There are some old friends in the mix. Remember @SouthLoneStar? There was a Reddit equivalent, but it only posted once, trying to engage Milo Yiannopoulos via r/the_donald.
There was a @TEN_GOP account, too, but it was only set up and used in July 2017, when the Twitter TEN_GOP account was temporarily suspended, then revived.
There was also a @Jenn_Abrams account, but it was only set up in December 2017, after the Twitter equivalent was shut down, and it only posted once.
#Trollfarm handle LGBT United was on Reddit, too. It was only used once, but it's an important comment, marking the moment when this account pretended to flip from Sanders to Trump, after the Orlando shooting.
Apparent goal: draw Sanders supporters away from Clinton.
Troll Twitter account @DorothieBell, one of the less-known handles, was also active on Reddit. Mostly cat videos and jokes, but also some negative content and comments about @HillaryClinton.
Another less well-known troll, @hyddrox, was a lot more active on Reddit, sharing a mixture of Russia, race relations and politics.
The same account was anti-Islam and anti-migrant, as its comments show. This looks like an attempt to build its alt-right / far-right credentials, as the #trollfarm did on other platforms.
The most effective accounts had no direct parallel on Twitter. The most effective of all, u/rubinjer, was pro-Trump and anti-Clinton, and specialised in memes, especially posted to r/the_donald and r/HillaryForPrison.
Again, an attempt to infiltrate the alt-right.
u/rubinjer survived well past the election, making its last post in May 2017.
The second most effective account, u/shomyo, focused more on conspiracy theories and attacks on US domestic and foreign politics.
u/shomyo shared lots of defences of Russia, including accusations of "Russiamania" and hysteria.
It also shared Kremlin propaganda outlets RT and Sputnik, especially on key narratives such as the siege of Aleppo.
And the "Soros" label, of course.
Another of the most effective troll Reddit accounts was u/WhatImDoindHere, which was anti-Black Lives Matter.
Compare that with another of the most effective ones, u/Kevin_Milner, which was pro-BLM and shared lots of posts on police brutality.
We've seen this time and again in the Russian operation: pushing both sides of divisive issues, to amplify division.
Even on the election, the picture wasn't wholly clearcut. Most posts which dealt with it were anti-Clinton and/or pro-Trump, but some early posts, in 2015, were anti-Trump.
Unclear whether this was to attract other users, or reflects the campaign's evolution.
This matches what we've seen on other platforms. The Russian operation had multiple goals: attack Clinton, attack the idea of US democracy, support Trump, sow division. It looks like the Reddit component's main goal was division and polarisation. / Thread ends.
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🚨BREAKING🚨 @Meta took down two covert influence ops:
Big one from Russia🇷🇺 targeting Europe with spoofed media websites like the Guardian and Spiegel
First one from China 🇨🇳 to focus on both sides of domestic US 🇺🇸 politics and Czech-China relations. about.fb.com/news/2022/09/r…
@Meta The operations were very different, but both worked on multiple social media platforms and petitions sites.
The Russian op was even on LiveJournal (cute).
List of domains, petitions etc in the report. #OSINT community, happy hunting!
@Meta China: this was the first Chinese network we’ve disrupted that focused on US domestic politics ahead of the midterms and Czech foreign policy toward China and Ukraine.
It was small, we took it down before it built an audience, but that’s a new direction for Chinese IO.
🚨JUST OUT🚨
Quarterly threat report from @Meta’s investigative teams.
Takedowns from around the world:
Cyber espionage in South Asia;
Harassment in India;
Violating networks in Greece, South Africa, India;
Influence ops from Malaysia & Israel
AND... about.fb.com/news/2022/08/m…
A deep dive into a Russian troll farm, linked to people with ties to what’s known as the Internet Research Agency.
It used fake accounts across the internet to make it look like there’s support for Russia’s war in Ukraine - and to pretend the troll farm's doing a good job.
The operation called itself “Cyber Front Z”.
We think of it as the Z Team, because it was about as far from being the A Team as you can get.
🚨JUST OUT🚨
Quarterly threat report from @Meta’s investigative teams.
Much to dig into:
State & non-state actors targeting Ukraine;
Cyber espionage from Iran and Azerbaijan;
Influence ops in Brazil and Costa Rica;
Spammy activity in the Philippines... about.fb.com/news/2022/04/m…
🚨 TAKEDOWN 🚨
This weekend, we took down a relatively small influence operation that had targeted Ukraine across multiple social media platforms and websites. It was run by people in Russia and Ukraine: about.fb.com/news/2022/02/s…
It consisted of approx 40 accounts, Groups and Pages on FB and IG, plus on Twitter, YouTube, VK, OK, Telegram.
It mainly posted links to long-form articles on its websites, without much luck making them engaging. It got very few reactions, and under 4k followers.
It ran a few fake personas posing as authors. They had fake profile pics (likely GAN), and unusually detailed public bios - e.g. former civil aviation engineer, hydrography expert.
The op posted their articles on its websites and social media, & amplified them using more fakes.
Personal 🧵 based on years of OSINT research into influence operations since 2014.
Looking at the Russian official messaging on “de-nazification” and “genocide”, it’s worth putting them in context of the many different Russian IO that targeted Ukraine over the years.
* Iran, targeting the UK, focusing on Scottish independence;
* Mexico, a PR firm targeting audiences across LATAM;
* Turkey, targeting Libya, and linked to the Libyan Justice and Construction Party (affiliated w/Muslim Brotherhood).
It’s not the first time for an Iranian op to pose as supporters of Scottish independence.
In the past, FB found a page that copied and posted political cartoons about independence as far back as 2013. @Graphika_NYC writeup here (pages 26-27) graphika.com/reports/irans-…