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Clément Molin

@clement_molin

May 29 • 24 tweets • 21 min read • Read on X

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Since the year started, Ukraine 🇺🇦 launched more than 1 000 mid-range drone strikes (only geolocated ones).

The intensification of strikes against russian 🇷🇺 logistics (150 vehicles, 30 trains, 400 warehouses) is a real game-changer in the war.

🧵THREAD🧵1/24 ⬇️

The ukrainian mid-range drone strike is quite recent. It started at the end of last year and quickly intensified in 2026.

Ukraine is using :
🔹Big fixed wings drones : FP-1/2
🔹Small fixed wings drones : Hornet/Bulava/RAM X...
🔹Short/Long range FPV.

Here 2 Hornet on a truck :

In total, I gathered more than 1 000 geolocations since january 2026 (sources provided at the end of the thread).

35% of the strikes hit depots and warehouses (we don't know what is inside most of the time). 20% hit vehicles and 7% hit air-defense.

These strikes are happening everyday. Keep in mind that what you see on the map only are geolocated videos.

On every published video, at least twice the number of strikes cannot be geolocated and much more are not published.

We currently have around 100 geolocated strikes per week, but again, remember we see only what Ukraine and Russia want to show us.

So now, let's go a little bit more deeper into the subject :

For months, Ukraine has been hitting multiple air-defense 🟡 systems as well as radars and EW🟠 systems across occupied territories.

All those strikes depleted Russian air-defense, and they havn't stopped in May.

Other strikes have been constantly hitting depots and warehouses 🔵 in multiple towns, with most of the time multiple strikes on a single area.

Those depots can hide air-defense, logistics, rear bases, ammunitions....

Many strikes also hit fuel and electricity targets⚪️

Those strikes have obviously some results, but we don't know too much about it since what is hit is hidden in depots.

Here, you can see a rear base hosting drone pilots which have been destroyed near Crimea.

And strikes like that are happening on a daily basis. Here is today's USF compilation of strikes with FP-2 drones on multiple targets (no yet on the map), including, at the end, many trucks.

Yesterday, multiple videos coming from the Melitopol-Crimea road appeared, showing large fire on trucks. Today, the GUR published some strikes on trucks, including air-defense truck and fuel truck.

We can see the aftermath of the event from above. The road wad effectively blocked.

To avoid the traffic jam, multiple trucks went on smaller roads of Kherson oblast, here near a canal on the Melitopol-Crimea road.

Cuting access to this road (brand new, very large allowing a lot of traffic) can significantly worsen russian forces situation in the south.

In fact, if we look the statistics, strikes against russian vehicles are constantly rising these last few month.

Few things to keep in mind :
🔹Not all are destroyed, but around half of the videos are showing the truck burning
🔹I counted around 133 trucks, 20 cars and 3 armoured vehicles

If we look to the map, we can see that multiple key roads are being hit, with more strikes hitting Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts these last few days :

x.com/99Dominik_/sta…
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Look at this map with the main supply roads targeted !

In total, I counted around 20 fuel trucks among those strikes. Is there any impact on the frontline ? Not yet, but Russian forces will eventually have shortage of supplies in multiple areas of the front.

What's next ?

This strike campaign is absolutely not isolated, it's growing, at the point multiple russian milbloggers have been alerting on the difficult situation.

This comes amid large difficulties for Russia this year.

In fact, for the very first time since 2023, Russia will lose territory in Ukraine this month, after the grey zone increased near Komar, in favour of Ukraine.

Ukraine mid-strike campaign is part of the reason for that, with russian offensive experiencing difficulties.

Russian milbloggers are not very happy with the situation, here are what one of them said (source : @moklasen)

What can Russia do ?

Not too much ! Putting an anti-drone net on all the main highways seems very difficult and costly.

Setting up air-defense post could work, but it would require much more troops, while Ukraine will strike those canon AD.

Ukrainian drones cannot be jammed and are too small to be seen on radar. The only solution for Russia is to scale drone based air-defense like Rubikon is doing. But for now, this has not been scaled and has nearly no effect.

The consequences for Russia are massive. The kill zone will expand to 20, 30 or even 50km, drones will target any convoy to the Azov Sea and any offensive preparation will be easily targeted.

The difficult situation on the frontline will not immediately change, but russian forces will experience supplies shortages more often.

If Ukraine was to launch counter-attacks on specific areas of the frontline throughout the summer, it will be able to cut any reinforcement, to target any russian movement and to avoid part of the drone threat (except fiber optic) thanks to good jamming.

Thus the logistical situation is becoming critical for Russia. If only a small proportion of trucks are currently being hit (probably 1 to 5% maximum on the most important roads), this is enough, if it continues, to create a difficult situation in the rear.

That's all what I could say on the current situation in russian occupied territories. I will continue to cover the situation.

If you want to support Ukraine, here is a good permanent fundraising : x.com/sternenko/stat…

To support me : buymeacoffee.com/clement.molin

Thanks !

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More from @clement_molin

Clément Molin

@clement_molin

Jun 18

Ukraine 🇺🇦 has now targeted around 500 russian 🇷🇺 trucks and vehicles during the last 48 days.

Mid-range strikes continue to expand across occupied territories, on roads, bridges and rear base. This continues to slow down russian offensive.

🧵THREAD🧵1/13 ⬇️

From tomorrow, I will be off for more than 1 week, which means there won't be any new map/airstrike/fortification/mid-range strikes update, apart from some small tweets.

I will however continue to follow the overall trends.

In total, I have 270 geolocated strikes on trucks and vehicles since january, most of those are from May to June.

The key Rostov-Crimea road remains the priority target, but roads in Donetsk, Luhansk and Kherson oblast have also been largely targeted.

Read 13 tweets

Clément Molin

@clement_molin

Jun 15

La guerre en Ukraine 🇺🇦/🇷🇺 a désormais dépassé la durée de la Première Guerre mondiale et pourrait encore durer plusieurs années.

Voici ce qu’il faut savoir en juin 2026 de ce conflit généralisé aux portes de l’Europe 🇪🇺 qui n'en finit plus.

🧵THREAD🧵1/10 ⬇️

Quel est l’objectif de guerre de la Russie, pays agresseur ?

Les objectifs de guerre de la Fédération de Russie ont beaucoup évolué depuis quatre ans. Outre les déclarations officielles, le principal objectif russe est resté territorial et politique. Moscou cherchait, le 24 février, à vassaliser l’Ukraine tout en annexant une large région, la « Novorossia », entre Kharkiv, le Donbass et Odessa. Cet objectif a largement évolué, notamment après l’échec des offensives sur Kyiv, Kharkiv et Odessa.

Aujourd’hui, l’objectif territorial principal reste l’occupation de toute la région du Donbass, en particulier sa capitale de facto, Kramatorsk. Il est très probable que l’armée russe dispose de deux objectifs territoriaux secondaires : l’occupation complète des deux autres oblasts annexés, Kherson (ce qui est quasi impossible à l’heure actuelle) et Zaporijjia, et l’harmonisation de la ligne de front sur la rivière Oskil dans l’oblast de Kharkiv.

L’objectif politique initial — redonner à la Russie sa puissance d’antan, l’ancrer dans l’Eurasie, retrouver les populations, les industries, les mines et l’accès à la mer des deux voisins slaves (l’Ukraine et la Biélorussie) — reste inchangé. Sans l’Ukraine, la Russie est condamnée à être une puissance secondaire et plus largement asiatique, sa dimension d’empire s’effaçant avec la montée en parallèle de la démographie non slave.

Les autres objectifs qui ont pu jouer un rôle auparavant sont caduques aujourd’hui : la démilitarisation de l’Ukraine semble impossible, quatre ans de guerre d’attrition n’ayant pas conduit à un effondrement ukrainien. La dénazification, étendard pour parler de l’effacement du nationalisme ukrainien, est également un échec. Les nationalistes ukrainiens sont plus forts et décomplexés que jamais, représentant près de 100 000 hommes dans l’armée ukrainienne. Les figures antirusses controversées d’Europe centrale et orientale ont par ailleurs été réhabilitées. Empêcher l’OTAN et l’UE de s’étendre à l’Est était aussi un mirage. Bien que la considération eût été réelle, la Suède et la Finlande ont rejoint l’Alliance, tandis que la Moldavie, le Caucase du Sud, les Balkans occidentaux et l’Ukraine ont accéléré leur rapprochement avec l’Europe, tous brandissant la menace russe.

L’objectif russe est donc désormais d’installer la confrontation dans la durée, jusqu’à un effondrement hypothétique de l’aide à l’Ukraine (qui semble compromise par la dernière aide de l’UE), l’essoufflement de la population ukrainienne (une considération bien réelle mais qui n’impactera probablement pas la situation au front) ou une victoire à la Pyrrhus, que ce soit la prise du Donbass suivie d’un cessez-le-feu ou une capitulation de l’Ukraine comme la Finlande en 1940.

Quel est l’objectif de l’Ukraine, pays agressé ?

L’objectif de Kyiv a lui aussi beaucoup évolué. L’armée ukrainienne a été surprise par l’ampleur de l’offensive du 24 février, qui lui a fait perdre des territoires stratégiques, comme le sud du pays. L’objectif initial de survivre en tant qu’État a été largement assuré par les victoires à Kyiv, Kharkiv et Mykolaïv en 2022. Le second objectif, retrouver les frontières d’avant-guerre, a échoué en 2023 après l’échec des offensives ukrainiennes. Depuis cette date, les Ukrainiens ont pour objectif de tenir dans la durée, jusqu’à un essoufflement ou un retrait hypothétique des Russes.

Kyiv refuse de se retirer des territoires sous son contrôle, mais a déjà accepté l’idée de concessions territoriales, de manière non officielle, sur la Crimée, le sud et l’est du pays. Pour Kyiv, il est hors de question de capituler et de céder des territoires sans combat à Moscou, d’autant que les garanties de bonne foi de la Russie ont historiquement montré qu’elles n’étaient pas tenues. Dès lors, l’Ukraine a développé ses propres moyens pour que chaque km2 de territoire conquis coûte plus cher à Moscou, tout en essayant de toucher au maximum l’économie russe. Une contre-offensive hypothétique reste possible, mais il est encore tôt pour savoir si les Ukrainiens ont les moyens de la réaliser.

Read 10 tweets

Clément Molin

@clement_molin

Jun 14

https://twitter.com/moklasen/status/2066093709360247128

For months, Ukraine 🇺🇦 has been conducting a series of deep infiltrations on the Velika Novosilka front.

Some of Russia’s 2025 gains have already been reversed, with the February counter-attack expanding to a 40-kilometer front.

🧵THREAD🧵1/12 ⬇️

https://twitter.com/moklasen/status/2066093709360247128

As a reminder, in February, the Ukrainian army conducted a discreet offensive for several weeks, clearing infiltrated areas, securing Pokrovsk'e and infiltrating areas that were previously under Russian control.

This counter-attack notably secured Ternuvat and prevented the use of Uspenivka to launch assaults on the Zaporizhzhia front.

This significantly slowed the Russian advance, reducing its length from 42 km to 25 km (west of Hulialpole).

Read 12 tweets

Clément Molin

@clement_molin

Jun 13

The Ukrainian 🇺🇦 blocus of Crimea is starting 🇷🇺

After they repeatedly hit bridges connecting Crimea and occupied Kherson oblast, the Ukrainians started implementing a blocus of the peninsula.

Last night, trucks and a pontoon bridge were hit.

🧵THREAD🧵1/15 ⬇️

Last night, the Code 9.2, Phalanx and the davinci units launched multiple strikes against targets in and around the key roads leading to Crimea.

As you can see on the map, only few bridges are connecting Crimea to mainland Ukraine. 6 of them have been reportedly hit including the main ones :

🔸Henichesk bridge
🔸Chonhar road bridge
🔸Chonhar rail bridge
🔸Armyansk bridge (on canal)
🔸Stavky and Myrne bridges (?) on canal

Read 15 tweets

Clément Molin

@clement_molin

Jun 11

https://x.com/clement_molin/status/2065091949833359402

Last night, multiple Ukrainian 🇺🇦 units hit the bridges leading to Crimea, further isolating the peninsula from the land bridge to Russia 🇷🇺

At the same time, strike campaign continues on multiple key roads, with over 375 vehicles and trucks hit since early May.

🧵THREAD🧵1/13 ⬇️

https://x.com/clement_molin/status/2065091949833359402

Crimea is connected with southern occupied Ukraine by multiple key bridges.

The one in Chonhar was hit few days ago by multiple drones, which forced the russians to put up a pontoon bridge for their road traffic.

At least 3 bridges have been recently hit. The one in Henichesk, the ones in Armyansk and in Stavky.

As we can see on the video, these strikes are putting holes in the middle of those key bridges. Any consolidation attempt will probably be hit.

Read 13 tweets

Clément Molin

@clement_molin

Jun 7

Ukraine 🇺🇦 continues its massive mid-range strike campaign against russian 🇷🇺 logistics.

Since early May, more than 290 russian trucks and vehicles have been hit. I have now mapped 210 strikes since january.

🧵THREAD🧵1/14 ⬇️

The strike campaign is guided by multiple units, using a large veriety of drones.

The backbone of it are the FP-1/2 strikes on key logistics hubs, mainly oil/fuel depots, trains, gas stations, electric substations and rear bases.

Those strikes are often guided with AI.

The latest video recently published showcased some strikes around Melitopol (few missed) with Hornet drones.

Interestlingly, everything is not blurred, which helps understanding how they are using those drones.