2. First, humility: Despite vast polling/big data Trump's election was unanticipated. Anticipating what will happen in a country largely inaccessible to truly independent investigation/polling is doubly difficult. Anyone who claims they did/can predict things is mistaken
3. We can salute the courage of non-violent protesters and sympathize with their frustrations but still be sober about their prospects. Citizen protesters, as far as we can tell, remain unarmed, unorganized, and leaderless
4. The Iranian regime’s vast coercive apparatus, as far as we can tell, remains cohesive, committed, and very well-practiced in repression. They've been doing this a long time, including in Syria
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5. In contrast to the Shah's political and military elite-many of whom were educated abroad or had foreign passports-the Islamic Republic's political/military elite don't have an Option B abroad. Option A, therefore, is to stay in power by all means necessary
6. The Islamic Republic may be able to rely, if necessary, on the Shia militias they’ve been training for years (in Syria/Iraq) and in some cases decades (Hezbollah). Fighting unarmed Iranian civilians will be easier for them than fighting Syrian rebels/Sunni jihadists
7. While I agree the #1 frustration of most protesters/Iranians is economic, accusing your political representatives of plunder and mismanagement is inherently political. Protest slogans reflect this:
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8. It is often male analysts insensitive to the indignities of women living in Iran who claim that protests are solely driven by economic frustration. Follow the great @AlinejadMasih to learn more
9. Human beings everywhere find corruption, repression, and injustice even more insulting when it's conducted from a moral pedestal. Transparency international ranks Iran--an Islamist theocracy--131/176 countries on the corruption index transparency.org/country/IRN
10. Another stat: During Iran’s 2009 protests less than 1m people had smart phones, few outside Tehran. Today 48 MILLION people have them. State-controlled media is less potent when people have independent news sources-and video cameras-in their pocket techrasa.com/2017/07/19/48-…
11. Another notable stat: A 2017 Gallup “Global Emotions” ranked Iran #3 in the world in “Highest Negative Experiences” (i.e. daily frustration/anger) after Iraq and South Sudan, of 142 countries surveyed: news.gallup.com/reports/212648…
12. I still find it remarkable these protests began in deeply religious/traditional cities like Mashhad and Qom, long considered to be government strongholds. It is akin to national anti-Trump protests beginning in Kentucky
13. Many folks in the West are obsessed with comparing Iran to Saudi Arabia. Most Iranians resent this comparison. You’ll never meet an Iranian who says, “I’m content w/ my life b/c we have more freedoms than Saudi.” Increasingly the latter is not even true anymore.
14. There are several folks offering commentary in the Western media who were/are employed by official Iranian government political/media organs. They should be transparent about this, just as former US officials are transparent about their work experience
15. This video reflects a common sentiment one hears among younger Iranians toward their parent’s generation, who brought down an authoritarian monarchy only to usher in an even more authoritarian (politically, economically, and socially) theocracy
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16. Laura Secor’s book ‘Children of Paradise’ covers Iran's generational divides well. It's terrific book on Iran's contemporary history amazon.com/dp/B00XIYG5YK/…
17. Regimes totally untethered from the West-like Iran-can commit far greater brutality against their own population. Hosni Mubarak couldn’t mass murder/gas/displace civilians like Bashar Assad, who needn't worry that Tehran/Moscow will stop providing him military/financial aid
18. Things US should do: 1)Carefully crafted statements of solidarity 2) Censuring those who provide Tehran the means/technology to repress/black out communication. 3)Mobilize allies who have good ties to Iran—EU, Japan, India, S Korea, etc-to deter massive crackdown/black out
19. On Friday January 5 we (@CarnegieEndow@CDA) will be talking more about these issues and launching an extensive report on Iran's Cyber capabilities/activities/repression, based on over a year of primary research carnegieendowment.org/2018/01/05/ira…
20. Things US should not do: 1) Encourage/incite protestors. George HW Bush encouraged Iraqis to rise up against Saddam in 1991, when they did so Saddam crushed them and Bush was blamed. 2) Unscripted presidential tweets that divert attention from Iran’s repression
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1/10 The US bombing of Iran's nuclear facilities is an unprecedented event that may prove to be transformational for Iran, the Middle East, US foreign policy, global non-proliferation, and potentially even the global order. Its impact will be measured for decades to come. 🧵
2 Trump indicated this is now the time for peace. It’s unclear and unlikely the Iranians will see it the same way. This is more likely to open a new chapter of the 46-year-old US-Iran war than conclude it.
3 Many of Iran's retaliatory options are the strategic equivalent of a suicide bombing. They can strike US embassies and bases, attack oil facilities in the Persian Gulf, mine the Strait of Hormuz, or rain missiles on Israel—but the regime may not survive the blowback.
1 We known from history the full impact of Israel’s attack on Iran will take years to unfold. It could prevent an Iranian bomb or ensure one. It could destabilize the regime or entrench it. For now, Iran’s capacity to respond is far weaker than a year ago. Initial thoughts🧵
2 Over the last year Israeli military action had already significantly diminished Iran's 'Axis of Resistance' in the Middle East. Hamas and Hezbollah are shattered, Assad’s regime is finished, and Iraqi Shia militias are subdued. Tehran is now overly reliant on Yemen's Houthis.
3 If Iran attacks Saudi oil facilities or tries to block oil flow in the Strait of Hormuz, it risks direct US retaliation, given Riyadh’s strong ties with Trump. Gulf states publicly condemned the attack, but many quietly welcome seeing Iran weakened.
1🧵 My new @ForeignAffairs essay on the ideological clash in the Middle East whose outcome could prove most consequential for the region and the world order, the battle between Saudi Arabia's "Vision 2030" and the Islamic Republic of Iran's "Vision 1979". foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/ne…
2 Vision 2030 appeals to popular aspirations; Vision 1979 exploits popular grievances. Vision 2030 seeks partnership with the U.S. and Israel; Vision 1979 thrives on resisting both. Vision 2030 is driven by social liberalization; Vision 1979 is anchored in social repression.
3 The two visions reflect the distinct personalities of their leaders: 85-year-old Ayatollah Khamenei and 39-year-old Crown Prince MBS, two of the region’s most powerful figures, whose mutual animosity is clear. MBS champions modernity, while Khamenei lionizes martyrdom.
1🧵Brief intro to our new essay with @nicolegrajewski on the Russia-Iran partnership and its centrality to numerous global challenges, including nuclear proliferation, cybersecurity, authoritarianism, disinformation, illicit finance, and energy security. carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/…
2 Russia and Iran are historical geopolitical rivals with competing national interests and centuries of mutual mistrust. Yet, throughout history, they've occasionally united against common adversaries, including the Ottoman Empire, the British Empire, and now the United States.
3 Perceived U.S. efforts to encircle them militarily, and subvert them internally, are one basis for their partnership. Their cooperation in deadly wars in Syria and Ukraine have further deepened their military, economic, and diplomatic ties. nytimes.com/2022/10/17/wor…
1🧵 Iran and Israel are unnatural enemies. They have complimentary national interests (energy/technology), a historic cultural affinity (Persians/Jews), and no bilateral land or resource disputes. Their conflict is best understood through the prism of ideology, not geopolitics.
2 The origins of the Iran-Israel conflict can be traced to Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the 1979 revolution that transformed Iran from a US-allied monarchy into an Islamist theocracy. Khomeini's myriad writings reflect his contempt for Israel and his open antisemitism.
3 Ayatollah Khamenei, Khomeini's successor, shares this worldview. He's frequently said Iran “will support and assist any nation or any group anywhere who opposes and fights the Zionist regime." He was the lone world leader to praise Hamas on October 7.
🧵1) Israel's killing of Hassan Nasrallah is hugely consequential for the Middle East. Hezbollah is the crown jewel of the Islamic Republic of Iran-the one effective enterprise Iran’s revolutionaries have built since 1979-and Nasrallah has been crucial to Iran’s power expansion.
2 Arab Hezbollah has been Persian Iran’s bridge to the five failing Arab states-Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and Gaza-that Tehran has been dominating. Iran provides the resources, but it was often Hezbollah, under Nasrallah’s leadership, that set up and trained these proxies.
3 Hezbollah had already experienced more leadership deaths in the last four months than over the last four decades. In a recent piece, @firasmaksad evoked Lenin: “There are decades when nothing happens, and there are weeks when decades happen.” time.com/7023965/lebano…