There’s a real question mark over what nuclear commitments Iran has made in an MoU. There’s a suggestion from a senior U.S. official that they made commitments on stockpile, decommissioning sites, stopping nuclear program. But a closer look suggests some of that is deceptive. -1-
So let’s dissect what’s going on here. A US official was asked if Iran had committed to a specific timeline for dismantling its program. Here’s the answer… -2-
“Yeah, so I think there are two elements to the question. One is they are committing indefinitely to never procure or develop nuclear weapons, that is a significant concession, something the president cared a great deal about.” Ok stop there. Iran has always said that. But it -3-
was clear the White House wanted that commitment again upfront of an MoU deal. Official continues… “And then, of course, there's a separate issue about how do you enforce that, how do you ensure that that, that, that doesn't happen, you know, we're not happy with a well…”-4-
“…say we're happy with the commitment to not build a nuclear weapon, but we have to verify that, and that's why the deal is structured in the way that it is, is to ensure that there's a verification and inspections regime, and that they don't receive the benefit of the..” -5-
“of the negotiation until we see that they're actually taking the affirmative steps in order to dismantle that nuclear program.”
Ok let’s stop there again. The issue is not really verification of the Iranian no nukes pledge. Verification would be about checking what work -6-
Iran is or isn’t doing on the ground. If you pledge to decommission sites or dismantle program, it’s pretty easy to figure whether that’s being done or isn’t with some inspectors on the ground. The official continues… -7-
🔥🔥And this to me is the key line. “So, yes, they are committing indefinitely to not build or procure a nuclear weapon, and then you know we're going to have to figure out exactly how we enforce that, and if we feel comfortable with how that we, if we feel comfortable with…”-8-
“the inspection and enforcement regime, that is when they will get some of the benefits of negotiation.”
So how to read all this in terms of what Iran has actually committed to?…-9-
My read is that Iran has clearly committed to not develop or procure nukes. Fine. Also that it made a more specific commitment to destroying the HEU stockpile though no clarity of the rest of stockpile will also be destroyed. Or when it will happen. -10-
It seems likely to me that the extent of Iran’s nuclear commitments in MoU stop there. There may be a set of “milestones” as the official put it for which Iran would get additional sanctions relief if Iran does them. So eg, dismantle sites and Iran gets x sanctions relief. -11-
But I’m skeptical of any account that says Iran has committed to dismantling its sites and its program in the MoU. That was a phrase used at one point by the official so some people might take that on face value. But I think it’s most likely that Iran has committed no nukes… -12
and that any steps it takes along the path of suspending or stopping its program are to be negotiated and would be future steps to win broader sanctions relief.
I’m open to being corrected if I’m wrong. -13-
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So just as there was a misunderstanding before Tuesday that negotiators had, somehow, to draw up a resolution to US-Iran differences, instead of come up with something which would get the two sides sitting down for talks, there's a new misunderstanding now. There is simply no -1-
way that Iran and the U.S. are going to resolve the issues around Hormuz, nuclear, missiles etc in the next 2 weeks. It's not going to happen. Impossible.
But it doesn't need to happen.
What needs to happen is enough to trigger the mutually agreed extension of talks-2-
That may not prove possible. In which case, we may be back in the war. Certainly both sides are threatening that. But words are cheap. War is not.
So something that provides a temporary mechanism for Hormuz, which probably gives Iran considerable continued control for now, but-3-
There were a lot of claims made last night by US officials including apparent intel that Iran considered attacking US first which deserve scrutiny.
But on nuclear negotiations, there's every reason to believe that Tehran completely misread situation. -1- wsj.com/world/middle-e…
The full story of exactly what Iran asked for in Geneva has I think not been told. My understanding comes from non-U.S. officials close to the talks as well as what Washington has said.
This is what we have from 3 people. -2-
It's important to understand that in many ways the last few weeks of US-Iran talks was something of a side shadow. The real negotiations were between Iran's regional partners and the @iaeaorg trying to get Tehran into the U.S. ballpark for avoiding war, keeping diplomacy on. -3-
Thread #Irantalks: The 2013 vibes around #Irantalks are very strong right now. We have Iran, which insists its right to enrich uranium is a legal certainty, nonetheless extremely extremely keen/determined to get the Trump administration to recognise it. -1-
Hence all this talk in public from Araghchi and others about not taking one step back, warning that to do so, would be to signal retreat across the board. Pre-2013, Iran similarly refused compromise until its enrichment rights were recognised by U.S. -2-
That essentially happened during the secret talks in Oman in 2013. It was clear enough by the second formal track spring meeting in Almaty that something major had changed. It turned out that was essentially an understanding that Iran's enrichment right was recognised. -3-
Iran reports @iaeaorg "The quantity of HEU produced & accumulated by Iran, the only NPT non-nuclear-weapon State to have done so, which remains in Iran without the Agency being able to verify it...is a matter of serious concern and a matter..." -1-
"of compliance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement." Report says @rafaelmgrossi "has made clear to Iran that it is indispensable and urgent to implement
safeguards activities in Iran in accordance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement, which remains in force,
and that..." -2-
@rafaelmgrossi "its implementation cannot be suspended under any circumstances." -3-
So @araghchi is saying he made a serious offer yesterday to E3. The E3 is saying it was unsatisfactory as tweeted earlier. So what was the offer? I now have a picture from a few sources. -1-
- Iran would pledge to meet with Witkoff/US. Not clear if that would be direct/indirect. For that, US must give guarantee of no attacks.
In exchange for Iran pledge to meet, E3 would have to pledge to extend snapback. -2-
- Those talks would focus on the issue of the 60% stockpile. Iran would retrieve all the 60% it could. Once retrieved, the UNSC would kill Resolution 2231 supporting the JCPOA. Which means killing off E3 snapback option. -3-
Assuming snapback happens tomorrow, there's a lot of confusion over what happens next under the 30 day period. It's best explained to say that we effectively enter a new phase of negotiation at least for the first 10 days...
Under the mechanism that i think is being used for the first time, the presidency of the UNSC has to put forward a resolution after 10 days which offers to cancel snapback. That can be vetoed in the normal way by Britain, France or the US (or Russia and China.) And then we'd -2-
get snapback after 30 days with the old sanctions and resolutions taking effect. There will be intense negotiation, diplos say, over the form of that resolution. Among the questions are will 2231 be extended and for how long and will snapback clearly be allowed at a later date-3-