So, I looked at the US-Russian “peace plan” and found multiple contradictions, where one point of the plan would directly contradict one or several other points. One thing is clear - the plan was not developed by diplomats or specialists in international law.
THREAD.
1/11
THREAD.
1/11
2/11
1. “Ukraine’s sovereignty will be confirmed” vs handing territory to Russia
•Point 1: “Ukraine’s sovereignty will be confirmed.”
•Point 21: Crimea, Luhansk and Donetsk are recognised as “de facto Russian, including by the United States.” Kherson and Zaporizhzhia are frozen along current front lines, and Ukrainian forces withdraw from the part of Donetsk they still control; that withdrawal zone becomes a neutral demilitarised buffer zone, internationally recognised as territory belonging to the Russian Federation.
These two ideas pull in opposite directions:
•If “sovereignty” is meant in the sense of Ukraine’s internationally recognised 1991 borders, then confirming it contradicts the explicit recognition of Russian control over Crimea, Donbas and a demilitarised slice of Donetsk.
•If instead “sovereignty” is silently redefined to mean “whatever is left after these concessions”, then point 1 becomes essentially cosmetic and misleading relative to the rest of the document.
So there’s a built-in contradiction between the headline promise (sovereignty confirmed) and the detailed territorial carve-outs.
1. “Ukraine’s sovereignty will be confirmed” vs handing territory to Russia
•Point 1: “Ukraine’s sovereignty will be confirmed.”
•Point 21: Crimea, Luhansk and Donetsk are recognised as “de facto Russian, including by the United States.” Kherson and Zaporizhzhia are frozen along current front lines, and Ukrainian forces withdraw from the part of Donetsk they still control; that withdrawal zone becomes a neutral demilitarised buffer zone, internationally recognised as territory belonging to the Russian Federation.
These two ideas pull in opposite directions:
•If “sovereignty” is meant in the sense of Ukraine’s internationally recognised 1991 borders, then confirming it contradicts the explicit recognition of Russian control over Crimea, Donbas and a demilitarised slice of Donetsk.
•If instead “sovereignty” is silently redefined to mean “whatever is left after these concessions”, then point 1 becomes essentially cosmetic and misleading relative to the rest of the document.
So there’s a built-in contradiction between the headline promise (sovereignty confirmed) and the detailed territorial carve-outs.
3/11
2. “Reliable security guarantees” vs caps, alliance bans, and loss of guarantees if Ukraine fights back
•Point 5: “Ukraine will receive reliable security guarantees.”
•Points 6-8: Limit the Ukrainian armed forces to 600,000; require a constitutional ban on NATO membership; and forbid NATO from stationing troops in Ukraine.
•Point 22: After the territorial arrangements, both sides must not change them by force; any security guarantees do not apply if this is breached.
In practice:
•Ukraine is permanently barred from the main collective defence alliance that could make its security guarantee credible, and its own forces are capped.
•If Ukraine ever tries to regain lost territory “by force”, the guarantees are voided - effectively punishing it for exercising self-defence.
Calling such a conditional and one-sided promise “reliable” is internally inconsistent: the plan describes the guarantees as strong while simultaneously writing in conditions that gut them at the moment Ukraine might need them most.
2. “Reliable security guarantees” vs caps, alliance bans, and loss of guarantees if Ukraine fights back
•Point 5: “Ukraine will receive reliable security guarantees.”
•Points 6-8: Limit the Ukrainian armed forces to 600,000; require a constitutional ban on NATO membership; and forbid NATO from stationing troops in Ukraine.
•Point 22: After the territorial arrangements, both sides must not change them by force; any security guarantees do not apply if this is breached.
In practice:
•Ukraine is permanently barred from the main collective defence alliance that could make its security guarantee credible, and its own forces are capped.
•If Ukraine ever tries to regain lost territory “by force”, the guarantees are voided - effectively punishing it for exercising self-defence.
Calling such a conditional and one-sided promise “reliable” is internally inconsistent: the plan describes the guarantees as strong while simultaneously writing in conditions that gut them at the moment Ukraine might need them most.
4/11
3. “Comprehensive non-aggression” and “ambiguities settled” vs detailed planning for the next war
•Point 2: A “comprehensive non-aggression agreement” is to be concluded between Russia, Ukraine and Europe, and “all ambiguities of the last 30 years will be considered settled.”
•Point 3: “It is expected that Russia will not invade neighbouring countries and NATO will not expand further.” (Note the weak wording: expected, not guaranteed.)
•Point 10 + side agreement: If Russia invades Ukraine again, there will be a “decisive coordinated military response” and all sanctions are reimposed; a side deal says any major Russian attack would be seen as threatening transatlantic security, but does not obligate direct intervention.
If non-aggression is “comprehensive” and past ambiguities are “settled”, why does the plan devote so much space to what happens when Russia attacks again?
It isn’t a strict logical contradiction, but it is a conceptual one: the text sells the settlement as final while building in detailed machinery for renewed conflict, signalling that neither side really believes the “comprehensive” part.
3. “Comprehensive non-aggression” and “ambiguities settled” vs detailed planning for the next war
•Point 2: A “comprehensive non-aggression agreement” is to be concluded between Russia, Ukraine and Europe, and “all ambiguities of the last 30 years will be considered settled.”
•Point 3: “It is expected that Russia will not invade neighbouring countries and NATO will not expand further.” (Note the weak wording: expected, not guaranteed.)
•Point 10 + side agreement: If Russia invades Ukraine again, there will be a “decisive coordinated military response” and all sanctions are reimposed; a side deal says any major Russian attack would be seen as threatening transatlantic security, but does not obligate direct intervention.
If non-aggression is “comprehensive” and past ambiguities are “settled”, why does the plan devote so much space to what happens when Russia attacks again?
It isn’t a strict logical contradiction, but it is a conceptual one: the text sells the settlement as final while building in detailed machinery for renewed conflict, signalling that neither side really believes the “comprehensive” part.
5/11
4. Russia’s “non-aggression” law vs rewarding the fruits of aggression
•Point 16: Russia will “enshrine in law its policy of non-aggression towards Europe and Ukraine.”
•Point 21: The same document asks Ukraine and the US to recognise Crimea, Luhansk and Donetsk as de facto Russian, and to accept de facto recognition of Russian control along the line of contact in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia.
•Points 13-14: Russia is reintegrated into the global economy, gets staged lifting of sanctions, an invitation back to the G8, and joint investment vehicles using unfrozen Russian assets.
So:
•Russia promises not to aggress in future, but the plan locks in and rewards the gains of past aggression with territory recognition and major economic benefits.
•“Non-aggression” is thus defined in a way that says, in effect: once you’ve successfully seized territory, you’re a non-aggressor as long as you stop there.
Again, not technically impossible, but it’s a glaring normative contradiction: aggression is condemned in principle and simultaneously legitimised in practice.
4. Russia’s “non-aggression” law vs rewarding the fruits of aggression
•Point 16: Russia will “enshrine in law its policy of non-aggression towards Europe and Ukraine.”
•Point 21: The same document asks Ukraine and the US to recognise Crimea, Luhansk and Donetsk as de facto Russian, and to accept de facto recognition of Russian control along the line of contact in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia.
•Points 13-14: Russia is reintegrated into the global economy, gets staged lifting of sanctions, an invitation back to the G8, and joint investment vehicles using unfrozen Russian assets.
So:
•Russia promises not to aggress in future, but the plan locks in and rewards the gains of past aggression with territory recognition and major economic benefits.
•“Non-aggression” is thus defined in a way that says, in effect: once you’ve successfully seized territory, you’re a non-aggressor as long as you stop there.
Again, not technically impossible, but it’s a glaring normative contradiction: aggression is condemned in principle and simultaneously legitimised in practice.
6/11
5. A “neutral demilitarised buffer zone” that is also Russian sovereign territory
•Point 21 (sub-clause): Ukrainian forces withdraw from the part of Donetsk they still hold; that area becomes a “neutral demilitarised buffer zone, internationally recognised as territory belonging to the Russian Federation. Russian forces will not enter this demilitarised zone.”
This is structurally self-contradictory:
•A neutral buffer zone usually implies space that is not fully controlled/occupied by either belligerent, or at least is not subordinated to one side’s sovereignty alone.
•Here, it is explicitly Russian territory - but Russian forces are barred from entering, and Ukraine has also withdrawn.
So you get a piece of Russian sovereign territory that neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces can occupy. That’s not impossible in international law, but it is conceptually muddled: if it’s truly neutral and demilitarised, tying it to Russian sovereignty is hard to reconcile with the idea of neutrality.
5. A “neutral demilitarised buffer zone” that is also Russian sovereign territory
•Point 21 (sub-clause): Ukrainian forces withdraw from the part of Donetsk they still hold; that area becomes a “neutral demilitarised buffer zone, internationally recognised as territory belonging to the Russian Federation. Russian forces will not enter this demilitarised zone.”
This is structurally self-contradictory:
•A neutral buffer zone usually implies space that is not fully controlled/occupied by either belligerent, or at least is not subordinated to one side’s sovereignty alone.
•Here, it is explicitly Russian territory - but Russian forces are barred from entering, and Ukraine has also withdrawn.
So you get a piece of Russian sovereign territory that neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces can occupy. That’s not impossible in international law, but it is conceptually muddled: if it’s truly neutral and demilitarised, tying it to Russian sovereignty is hard to reconcile with the idea of neutrality.
7/11
6. “Ambiguities settled” vs open-ended leverage and continuing bargaining
•Point 2: Claims that “all ambiguities of the last 30 years will be considered settled.”
•Points 13-14: Set up phased, case-by-case lifting of sanctions, a new US–Russia long-term economic agreement, and a separate US–Russian investment fund using remaining frozen Russian assets – explicitly “aimed at strengthening relations and increasing common interests.”
•Point 15: Creates a “joint American-Russian working group on security issues” to ensure compliance with the agreement.
If things are genuinely settled, you would expect clear, one-off terms:
•Instead, the sanctions, investment, and security architecture is designed as ongoing, discretionary processes where the US and Russia keep bargaining over implementation.
•That means the core issues remain subject to leverage and negotiation, i.e. ambiguous by design.
So point 2’s claim of closure clashes with a structure that deliberately keeps key levers (sanctions, funds, working groups) open.
6. “Ambiguities settled” vs open-ended leverage and continuing bargaining
•Point 2: Claims that “all ambiguities of the last 30 years will be considered settled.”
•Points 13-14: Set up phased, case-by-case lifting of sanctions, a new US–Russia long-term economic agreement, and a separate US–Russian investment fund using remaining frozen Russian assets – explicitly “aimed at strengthening relations and increasing common interests.”
•Point 15: Creates a “joint American-Russian working group on security issues” to ensure compliance with the agreement.
If things are genuinely settled, you would expect clear, one-off terms:
•Instead, the sanctions, investment, and security architecture is designed as ongoing, discretionary processes where the US and Russia keep bargaining over implementation.
•That means the core issues remain subject to leverage and negotiation, i.e. ambiguous by design.
So point 2’s claim of closure clashes with a structure that deliberately keeps key levers (sanctions, funds, working groups) open.
8/11
7. Full amnesty and “no claims” vs legally binding enforcement and sanctions
•Point 26: “All parties involved in this conflict will receive full amnesty for their actions during the war and agree not to make any claims or consider any complaints in the future.”
•Point 27: The agreement is “legally binding” and monitored by a Trump-headed Peace Council, which will impose sanctions for violations.
The clash:
•Amnesty + “no claims/complaints in the future” suggests no legal or political accountability for past or future conduct linked to the war.
•Yet point 27 explicitly foresees punitive measures (sanctions) for breaches of the agreement - which are, in practical terms, claims and complaints about behaviour.
You can interpret this as: amnesty only for past actions, sanctions only for future breaches. But the text of point 26 is much broader (“in the future”), so there is at least a textual contradiction between the promise of no further claims and the creation of an enforcement and punishment mechanism.
7. Full amnesty and “no claims” vs legally binding enforcement and sanctions
•Point 26: “All parties involved in this conflict will receive full amnesty for their actions during the war and agree not to make any claims or consider any complaints in the future.”
•Point 27: The agreement is “legally binding” and monitored by a Trump-headed Peace Council, which will impose sanctions for violations.
The clash:
•Amnesty + “no claims/complaints in the future” suggests no legal or political accountability for past or future conduct linked to the war.
•Yet point 27 explicitly foresees punitive measures (sanctions) for breaches of the agreement - which are, in practical terms, claims and complaints about behaviour.
You can interpret this as: amnesty only for past actions, sanctions only for future breaches. But the text of point 26 is much broader (“in the future”), so there is at least a textual contradiction between the promise of no further claims and the creation of an enforcement and punishment mechanism.
9/11
8. Tolerance and minority rights vs the territorial settlement that removes Ukrainian protections
•Point 20: Both sides commit to educational programmes promoting understanding and tolerance, abolish discriminatory measures, guarantee rights of Ukrainian and Russian media and education, and reject Nazi ideology. Ukraine will adopt EU rules on religious and linguistic minority protections.
•Point 21: At the same time, millions of Ukrainians in Crimea and Donbas are effectively transferred into the Russian legal space, plus parts of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia fall under de facto Russian control.
The plan’s rights language applies formally to both countries, but:
•Ukraine is required to align with EU standards on minority protection.
•Russia is not given comparably detailed obligations regarding Ukrainian-speaking or pro-Kyiv populations in the ceded areas; it only has to enshrine non-aggression and join vague educational programmes.
So there’s an internal mismatch: a strong rhetorical commitment to protecting minorities and media on both sides, paired with a territorial outcome that relocates vulnerable Ukrainians into a system the text does not subject to equivalent obligations.
8. Tolerance and minority rights vs the territorial settlement that removes Ukrainian protections
•Point 20: Both sides commit to educational programmes promoting understanding and tolerance, abolish discriminatory measures, guarantee rights of Ukrainian and Russian media and education, and reject Nazi ideology. Ukraine will adopt EU rules on religious and linguistic minority protections.
•Point 21: At the same time, millions of Ukrainians in Crimea and Donbas are effectively transferred into the Russian legal space, plus parts of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia fall under de facto Russian control.
The plan’s rights language applies formally to both countries, but:
•Ukraine is required to align with EU standards on minority protection.
•Russia is not given comparably detailed obligations regarding Ukrainian-speaking or pro-Kyiv populations in the ceded areas; it only has to enshrine non-aggression and join vague educational programmes.
So there’s an internal mismatch: a strong rhetorical commitment to protecting minorities and media on both sides, paired with a territorial outcome that relocates vulnerable Ukrainians into a system the text does not subject to equivalent obligations.
10/11
9. Elections in 100 days vs the scale of constitutional, territorial and security changes
•Point 25: “Ukraine will hold elections in 100 days.”
•Meanwhile Ukraine must:
•Amend its constitution to ban NATO membership (pt 7).
•Accept new borders and pull back from Donetsk region (pt 21).
•Reconfigure its armed forces and security architecture (pts 5–10, 15–17).
Free, competitive elections presuppose a settled constitutional and territorial framework. Here, the plan compresses:
•A constitutional rewrite
•A massive loss of territory
•A full restructuring of the security system
into essentially the same 100-day window as the elections. The text doesn’t say which must come first, creating a timing contradiction: you cannot both legislate foundational changes and run an orderly, legitimate election in a polity whose basic shape is being redrawn at the same time.
9. Elections in 100 days vs the scale of constitutional, territorial and security changes
•Point 25: “Ukraine will hold elections in 100 days.”
•Meanwhile Ukraine must:
•Amend its constitution to ban NATO membership (pt 7).
•Accept new borders and pull back from Donetsk region (pt 21).
•Reconfigure its armed forces and security architecture (pts 5–10, 15–17).
Free, competitive elections presuppose a settled constitutional and territorial framework. Here, the plan compresses:
•A constitutional rewrite
•A massive loss of territory
•A full restructuring of the security system
into essentially the same 100-day window as the elections. The text doesn’t say which must come first, creating a timing contradiction: you cannot both legislate foundational changes and run an orderly, legitimate election in a polity whose basic shape is being redrawn at the same time.
11/11
10. Deterrence vs rehabilitation: security threat or economic partner?
Finally, there’s a deep tension between how Russia is described and how it is treated:
•On one hand, the plan is built around the fear that Russia might attack again – hence the detailed US guarantees and sanctions snapback clause (pt 10).
•On the other, it rapidly reintegrates Russia into the global economy, invites it back to the G8, and creates lucrative joint ventures with the US using unfrozen assets (pts 13–14).
So Russia is framed simultaneously as:
•A continuing security threat that needs strong deterrence, and
•A trustworthy economic partner to be rewarded with major integration.
That dual role isn’t logically impossible, but it makes the deterrent threat less credible: if the West stands to profit heavily from partnership with Russia, its willingness to actually snap sanctions back on is put in doubt by the very economic architecture the agreement creates.
SUMMARY:
The plan attempts to present a decisive and stabilising settlement but is structurally inconsistent. Its core contradictions such as sovereignty vs concession, security vs constraints, non-aggression vs preparation for renewed conflict weaken its internal logic and raise questions about enforceability, legitimacy, and long-term stability.
END of the thread.
10. Deterrence vs rehabilitation: security threat or economic partner?
Finally, there’s a deep tension between how Russia is described and how it is treated:
•On one hand, the plan is built around the fear that Russia might attack again – hence the detailed US guarantees and sanctions snapback clause (pt 10).
•On the other, it rapidly reintegrates Russia into the global economy, invites it back to the G8, and creates lucrative joint ventures with the US using unfrozen assets (pts 13–14).
So Russia is framed simultaneously as:
•A continuing security threat that needs strong deterrence, and
•A trustworthy economic partner to be rewarded with major integration.
That dual role isn’t logically impossible, but it makes the deterrent threat less credible: if the West stands to profit heavily from partnership with Russia, its willingness to actually snap sanctions back on is put in doubt by the very economic architecture the agreement creates.
SUMMARY:
The plan attempts to present a decisive and stabilising settlement but is structurally inconsistent. Its core contradictions such as sovereignty vs concession, security vs constraints, non-aggression vs preparation for renewed conflict weaken its internal logic and raise questions about enforceability, legitimacy, and long-term stability.
END of the thread.
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