Thread: if you're arguing whether the Kremlin operation's main goal was electing Trump or dividing Americans, you're missing the point. The most important thing is stopping a repeat. @DFRLabmedium.com/dfrlab/electio…
All the way through, the operation attacked Clinton, with posts like these. How was that not helping Trump? (h/t @ushadrons for their repository of troll posts at medium.com/@ushadrons)
Mueller's indictment says the troll operators were ordered to support Trump from at least February 2016. They did it with posts like these.
But we also know that the day after the election, the operation posted this. Dividing Americans was always a goal, especially once the vote was over.
We know from the Mueller indictment that the operation was ordered to find sensitive issues and inflame them.
As early as May 2016, the troll factory triggered a face-off in Houston by organizing simultaneous pro- and anti-Islam rallies.
The trolls took both sides on issues like #TakeAKnee, #NoDAPL and LGBT rights.
Not all troll account were equally effective. The one which targeted native Americans, for example, didn't seem to get significant traction.
Other target communities, especially the alt-right, were fooled hook, line and sinker. Even Trump campaign members amplified troll posts.
Troll accounts which posed as BLM activists fooled many, too. Even @jack retweeted the Crystal Johnson account.
In all this, the most embittered and rancorous communities were also the most easily duped. The troll operation's biggest asset was America's hyper-partisan divide.
There's no point arguing over the "main goal" of the last influence operation. The important thing to prevent the next one, wherever it comes from.
That requires leadership on both sides with enough political courage to abandon the rhetoric of division, and accept that the greatest threats to America come from outside the country. / Thread ends
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🚨BREAKING🚨 @Meta took down two covert influence ops:
Big one from Russia🇷🇺 targeting Europe with spoofed media websites like the Guardian and Spiegel
First one from China 🇨🇳 to focus on both sides of domestic US 🇺🇸 politics and Czech-China relations. about.fb.com/news/2022/09/r…
@Meta The operations were very different, but both worked on multiple social media platforms and petitions sites.
The Russian op was even on LiveJournal (cute).
List of domains, petitions etc in the report. #OSINT community, happy hunting!
@Meta China: this was the first Chinese network we’ve disrupted that focused on US domestic politics ahead of the midterms and Czech foreign policy toward China and Ukraine.
It was small, we took it down before it built an audience, but that’s a new direction for Chinese IO.
🚨JUST OUT🚨
Quarterly threat report from @Meta’s investigative teams.
Takedowns from around the world:
Cyber espionage in South Asia;
Harassment in India;
Violating networks in Greece, South Africa, India;
Influence ops from Malaysia & Israel
AND... about.fb.com/news/2022/08/m…
A deep dive into a Russian troll farm, linked to people with ties to what’s known as the Internet Research Agency.
It used fake accounts across the internet to make it look like there’s support for Russia’s war in Ukraine - and to pretend the troll farm's doing a good job.
The operation called itself “Cyber Front Z”.
We think of it as the Z Team, because it was about as far from being the A Team as you can get.
🚨JUST OUT🚨
Quarterly threat report from @Meta’s investigative teams.
Much to dig into:
State & non-state actors targeting Ukraine;
Cyber espionage from Iran and Azerbaijan;
Influence ops in Brazil and Costa Rica;
Spammy activity in the Philippines... about.fb.com/news/2022/04/m…
🚨 TAKEDOWN 🚨
This weekend, we took down a relatively small influence operation that had targeted Ukraine across multiple social media platforms and websites. It was run by people in Russia and Ukraine: about.fb.com/news/2022/02/s…
It consisted of approx 40 accounts, Groups and Pages on FB and IG, plus on Twitter, YouTube, VK, OK, Telegram.
It mainly posted links to long-form articles on its websites, without much luck making them engaging. It got very few reactions, and under 4k followers.
It ran a few fake personas posing as authors. They had fake profile pics (likely GAN), and unusually detailed public bios - e.g. former civil aviation engineer, hydrography expert.
The op posted their articles on its websites and social media, & amplified them using more fakes.
Personal 🧵 based on years of OSINT research into influence operations since 2014.
Looking at the Russian official messaging on “de-nazification” and “genocide”, it’s worth putting them in context of the many different Russian IO that targeted Ukraine over the years.
* Iran, targeting the UK, focusing on Scottish independence;
* Mexico, a PR firm targeting audiences across LATAM;
* Turkey, targeting Libya, and linked to the Libyan Justice and Construction Party (affiliated w/Muslim Brotherhood).
It’s not the first time for an Iranian op to pose as supporters of Scottish independence.
In the past, FB found a page that copied and posted political cartoons about independence as far back as 2013. @Graphika_NYC writeup here (pages 26-27) graphika.com/reports/irans-…