The basic claim from the US, France and UK was that they targeted three sites, one at Barzah in greater Damascus, two at Him Shinsar, west of Homs.
They said all were directly related to the chemical weapons programme.
(Map by US DoD)
The @DeptofDefense briefing showed before-and-after imagery of the sites it named. Thanks to stars like @JakeGodin and @vpkivikami, they've been geolocated and checked against satellite imagery.
This is the Barzah site, 33.558419, 36.316080.
This is the first Him Shinsar site, 34.681473, 36.466262.
This is the second Him Shinshar site, 34.695222, 36.537528.
The strike countries broadly agree on the weapons and platforms used:
US TLAMs
US JASSMs
UK Storm Shadows
French SCALPs
USS Monterey
USS Laboon
USS Higgins
USS John Warner
FS Languedoc
US B-1B Lancers
RAF Tornadoes
French Rafale and Mistral
There's a discrepancy in how they describe the Him Shinshar sites. The US called them storage facilities; the French Minister of Defence called them "important production sites."
The Russian MoD's briefing broadly agreed on the number of weapons used and most of the platforms. The big difference was in the targets it listed, and the success of the Syrian air defences it claimed.
The three sites listed by the US have been verified against satellite imagery. The next question is whether there's confirmed evidence showing strikes, or attempted strikes, on the airfields. / Thread ends
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🚨BREAKING🚨 @Meta took down two covert influence ops:
Big one from Russia🇷🇺 targeting Europe with spoofed media websites like the Guardian and Spiegel
First one from China 🇨🇳 to focus on both sides of domestic US 🇺🇸 politics and Czech-China relations. about.fb.com/news/2022/09/r…
@Meta The operations were very different, but both worked on multiple social media platforms and petitions sites.
The Russian op was even on LiveJournal (cute).
List of domains, petitions etc in the report. #OSINT community, happy hunting!
@Meta China: this was the first Chinese network we’ve disrupted that focused on US domestic politics ahead of the midterms and Czech foreign policy toward China and Ukraine.
It was small, we took it down before it built an audience, but that’s a new direction for Chinese IO.
🚨JUST OUT🚨
Quarterly threat report from @Meta’s investigative teams.
Takedowns from around the world:
Cyber espionage in South Asia;
Harassment in India;
Violating networks in Greece, South Africa, India;
Influence ops from Malaysia & Israel
AND... about.fb.com/news/2022/08/m…
A deep dive into a Russian troll farm, linked to people with ties to what’s known as the Internet Research Agency.
It used fake accounts across the internet to make it look like there’s support for Russia’s war in Ukraine - and to pretend the troll farm's doing a good job.
The operation called itself “Cyber Front Z”.
We think of it as the Z Team, because it was about as far from being the A Team as you can get.
🚨JUST OUT🚨
Quarterly threat report from @Meta’s investigative teams.
Much to dig into:
State & non-state actors targeting Ukraine;
Cyber espionage from Iran and Azerbaijan;
Influence ops in Brazil and Costa Rica;
Spammy activity in the Philippines... about.fb.com/news/2022/04/m…
🚨 TAKEDOWN 🚨
This weekend, we took down a relatively small influence operation that had targeted Ukraine across multiple social media platforms and websites. It was run by people in Russia and Ukraine: about.fb.com/news/2022/02/s…
It consisted of approx 40 accounts, Groups and Pages on FB and IG, plus on Twitter, YouTube, VK, OK, Telegram.
It mainly posted links to long-form articles on its websites, without much luck making them engaging. It got very few reactions, and under 4k followers.
It ran a few fake personas posing as authors. They had fake profile pics (likely GAN), and unusually detailed public bios - e.g. former civil aviation engineer, hydrography expert.
The op posted their articles on its websites and social media, & amplified them using more fakes.
Personal 🧵 based on years of OSINT research into influence operations since 2014.
Looking at the Russian official messaging on “de-nazification” and “genocide”, it’s worth putting them in context of the many different Russian IO that targeted Ukraine over the years.
* Iran, targeting the UK, focusing on Scottish independence;
* Mexico, a PR firm targeting audiences across LATAM;
* Turkey, targeting Libya, and linked to the Libyan Justice and Construction Party (affiliated w/Muslim Brotherhood).
It’s not the first time for an Iranian op to pose as supporters of Scottish independence.
In the past, FB found a page that copied and posted political cartoons about independence as far back as 2013. @Graphika_NYC writeup here (pages 26-27) graphika.com/reports/irans-…