indicate that it is not capable of resisting Arctic conditions, including wind, cold and icing.
9/ According to the RDK, "When the ship maneuvers, the Anchar loses tracking. The guidance time is more than four minutes. In the event of a failure, the entire system is switched off." Its location is exposed when it is in operation.
10/ 🔺 "OZON-MEI — over-the-horizon. Over-the-horizon radar project using the evaporation waveguide effect. It works by forming a plasma channel in the near-surface atmosphere."
11/🔺 "Tirada-2.3 — "Interference". Satellite communications electronic suppression station. Part of the Tirada-2S complex."
According to the RDK, this is a narrow-target system for disabling satellite communications which uses directional antennas to focus on specific targets.
12/ Operating in ranges from 225 MHz to 15 GHz, it is used to temporarily disrupt communications with US and British military satellites (WGS, MUOS, Skynet).
13/ 'Fortuna' says: "Such a complex jams communications and also generates false signals. For example, a drone flying over the Bryansk region may "think" that it is over Ethiopia. Disorientation and substitution of coordinates occur."
14/🔺 "NMS REP DDV — suppression radio brain. Ground-based mobile station for suppressing long-range satellite communications. Controls other electronic warfare systems. Suppresses FleetSatcom, Milstar, MUOS, etc. links."
15/ The RDK desribes this as a key element of Russian signal suppression technology:
“This is a radio brain, everything depends on it: it determines radiation modes, types of interference, phasing."
16/ However, they say that it has serious flaws. It is reported to be extremely sensitive to weather, vibrations, requires complex settings and a stable power supply. The system copes poorly with combat conditions.
17/🔺 "Software modules, OS, CORVETTE. Operating systems and software modules used for protection and work with electronic warfare. We understand the architecture, but will not disclose all the security details."
18/ The hacked documents also reveal that Russia exploits China's satellites, apparently without China's knowledge. "Russia uses civilian Chinese satellites to cover the calibration of its systems."
19/ "That is, Russian electronic warfare systems are posing as terminals of the PRC’s civilian fleet in the Pacific Ocean. China has not been officially notified of this. If a signal is detected, Russia is betting that the responsibility will fall on the Chinese channel.
20/ "This is a risky game. Sooner or later, China will understand this. And we already know which satellites they “hang on to,” which channels they mimic. This is an extremely interesting and unexpected observation."
21/ 'Fortuna' says that Russian strategic electronic warfare systems suffer from the lack of an operational ecosystem. "This is a huge, overloaded structure, not ready for a real war."
22/ Russia has invested heavily in its EW systems to compensate for its relative lack of satellites, compared to the United States or China. The leak is likely to be a considerable setback, as it will enable Ukraine's Western partners to develop countermeasures. /end
1/ Russian casualty ratios in Ukraine are in places as high as 25 to every 1 Ukrainian defender, according to the UK Defence Secretary John Healey. A newly published account by warblogger 'Bch3' of the lives of Russian convict stormtroopers helps to illustrate why. ⬇️
2/ "Different people. Different faces. Someone with a hoarse convict's voice, twisted by life like a Karelian birch; another simple, without his own opinion, just tagging along with fate. Mice with petty souls and predatory wolves; team players and loners.
3/ They're told — "You know cold and hunger, so go ahead, you are more prepared by life to survive, not to go crazy during a bloody assault." On all fronts, they are at the forefront of the attack, they do not receive medals and orders, those who follow.
1/ Simply travelling to and from the front line in Ukraine is a deadly task, due to the wide-ranging presence of drones. Many soldiers are killed before they even get near a frontline position. An account from a Russian warblogger highlights the work of "killzone runners". ⬇️
2/ 'Voenkor Kotenok' writes:
"On the front lines, they're often called "runners." They're supposedly special forces/semi-combatants on errands. They're supposedly as nimble as sperm, evading even drones."
3/ "The attitude is somewhat dismissive, as if they're not second-class citizens, but rather just helpers. They say there are "tough guys," assault troops, a military elite (and there is one, right?), and then there are the runners, the lackeys. You get the idea.
1/ Telegram will not be restored in Russia, and tighter restrictions will be imposed on mobile phone ownership, says Sergey Boyarsky, head of the State Duma IT Committee. He cites scammers, pro-Ukrainian sabotage, and drone attacks as the reasons behind these moves. ⬇️
2/ In a wide-ranging interview with the St Petersburg online newspaper Fontanka, Boyarsky has explained the thinking behind the government's new restrictions on Telegram. He says that "Telegram doesn't comply with Russian Federation law, and hasn't done so for many years."
3/ "The requirements are simple, basic: localise user data within the Russian Federation, remove prohibited information (extremism, terrorism), and cooperate with law enforcement agencies to solve serious crimes (for example, the Crocus [terroist attack] case)."
1/ While Telegram is only part of a wider complex of communications systems used in the Russian army, it comprises a keystone without which the wider system falls apart. A commentary by a Russian warblogger explains the Russian army's communications ecosystem in detail. ⬇️
2/ Responding to comments earlier this week by presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov, 'Vault No. 8' provides a "briefing note" on the role of Telegram in the Russian military communications ecosystem.
3/ "A typical motorised rifle regiment (today, the basic tactical unit—the military unit that holds the front line) utilises several tools to manage its troops:
1/ While the Russia army struggles with the impact of Telegram and Discord being throttled or blocked by the government, Ukraine has long used a highly sophisticated indigenously developed digital command and control system. Russian warbloggers have highlighted the contrast. ⬇️
2/ Detailed accounts such as the one in the thread below illustrate how Telegram – a commercial app run from Dubai – has been a central tool in the Russian kill chain, allowing for rapid responses to Ukrainian actions. Discord was also heavily used.
3/ Although this approach has been effective, it has now deliberately been rendered unusable by the Russian government. 'Two Majors' compares how Ukraine has approached digital command and control, and never made itself reliant on Telegram:
1/ The Russian army is reportedly forcing its soldiers to abandon Telegram and move over to the government-authorised MAX app. A Russian warblogger explains why the transition will prove to be very difficult. ⬇️
"Some challenges of switching from Telegram to MAX for our military personnel.
Telegram doesn't require a Russian number to be linked, making it difficult for adversaries to [de]anonymise users."
3/ "Max requires not only a Russian number but also real data (according to the messenger's rules), which enemy electronic warfare systems will immediately receive (although a Russian number alone is sufficient for the enemy to identify a user).